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Articles

Educating Executives: Social Science, Self-Study, or Socrates?

- One University's Role in Executive Development *Sidney Mailick* 275
- Liberal Education for Public Service? *Charles A. Nelson* 278
- Understanding Self and Organization *Nathan D. Grundstein* 285
- Training Middle Management in the Field *Harry W. Reynolds, Jr.* 291
- Brookings' Executive Conference Program
 *William T. McDonald and Carl F. Stover* 296
- Benefits from Management Training *Robert J. Mowitz* 300
- The President and Administration—Eisenhower *Edward H. Hobbs* 306
- Science Democratized: Advisory Committees on Research *Lewis C. Mainzer* 314
- The Opposition to the Senior Civil Service *William Pincus* 324

Reviews

- Great Cities, Great Problems, Great Possibilities? *Coleman Woodbury* 332
Great Cities of the World; Their Government, Politics and Planning, by William A. Robson; *Governmental Problems in the Chicago Metropolitan Area*, by Leverett S. Lyon; *Cities in Flood; The Problems of Urban Growth*, by Peter Self; *Urban Land Use Planning*, by F. Stuart Chapin, Jr.; *Metropolitan Communities: A Bibliography*, prepared by Government Affairs Foundation, Inc.
- Informing Government with Economics *Jesse Burkhead* 340
Federal Expenditure Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, papers submitted to and hearings before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, Joint Economic Committee, U. S. Congress
- The Perils of Popularity *Robert C. Wood* 349
The Office of Governor in the United States, by Coleman B. Ransone, Jr.
- A Dashing Administrator *Charles S. Ascher* 351
The Life and Times of Baron Haussmann: Paris in the Second Empire, by J. M. and Brian Chapman

Features

- Developments in Public Administration *William B. Shore* 353
- Comment and Critique *Letters to the Editor* 369
- Editorial Comment: Specialist and Generalist *James W. Fesler* 370
- Society Perspectives: Interchange, Transfers, and ASPA *Henry Reining, Jr.* 371

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in this number

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Educating Executives: Social Science, Self-Study, or Socrates?

► The spurt of educational programs for executives noted by Marshall Dimock in the Spring *Review* bespeaks not only the growing emphasis on in-service training and adult education of all types but also the relatively recent spread in the recognition that management is far different from expertness in a specialty and much more than a common-sense art. Attention to executive development has been associated with a rethinking of the role and skills of the successful executive and with growing emphasis on leadership as the proper stance for the administrator within

the organization and his appropriate role in public policy development and community affairs.

Here are described and analyzed five somewhat different educational programs for executives and potential executives, along with a survey of the reactions of participants to one of them. The programs differ in content—though the reader may well consider whether the difference is substantial. They differ too in important details relating to the learning process, e.g., length of the course, whether it takes the participant completely away from his desk, whether persons of differing or similar background are brought together.

One University's Role in Executive Development

By SIDNEY MAILICK

New York University

IN recent years, following the footsteps of industry, government has become much occupied with executive development. A federal official recently referred to it as "*the current fad*"—with the implication that it is destined to lose momentum. At any rate, it is currently of great interest. Public administration and personnel groups feature panels on executive development, and universities have become increasingly aware that there is a role for them in the great awakening.

With such a swift spread of interest in the subject, it is not surprising that not all are using words about executive development in the same way. Some, using the term executive development, refer only to preparation of administrators at lower echelons for higher responsibilities, while others include programs designed to aid executives in realizing their potentialities more fully in their present positions. Some think only of formal training courses as executive development while others encompass the total process by which the executive aids himself and is aided by the organization to better perform in present and pos-

sible future positions, including a host of on-the-job as well as off-the-job activities and both appraisal and development techniques.

There is wide agreement, however, that there may be several partners to the cooperative process of improving executive performance—the agency, the government unit or regional cluster of agencies, the professional society, the university, and the management consultant firm. The difficulty usually comes with the attempt to define the role of each. Let us describe one university program—that of the University of Chicago—to see a possible relationship of a university program to the over-all effort.

Early in 1954, the Chicago Federal Personnel Council investigated the establishment of an executive development program for federal officials in the Chicago region. The Council's Management Development Subcommittee contacted several universities in the Chicago area and, after correspondence, discussion, and negotiation the proposal of the University of Chicago was approved, with the program to be administered by University

College—the branch responsible for adult education programs generally.

Of great aid in the planning by the subcommittee and the university were the results of a questionnaire of the Federal Personnel Council soliciting the attitudes of federal employees on the proposed program. A special seminar for agency heads began the program. In it, the content of the other seminars, the responsibilities of agency heads in executive development, and the methods of instituting more effective training programs in the agencies themselves were analyzed.

Six seminars were designed for other executives, concerned with aspects of human relations which permeate levels of every agency, questions of structure by which each agency is organized, and the problems of agency external relations. Additional seminars were concerned with instruments, such as controlling the work program and improving communications, whereby the operations might be made more effective. A final seminar was devoted to executive use of budgeting procedures, with special reference to the then new functional budget.

In its first experimental year, 1954-55, 150 to 200 executives participated. More than half of the eligible civil servants (grade 12 and up) applied for admission. About half were approved by a screening committee established by the Council's Management Development Subcommittee.

The second year of the program represented basically a continuation of the general experimental effort of the first year. The university, in essence, was testing out various content areas and methods which would prove to be of greatest utility for this particular audience. Professors with such diverse backgrounds as humanities and the social sciences led seminars, and there was no uniformity in the conduct of the various seminars. Often such subjects as human relations and communications, taught in separate sections of the same seminar, were presented as rather different phenomena.

New Focus: Decision-Making

AT the conclusion of the second year, the subcommittee and the university began

an extended series of discussions evaluating the first two experimental years. A revised curriculum followed. The various seminars were grouped into two basic categories—the first dealing with various conceptions of administration both as a field of study and as an activity, the second dealing with various skills of administration, centering around decision-making as the heart of the process.

The program was based on the position that the executive in industry, government, education or other institutions, is the man who has to make decisions, communicate these decisions to various centers in the organization, and motivate individuals both to execute the decisions and to make decisions themselves—all done within the context of an organization.

Both the processes of decision-making in organization and the different types of decision situations which confront the executive were investigated. Various seminars analyzed the nature of rational decision-making in organization and the elements of non-rationality which condition the process. Since in every decision situation there are both factual and value elements, one seminar dealt with the use of science to validate factual elements in decision-making, and a second explored the various ethical positions in the validation of the value element in decision-making.

The process whereby the executive selects the one alternative from the various alternatives does not end the decision situation. Additional seminars dealt with the communication of administrative decisions and with the motivating of individuals in decision execution. Seminars on organizational theory attempted to analyze the system of equilibrium which is established by the participating contributors.

The program did not limit itself to the "how" of decision-making but also focused on the "what" and "why" of decision-making in the federal government context. Thus one seminar attempted to define administration and relate it to the political, economic, and social superstructure in which it operates. Another dealt with the history, traditions, and general philosophy of America's administrative pattern. Still another seminar exam-

ined the history and organization of the administrative systems of England, France, and Germany.

The response to the revised curriculum by the Federal Personnel Council and its subcommittee was generally enthusiastic. Written evaluations by participants and an increase in registration which followed—despite sharply increased tuition—supported that sentiment.

From the vantage point of the university, the evening program posed several important pedagogical problems, even though it was enthusiastically received. Seminars were conducted from 6 to 8:30 P.M. one evening per week for eleven weeks. The executive often would come to the seminar tired after a full day's work, bringing with him the concerns of the agency and of his daily work situation. Most of the executives were not able to do much outside studying beyond the bare minimum of required readings, and travel prevented many participants from attending all sessions.

Summer Residential Courses

To remedy some of these defects and also to make available the resources of the university to non-Chicago federal executives, summer institutes were conducted in 1957 and 1958. Lasting either two weeks or one month, the courses provided concentrated study on the main campus, with participants residing together. The same approach to the administrative process which characterized the evening program provided the frame of reference for these intensive programs. The one-month program went beyond analysis of organization theory, decision-making theory, communications, and human relations to include such topics as science and administration and ethics and administrative behavior.

Teaching techniques were varied in these summer programs: seminars, lectures, and special workshops were used. In the workshops, a hypothetical "agency" was created within which each individual was assigned a special role. The "agency" underwent a charted change; a number of decisions were made and events took place much the same as in an actual organization. Norman H.

Martin, who supervised this activity, has described its purpose:

To offer the participants an opportunity to put into practice some of the theories and principles they have learned in the executive development program. In normal work environment, a climate may exist which makes the executive hesitant to change his own behavior or to practice new methods and techniques of administration or supervision. In the workshop, he can assume a "role" which permits him to experiment.

The seminar leaders, lecturers, and workshop supervisors consisted of a group of distinguished specialists in the field of public administration and various areas of the social sciences. These persons were drawn from many university faculties throughout the country as well as from government service.

In addition to the evening seminars and the summer programs for federal executives, there is also an evening middle-management program¹ and an evening executive program for municipal, county, and state governmental units and nonprofit organizations in the Chicago area.

An Evaluation

WHAT may we say regarding the results of the programs established by the University of Chicago? Harold Guetzkow of Northwestern University, as research consultant, leads a project to evaluate the effects of the program on the participating executives, particularly on their decision-making capabilities. Empirical investigations of this kind are to be welcomed.

However, a general training program of the kind established by the University of Chicago should not be evaluated solely by itself. Rather it must be assessed, in part at least, in terms

¹ The curriculum consists of the following seminars: A Modern View of Management Theory and Principles; Communication and Management; The Applications of Psychology in Management; Personnel Administration; The Building of Good Employee Relations; Work Management: The Efficient Use of Men and Materials; Developing Employees through Coaching and Counseling; Effective Speaking; Conference Leadership; Reading Improvement Laboratory; Effective Writing; The Letter, the Survey, and the Report; Workshop in Creative Thinking.

of how effectively it is used by each agency. We come back to the familiar dictum that training is the responsibility of each line agency. A central personnel agency may guide and furnish aid. A university or management consultant firm may provide supplementary generalized training. But the basic job of training must be done by each agency, in terms of the agency needs and conditions and the individual needs of each executive. Generalized executive training must be part and parcel of an over-all "agency-individual" executive development plan.

It is heartening to note that certain federal agencies *are* carefully using the University of Chicago's Executive Training Program to supplement training and development efforts within their agencies. However pleasant it might be for the agency head, the primary responsibility for executive training and development should not be given to a university. On the other hand, a university has a significant role as a partner.

University programs may do many things, and exactly what is done should depend upon a full analysis of the changing needs of the members of the organization and the organization itself. They may deal with the skills

of administration, those that are personal or those that are a function of a given position or agency. Or university programs can attempt to sharpen the executive's understanding of the administrative process and the nature of organizational behavior. Alternatively, they might focus on the political, economic, and social policy issues which confront the government administrator. Recent years have seen the development of programs which attempt to humanize or liberalize the thinking of the executive through the process of analyzing the great ideas of our tradition and culture.

At times, persons express the fear that an executive development program may be part of a conspiracy to de-individualize the executive, to make him a conformist, an "organization man," and to rob him of his individuality. There may be programs which do these things. It would seem, though, that the very purpose of a university executive program is the opposite—to challenge preconceived patterns of thought, to encourage doubt and questioning of long-held principles and practices. In fact, this was the approach to executive development through which the University of Chicago fashioned its program.

Liberal Education for Public Service?

By CHARLES A. NELSON

Nelson Associates, Management Consultants

A NUMBER of leading corporation executives have come to the conclusion that a broad liberal education—as distinct from vocational training—is a most desirable part of preparation for business leadership and that such an education becomes more urgently necessary as business becomes more complex.

This belief is shared not only by those who, like Clarence B. Randall,¹ formerly Chairman of the Board of Inland Steel Company, themselves have had the benefit of a classical education in their college years, but also by other leaders with a background of technical training.

¹ *The Randall Lectures* (Fund for Adult Education, 1956).

Thus Gilbert W. Chapman, President of The Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, has stated:

My undergraduate days were spent in a school of engineering. After four years of this highly specialized training, I immediately began my business career in an American corporation. Since that time, it has become increasingly apparent to me that the problems of an executive become less specialized and more general or basic as the man advances toward the top. The specialist cannot function effectively at the top level of management if all he brings to it is his specialty. At that level, the daily problems call for broad general knowledge, openmindedness, an understanding of human nature, an insight into human frailties, a fairness of mind, a clarity of thought, all these beyond the

ordinary knowledge of a complex business problem. . . . The specialist is not excluded from a career in top management; it would be a little ridiculous for an engineer to suggest that. My contention is that the specialty alone, which thrives so well in the laboratory or research center, is in itself not sufficient qualification for top executive responsibility. Let the specialist extend his knowledge into the broader fields of general learning; then he, too, can move ahead—perhaps even more rapidly than others. . . . What the world needs, and what American business needs, is a steady stream of creative men with a broad knowledge and a capacity for independent thinking. We need men who pursue ideas, who will seek to solve problems, although they may have nothing to do with the immediate business problems before them—men whose thought processes do not end with the business day, who, through their education, have learned that one of the greatest joys in life is to be able to think for one's self.²

Many industrial leaders have expressed similar views,³ reflecting a conviction that executives now face problems, either arising for the first time or increasingly acute, that call for an understanding based on more than technical competence and general experience. To meet the need, Chapman specifies that executives should have (1) an understanding of "the responsibility of American industry and the influences which radiate from it. This kind of leadership requires a sympathetic knowledge of the people of other countries as well as our own, familiarity with the history of all peoples, their modes and customs"; (2) a preparation through practice in logical analysis for the complexities they will encounter in the expanding American economy; (3) the ability to read, write, and speak—to communicate decisions and the meaning of decisions; (4) an understanding of human nature. (These requirements, of course, are as applicable to public administration as to business.)

These statements illustrate the concerns that led to the establishment of programs of liberal education for business executives. What sort of programs have been developed to meet this need?

² *Specific Needs for Leadership in Management* (Humanities Center for Liberal Education in an Industrial Society, University of Massachusetts, 1957).

³ A number of these statements have been collected in Robert A. Goldwin (ed.), *Toward the Liberally Educated Executive* (Fund for Adult Education, 1957).

Programs in Progress

THE first and still the most intensive of these programs is the Institute of Humanistic Studies for Executives at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. This Institute was established in 1953 for middle management executives of the Bell Telephone system.⁴ Since then, programs have taken hold at Wabash College in Crawfordsville, Indiana, Southwestern College at Memphis, Tennessee, Pomona College in Claremont, California and elsewhere. The Executive's Program at Aspen, Colorado is the outstanding example of such a program offered outside university sponsorship.

The University of Pennsylvania program is built around such units as Practical Logic, Economic History and Thought, History and Aesthetics of Music, Art, Comparative Literature, Social Science, Philosophy of Ethics, History and Meaning of Science, International Relations, City Planning, and American Civilization. Distinguished writers, teachers, musicians—leaders in all aspects of the life of the mind—are invited to meet with the students. The program requires ten months of full-time work in residence; the Bell companies grant leave with full salary to the participating executives.

The objectives of the program have been stated as follows:

1. To enable a potential future executive to understand and interpret the social, political, and economic changes—both national and world wide—which will influence the problems of corporate management to an increasingly greater degree in the future. This might be defined as developing a breadth of outlook, looking toward future "statesmanship" in the business.
2. To indicate the importance, impact, and use of history, science, philosophy, and the arts in the world today, particularly as they influence large groups of people, such as employees, customers, and stockholders.
3. To motivate the participants in the program to accept the concept of intellectual activity as a never ending process to be continued throughout life.

⁴ For a description of the first class and its experience, see E. Digby Baltzell, "Bell Telephone's Experiment in Education," 210 *Harper's Magazine* 73-77 (March, 1955).

4. To balance with a humanistic background the almost complete attention generally given by younger men in the business to acquiring technical knowledge and competence as a result of working in an atmosphere of intense competition with other individuals.

5. To offset a tendency to overconformity, which is bound to occur in a business which is highly specialized and which promotes almost entirely from within the organization.⁵

The Southwestern College program, called the Institute for Executive Leadership, does not require the participant to leave his job. The group meets one morning a week for three hours throughout the school year; several residential weekends are scheduled throughout the year. The employer, besides releasing the executive one morning a week, typically pays the tuition (\$300.00). The participant receives regular reading assignments; the basic method of instruction is discussion based on common reading. The curriculum includes units covering The Liberating Art (discussion), Man and the Arts, and American Civilization.

There is a wide range of position, age, and type of business represented in the Southwestern College program. In the current class of thirty men, there are several company presidents as well as middle- and upper-management executives. There are a few men from branch offices of national corporations; most of them are from local concerns, some of which are family managed. All are from the Memphis area; only one, a university administrator, is not a businessman.

The Pomona College Business Executive Program follows still a third pattern.⁶ Executives are brought together for a two week concentrated residential program during the summer. The curriculum includes lectures, reading sessions, conferences, and discussions on a wide range of subjects in the humanities, the sciences, and the social sciences.

⁵ John Markle, II, vice president-personnel, Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, quoted in Peter E. Siegle, *New Directions in Liberal Education for Executives* (The Center for the Study of Liberal Education for Adults, Chicago, 1958) p. 10-11.

⁶ For a description of each of these programs and several others with the same general objectives, see *New Directions in Liberal Education for Executives*.

Why Liberal Arts for Management?

WHAT is the supposed relevance of the liberal arts to business management or to public administration? And first, what do we mean by liberal education?

Those studies are liberal which help to perfect a man *as a man*. This provides a clear distinction between liberal and vocational education, since vocational studies tend to perfect men not as men but as carpenters or doctors or engineers or business managers or government officials. Vocational subjects can be more or less liberal depending upon the way they are taught and the nature of the vocation, since some vocations are more consistent with the full development of man's potentialities than others.

Advocates of the liberal arts often insist that they are not useful or practical. They want to emphasize that the liberal arts are debased when they are used merely to help a man earn a living. But what they mean to say is that the liberal arts are in reality the most useful of all arts because they help to fulfill the highest of all human purposes—the perfection of the man himself.

Thus, the liberal arts do not stand or fall according to whether or not they make better business managers or better public administrators. But the performance of an executive is affected by his education, and I think it is possible for the liberal arts to transform the practices of the administrator.

This transformation can happen particularly when the manager or administrator sees his job as that of a teacher. We think of teaching as one profession and of administration as another. I suggest that an executive must become a good teacher if he is to be fully effective. Teaching is an art that requires both knowledge of the subject taught and knowledge about the student and the learning process. Thus the civil servant with supervisory responsibilities in the Interstate Commerce Commission should combine a knowledge of transportation and legislation regulating the railroads with a knowledge of the characteristics and needs of a subordinate whom he is trying to develop. The success of the supervisor in his job depends on the extent to which he is able to combine these various kinds of arts and knowledge. As we know,

however, it is possible to have a completely knowledgeable man who is a poor teacher, because, while he may have knowledge of the subject and even a theoretical knowledge of men and how they learn, he may not have developed the art of summoning his knowledge with clarity and transmitting it successfully to others.

What can the liberal arts contribute to the executive's understanding of his function as a teacher? They can help the executive to understand the nature and aims of men (including of course, his superiors and subordinates) and of the conditions under which men are able to achieve what they seek. The liberal arts can enable the executive to see more clearly the occasions on which the objectives and activities of the organization are likely to conflict with the aims and purposes of the men who must carry out these objectives and activities. The administrator, of course, teaches through his actions and decisions at least as much as he does by his instructions. And a liberal education can help him to foresee the consequences of his decisions and actions, not by giving him the power of foreknowledge but by developing his capacity for sustained thought about the logical relations of events to one another and by providing him with insights into the motivations and aims of men.⁷

What can the liberal arts contribute to the exercise of the other executive roles? Briefly some of the most basic contributions include: (1) the development of the capacity of choosing wisely among alternatives; (2) the habit of considering objectives as well as means of implementation; (3) a perspective of time and history, and (4) the habit of reason.

The capacity for choosing wisely depends upon the ability to weigh alternatives, the ability to speculate about the possible consequences of actions, and the moral qualities necessary to elect the best course whatever the obstacles or uncertainties. Only the most skillful and devoted study of the liberal arts achieves this, but any careful study of the liberal arts contributes to it.

The habit of considering objectives as well as means of implementation is the natural outgrowth of work and discipline in philosophy, political thought, literature, and the sciences. The liberal arts add another dimension to what we ordinarily think of as "the practical man." The practical man, we say, is one who can get things done. The added dimension comes with the questioning: What things are worth doing? For what purpose? In what order?

A perspective of time and history, one of the best safeguards against rash and ill considered public action, hardly can be acquired except by reading and reflection. This perspective seems to permeate the behavior of decisive leaders as different as Churchill and Truman. Anyone doubting the values of this kind of knowledge should perhaps reread the story of the Melian Conference in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War; and surely the Federalist Papers, Tocqueville, and Bryce provide some of the surest insights we have into the roots of our national behavior.

The habit of reason, of exploring the connections between ideas, of constructing the logical links in an argument, is in good part a development from the kind of education which poses the questions of why, what for, how, and in what way. Liberal education as I see it is consistently concerned to discover the general from the particular, the causes as well as the effects, the purposes as well as the methods. In these ways such an education develops the habit of reason, a valuable habit particularly in the leader in public life.

Evaluating Liberal Arts for Management

THERE is an inclination on the part of some observers to suppose that the value or effectiveness of the liberal arts can be determined solely by the extent to which they improve a man's performance on the job. This, I think, is clearly not so. The liberal arts, as we have said, are the "education of the man as a man." Their study is designed not to improve effectiveness in a particular calling, but to develop and complete the individual as such; thus the supposition that the effectiveness of a liberal education can be measured by job performance assumes too much. It as-

⁷ For a fuller development of the argument in this section see my article "The Liberal Arts in Management," 36 *Harvard Business Review* 91 (May-June, 1958).

sumes that the requirements for performance in a particular job are completely consistent and practically identical with the best behavior of the complete man. Under ideal conditions this may be so, but the conditions are never quite ideal. How many executive positions are there which support this assumption? Who is prepared to say to what extent the liberal arts fit or unfit a man for organizational success according to that organization's definitions of successful performance?

If these reservations are appropriate, then we can see that any attempt to measure the effectiveness of the liberal arts as preparation for job performance involves a basic difficulty. This need not prevent us from making the judgment. We must not forget, however, that the judgment that is made may say more about the adequacy of the job and the society than it does about the education of the job holder.

With these reservations in mind we can then ask the question: What evidence do we have that the existing liberal arts programs have improved executive performance? These are all new programs, the oldest being only five years in existence. Only limited data are available to measure the results. We can be sure that if any of these programs have had effects of a truly fundamental sort, they will be visible in executive performance only many years hence; that effect, whatever it turns out to be, will be the most significant result of the experience. So that in a very real sense it is impossible to know how effective these programs have been and in what ways these effects have been achieved. This is borne out if we take as objectives either Gilbert Chapman's statements quoted earlier, or those John Markle, II listed as the aims of Bell's Pennsylvania program; in either case much of what is sought can only be discerned by observation of future executive performance.

There are, of course, the personal judgments of the men who have participated in the programs, the opinions of their job superiors, and the observations of the instructors in the programs. According to these persons, the programs on the whole have had marked and good effects on many executives. This generalization should be tempered with the

note that those superiors who were originally skeptical about the program tend to be less impressed with the effects on their subordinates than do the bosses who were convinced of the value of the program from the start.⁸

In the case of the University of Pennsylvania program, a number of evaluative devices have been used and it may be possible to obtain very significant information in the future.

In the case of the Southwestern College program, where I have met most of the participants over the past three years and talked with many of them, with some of their bosses, and with the instructors, there is a widespread conviction that the program has a constructive effect upon executive performance. There have been, for example, many promotions awarded to participants during and after completion of the program. In some cases the employer attributes the promotion directly to capacities developed through the program (broader scope, sounder judgment, improved ability to deal with fellow employees). In other cases, of course, promotions were on the way and had nothing to do with the program; and, as might be expected, in some cases men who were slated for promotion were placed in the program with the hope that it would provide additional "polish."

One of the fears that attended the opening of these programs has not materialized. Some university people and some industry observers as well thought that these programs might affect the participants in such a way that they would leave business for other occupations. The fact is that, while one man in Memphis left his job for a year of graduate work and is now back with his company, every executive in the Southwestern College program is still in the same line of work (a few have changed companies) and every graduate of the University of Pennsylvania program has remained with the Bell System.⁹

In brief, at the present juncture, the fragments of evidence seem to support the value

⁸ One might cheer the skeptics by admitting that most of those evaluating the program favorably had a stake in it, either the investment of their time or the vindication of their ideas.

⁹ Thus, of about 175 graduates of the University of Pennsylvania and Southwestern College programs, none

of these programs, but no data of an incontrovertible character is available to convince the confirmed skeptic. The liberal arts colleges themselves rest in part upon an act of faith in the efficacy of education; perhaps we should be suspicious if anyone claims to offer "proof" that these new executive programs are a success or a failure.

Furthermore we should be cautious in assessing the effects of any educational program undertaken by an adult. Except for an experience as intensive as the University of Pennsylvania program, we are dealing with only a slight fraction of a man's life over a short space of time. His previous education, his native capacities, his family concerns, his motivation, are all going to affect the outcome. And as for his job performance, it probably will be more affected by the conditions of work, the tasks assigned, and the kind of supervision he receives than by even the most effectively organized program of studies. Such reservations do not deny the value of education; they simply define its limits.

Liberal Education and Public Service

ALL that I have said about liberal arts for executives applies as much—perhaps more—to public executives. And liberal education for the public service cannot achieve full effectiveness if limited to career executives. The conditions of work and the policy limits within which the civil servant must operate are set typically by other public servants outside his ranks, i.e., political leaders; thus, he is concerned necessarily with the nature of public leadership at these other levels. Surely the civil servant would be pleased at the prospect that his political superior recently might have studied literature, political theory, American history, and constitutional law!

Policy leadership in this country is widely dispersed, including as it does both full-time legislative and executive personnel (elected and appointed) and civic leaders whose role in the chamber of commerce or the library board, the advisory committee on state taxes or the Hoover Commission gives their deci-

have left industry. However, I have reports of several executives who have left industry purportedly as a result of participation in similar programs not described here.

sions an impact on the public welfare. Although these public service positions are unguarded by educational requirements or ability tests, they typically go to persons with achievement in business or the law. Some, as we have seen, may have had the opportunity of an in-service liberal education, but the number is still infinitesimal. We should begin to think of programs open not only to business but available, too, to professional persons and others who might be expected to enter public life, along with career executives. This cannot happen, however—and particularly civil servants cannot be expected to take part—until such leaders have become convinced of the value of liberal arts education and the feasibility of providing fairly lengthy leave and correspondingly high tuition. In the meantime, another approach may be more acceptable.

The programs that have been described all have in common *exclusive* attention to liberal education. Is this the only way that the advantages of the liberal arts can be provided for executives? I think not. While there is undoubtedly some advantage in the exclusive concentration on these subjects as they are pursued for their own sake, still there are many ways in which the liberal arts can be introduced into educational programs that have professional objectives. This is happening in the undergraduate curricula of some of our leading engineering and business schools. The same liberalizing of the professional curriculum can occur and is increasingly occurring in programs of continuing education developed for men midway in their careers. The Executive Conference Program for top federal officials sponsored by The Brookings Institution at Williamsburg is a case in point: while there is a core of information that is related directly to the jobs performed by the civil servant, there also is scope for the consideration of basic questions of ethical and political judgment underlying the decisions of government personnel. Other instances could be cited.¹⁰ Similarly, if one examines the seventy or more executive development programs now available to practicing businessmen in this country, one finds that only about a fifth of

¹⁰ Editor's note: See, for example, other articles in this symposium.

them are devoted exclusively to upgrading of specific executive skills and knowledge while more than half include the treatment of more general subjects such as management theory, economics and finance, and human relations; of these a significant number concentrate heavily in the nonvocational study of the sciences and the humanities.¹¹ Although the inclusion of some liberal arts instruction in professional training probably produces less impact than does the complete concentration on the liberal arts, it does enable a much larger number of executives to obtain the advantages the liberal arts afford.

A whole range of conferences, meetings, courses, and seminars needs to be devised by universities and other organizations to develop the capacities of civil servants and of present and future political executives and civic leaders. On some occasions the lawyers, businessmen, and government officials should meet together to gain the advantages of the cross-fire; on other occasions they should meet separately for concentrated work on their own needs and problems.

There is an ever increasing range of opportunities for liberal education through informal adult study and discussion groups which should not be overlooked by the executive. These include the Great Books discussion groups offered widely throughout the country under the auspices of the Great Books Foundation, the programs in politics developed by the American Foundation for Political Education, the wide range of programs originated by The Fund for Adult Education, and others developed by a number of universities and national organizations.

Why In-Service?

BUT perhaps a final question should be posed. Doesn't the need for liberal education of men in mid-career stem from a lack of it earlier? Would it not be sufficient to provide a broad liberal education in the formative years and especially in the undergraduate college curriculum, leaving for the postcollege years an exclusive emphasis on specialized training? There seem to be good reasons why

this approach, easily stated if difficult of achievement, will not suffice.

Many of those subjects which the liberal arts illuminate most seem to be appreciated only by the mature adult, by the man or woman who has had some experience of life. The problems of ethics and of practical judgment, which are at the heart of all decision making, only can be appreciated by those who have had some real experiences in groping with these problems. Someone has observed that we have child prodigies in music, science, and painting, but not in ethics and politics; it is simply not possible for the child or young man in the protected environment of the family and the school to understand the dimensions of decisions affecting other people and the society in general.

Recently one of the graduates of the University of Pennsylvania program commented that he had been surprised at being chosen to participate. After all, he had had a prep school education and four years of liberal arts at Harvard. Now, fifteen years later, what was the use of taking those courses over again? He reports with conviction and some elation the shock he received, discovering, when confronted with the liberal arts in his late thirties, that they had a value and relevance he saw only dimly in college. Now, he reports, he has completely changed his way of looking at important questions, including daily business decisions. He mentioned particularly the study of history and of ethics as a force in this profound shift in his views.

There are no doubt some who are untouched by the liberal arts when they confront them as adults, and certainly there are some on whom the undergraduate experience had a more profound effect, but this does no more than modify the contention that the great issues which the liberal arts raise are the special concern of the mature adult. It is only as adults that we can cope with these questions in the most meaningful way. The high school and the college can provide a beginning. But we are never so wrong and never so unwittingly disparaging of a man as when we say of him that he "completed his education" at such and such a college. That is almost the equivalent of saying that he died at the age of twenty-two.

¹¹ For this information I am indebted to an unpublished study prepared by Gordon G. Dupee.

Understanding Self and Organization

By NATHAN D. GRUNDSTEIN

University of Pittsburgh

THE comments set forth below are based on the following experience with executive development programs for public executives: (1) a three-year program for the federal executives of the Detroit area; (2) a one-year program for the executives of the Michigan Employment Security Commission; (3) a one-year program for the executives of the city of Detroit; and (4) two separate one-year programs for Michigan state executives.

Content: Technique Plus Morality

INITIALLY the program for executive development was rooted exclusively in technology—the need to overcome the drag of obsolescence in executive skills and knowledge about organization. But with experience I came to understand that it had to be rooted in a social morality as well as a technology, for the significance of particular technology to the executive is related to his image of his profession. In time I came to the view that the executive should demand of his profession that it provide (1) room to affirm his attitudes toward life and the world about him—personal expression; (2) room for creative action—innovation; (3) room for the development and use of complex skills—craft; and (4) room to deal with the central problems of his time—a sense of significance.

What technology is relevant for the development of executives? The answer to this question must draw upon some concept of the content of the executive function. The social utility of the technology is to aid the participants to act appropriately with reference to the real world that a concept of the executive function postulates as there for the executive to deal with. The criteria of relevancy, therefore, are contained within the concept of the executive function that is adopted as a working base.

What is troublesome in practice is that the postulated "real world" of the executive will not mirror the experienced world of the particular executives participating in a specific

development program. However, it is not intended that it do so. The difference between the two is quite important in the design of an executive development program. Such a program has as an objective to assist the individual executives to envision the more generalized world of the executive as a distinctive organization role. Thus the postulated "real world" of the executive so conceived may differ from and transcend in scope the more restricted realm of experience of a particular executive participant. The individual executive of a specific organization is, by reason of his position in that organization, acting out a variant of a generalized role, yet he may not think of his development as an executive in these terms.

All this is related to the problem of how to make the technology deemed relevant to the development of executives personally meaningful to the individual executive participants.

Most public executives come into a program with specific skill difficulties and with particular frustrations arising out of on-going organization practices. When they are asked the question: "The problems of organization with which I have the most difficulty are . . .," replies such as the following are forthcoming:

1. Maintaining chain of command through the organization with respect to directives and policies issued. This includes persons who like to cut around or by-pass heads of departments or divisions.

. . .

1. As a "staff" man, trying to keep from acting as if I were "line" i.e., to keep from trying to do everyone's thinking for them. Having worked as a scientist before I was an administrator, I tend to have confidence only in men with similar background, and to doubt the abilities of those who came up "the practical" way.

2. I feel hampered by organizational channels. In earlier experience, I worked with groups where the idea counted, rather than who came up with it. I find it hard to take to the self-minded who

put personal glory ahead of the job to be done, and whose sensibilities are delicate.

• • •

1. Adapting assignments to various personalities.
2. Motivating and training.
3. Coordinating policy from above with thinking of technicians below. That is, trying to help each see how the other thinks about problems.

• • •

1. Meeting deadlines due to shortcomings of associates.
2. Difficulty in obtaining prompt replies to queries on policy and details.
3. Inability to obtain proper recognition for my subordinates in a monetary way, in a reasonable time.
4. The difficulty of getting rid of a job when completed due to improper planning by my superiors or associates.

• • •

1. Identification of specific work project assignments sufficiently in advance to best utilize the capabilities and time of various staff members. This relates, however, in a large measure, to the nature of the organization's duties—they are *not* specific and call for aliveness to the day-to-day and month-to-month needs.


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1. Adequate pre-planning of comprehensive interrelated programs in relation to relative values, the timing in regard to possibilities of application, and getting general agreement and understanding of each throughout the organization.

The danger here is that the payoffs they may want from a development program *at the outset* may be much too limited. The development of one's self as an executive involves more than the development of particular functional skills. The skills regarded as appropriate for the executive are related to the image of the executive selected to guide self-development. In the course of a development program, the participating executives may be made aware that a reassessment of their needs and methods of operating implies a reassessment of the image they hold of their function as executives.

Focus: Self and Organization

VISUALIZE a tripartite division of the content of a program of executive development as follows:



Every program must have *some* basis for its basic content classifications—an orientation toward the subject matter that facilitates choice of areas for concentration. And every program has to make *some* choices about how it will allocate its resources. What I wish to speak briefly about here are some of the considerations that went into the choices I made.

I concentrated the content of our executive development programs in the I and II areas and gave only collateral attention to III.¹ The programs were grounded in technology and pointed towards improvements in technological capacity and technical performance as evidence of development. The I and II areas were given priority in claims on resources as promising the greatest payoffs in the way of changes in executive performance. It seemed to me that it is in the III area that our technology for the executive is least adequate and most in need of improvement. The technology in I and II is more structured, has greater

¹ City executives devoted attention to the urban community as the focus of administration, and federal executives in a three-year program devoted one year to historical, comparative, and ideological factors influencing administration and contributing to the various images of the public executive as a social type or class in different societies. The federal group was fascinated by these materials. Admittedly they promote large insights into one's conception of one's social contribution, but their effect upon technological competence and changes in performance is obscure. For these purposes, an ordering of the materials dealing with the organization environment that relates them to contemporary social action and social theory concepts would be more likely to yield technologically useful payoffs for the public executive.

depth, is information loaded, has developed an experimental base, and the materials are in a form more adaptable to the teaching and learning processes. The intellectual content of III needs further development and adaptation to include it in an executive development program founded in technology. (The executive development program can be used, though, to test the utility of materials focused on the organization environment.)

Although there was some variation between programs in the subject matter of particular sessions, in the design of the programs as a whole the dual focus was always kept in mind. The dual focus is not to be interpreted as a dichotomy but rather as a complementary development of both the externalized and internalized aspects of executive experience with organization. The point of integration, the one at which a development program must aim, is the individual executive. The organization behavior with which the executive is concerned is not only the behavior of others but also his own, and to comprehend how and why the two interact is an essential of personal development. Consciousness of all that is involved in the experiences of self with organization is essential for both survival and effectiveness as an executive. The individualized bio-psychological dimensions of self as a participant intrude upon the externalized system of impersonal relationships.

For a development program grounded in technology (the technology assumed necessary to deal with organizations), the executive as an educated man and public spokesman will be placed second to the executive as a skilled but limited professional. The choice of priorities is determined by the perspective within which we conceive of the function of our career executives. They are not thought of (nor do they so regard themselves) as men of intellectual and cultural eminence, as propagators of ideas, as persons at liberty to publicize their views about society and its institutions.

Perceiving Patterns in Experience

AN executive development program should take into account the variance between the participants' structuring of their experi-

ence with organization and an intellectual ordering of the materials in area II for purposes of constructing a developmental sequence of ideas for exposition. Executive development programs deal with a range of organization activities that are not new to the experience of the participant executives. What is new is the restructuring and reordering of that experience that is attempted by the program of development. It is the interpretive ideas and concepts that are brought to bear on their experiences that is new to the executives. These interpretive ideas and concepts attempt to reanalyze and reorder, and so infuse with a new meaning, what the executive has previously seen as reality for purposes of action and to which, of necessity, he has already made an adjustment of some sort. An executive development program attempts to make the participants conscious of the way in which they perceive the "reality" they experience as organization and how they structure it into some patterns meaningful to them.

Throughout, therefore, an executive development program has to come to grips with how and what the participants personally experience as organization. Participant responses to two questions illustrate how this need emerges and can be dealt with in a development program. An opportunity for the responses to the first question was given following two sessions that were devoted to alternative ways of thinking about organization, which was presented as not a "thing" but as represented by various sets of ideas for structuring different dimensions of a complex of goal-oriented activities and of which scientific management (structure-function analysis) was but one. They were then asked: "The discussion of scientific management and perspectives for understanding organization left me with the following questions:" The responses, some of which are given below, indicate some of the reactions that take place when an impersonal intellectual ordering of data in lecture form comes up against the personalized, experienced, total involvement of particular executives who have their "real" world of organization to live in and with.

Can scientific management succeed where controls and limitation are often set by those outside

of the organization? (legislative, budget division.) Does scientific management assume that there is a right place for everyone "frozen in" an organization? (Has reference to an assumption that the manager has *complete* control over the members of the organization.)

• • •

Assuming that I have absorbed (and will continue to) some of the basic principles of Scientific Management, etc. how valuable will this prove in attempting to increase the productivity of my organization in view of the inherent differences between a business organization and state government. Unless nearly everyone higher up in my organization is similarly indoctrinated, it becomes very difficult to make substantial changes in the echelon below. In other words the theory's fine but there are many practical difficulties.

• • •

Is my organization operating in an efficient manner? Prior to this meeting I believed that my group was operating as efficiently as possible, however, now I am beginning to see things that should be changed. I think that through these meetings we get a chance to give our organization more thought, than when we are on the work and pushing to get more done all the while.

• • •

1. What type of a yardstick can I use to determine the degree of application of scientific management to both myself and organization?

2. When applying the principles of scientific management will I become too critical of my superiors as well as employees?

3. How will present cooperation of employees be reflected in work productivity when this approach is used?

• • •

1. What sort of tasks and assignments lend themselves most effectively to very specific, rigid and detailed instructions or assignments with little opportunity for the performer to use his judgment and experience?

2. What sort are most effectively accomplished by general instructions and delegation of authority and responsibility so the worker is involved in planning and details of execution?

• • •

Can and how might this be adapted to and used in my every-day work? How can one escape from the "frame work" of his own experience—i.e. better see in perspective? Can things designed to improve organizational efficiency in the output of a

product also be used to improve organizational efficiency in the output of a *service*?

Replies to the question "The problems of organization with which I have the most difficulty are:" (see p. 285) can be helpful in identifying the personally-experienced world of the participants when they are analyzed so as to ascertain:

1. What responses imply that the need for self-change is the source of difficulty?

2. What responses imply that the need for a change in others is the source of difficulty?

3. What responses state the problem content as a matter of depersonalized relationships (coordinating, chain of command) and what responses state the problem content as difficulties with persons?

4. What is the content of the difficulties listed as person-oriented problems?

5. What do the responses reveal about executive judgments regarding the control they can exert over organization components?

6. What responses list skill difficulties?

7. What do the responses indicate about the ability of the participants to define and state their problems?

Individual Change and Program Design

A DEVELOPMENT program assumes change of some sort will ensue. But how much change? In what direction? Over what time period (do you want short-term or long-term payoffs)? And what kinds of change? Some of the changes involve relearning; others involve new learning. How does one perceive and restructure the experiences he undergoes. Or, rather, how does one go about getting another to perceive and restructure the experiences he undergoes. Some of the changes are in the conceptual (thinking) area with no challenge to one's image of self, but some changes are directed to altering one's image of self. I attempted to get into this area of perception of self and others through a sensitivity sequence that was directed to raising the level of consciousness regarding one's behavior. Two psychiatrists and a cardiologist (who was also the General Superintendent of a large county hospital) discussed consciousness of self and its relation to executive behavior, and what the

executive should know about stress for purposes of assessing his own behavior under conditions of stress. That sequence had a real impact on the group. You might try your own responses to statements like the following to get an idea of the challenges to established perceptions of self that were experienced by the participants:

To understand ourselves, we must first see how we misunderstand ourselves.

I don't always live myself consciously. Mental health is the development of insight, i.e., to live myself consciously.

The notion of betweenness is an illusion. We can't get at one another; we can only get inside ourselves. The betweenness is only within me.

Failure is a name-calling device. We need to overcome fear of failure. All obedience is self-obedience. I can only obey myself.

The executive is his own employer.

Our enemies are our own creation. They are products of ourselves.

Not being aware is like not having a nervous system.

Making the world a better place to live in is just looking out for self. We can only live self.

I can never do anything wrong. I am helping myself the best I can at all times.

You become your own perceptions.

* * *

Each of us has an inborn response and tolerance pattern to stress.

The learning process regarding stress situations starts quite early in life. Throughout one's life one continues to abandon earlier learned responses to stress situations and searches for new ways to respond to new stress situations.

The peak of development of feelings is reached in adolescent years. But in this period the *learning* of how to handle feelings of self is not fully developed.

Dependency is a built-in factor of the job of the executive. Some executives can't deal with this dependency aspect of their jobs.

Properly utilized stress enables a person to better himself.

The ability to handle risk situations is tied to stages of individual growth and development.

Work with the members of the group over a considerable period of time in just this one area of perception of self in relation to others is necessary if any long-term change in behavior and personality is to be effected. What is involved here from a learning standpoint is

discussed in detail in a book by Nathaniel Cantor, *The Learning Process for Managers*,² and what he describes is what I experienced.

The changes that can be effected in the participants by an executive development program are related to the design of the total program. Viewed comprehensively, an executive development program includes participant preparation for the learning experience, the learning experience proper, and the on-the-job aftermath of the learning experience.

Executive expectations regarding the program should not be left to emerge at random lest inappropriate expectations defeat the objectives of the learning experience. Some preparatory measures are called for, built upon joint exploration of individual needs and the individual work situation by the person who will assume responsibility for the program of development and the executive participants. A genuine awareness of individual development needs emerges slowly and only as the parties evolve a unity of feeling and outlook in a nonthreatening and permissive atmosphere in which there is an awareness of a dominating desire to be of help and a confidence that the competence to be drawn upon for that help is there. The expectations of the central personnel agency, which negotiates for the program, are not identical with those of the executive participants. The latter have individual development needs of which the central personnel agency may not be aware; the agency's outlook is focused on generalized needs of the career service (a depersonalized view), and there is not necessarily an intimate and supportive relationship between the agency and the individual executives. The executives may, in fact, view the agency as a source of some of their present frustrations. My own experience has been in situations in which considerable leeway to innovate and initiate was permitted, and the possible outcomes in the way of development were left open on a wait-and-see basis.

Continued work with participants following the classroom work was not provided in the programs with which I have had experience. There is certainly room for individual assistance (really highly individualized educa-

² Harper and Brothers, 1958.

tion) where an objective of a development program is improved executive performance through self-development. Individual assistance to the person who is in some degree receptive to taking the risks of change involved in applying new insights to his own activities is just another dimension of executive development. But what resources should we have available and what must we know and what abilities must we have to be effective in providing assistance to the individual executive?

Requirements for Improving Programs

If development programs for public executives are to expand on any large scale, financial assistance is needed in three areas:

1. *To prepare those who are to be responsible for the development of others.*

Radical departures from the model of the university seminar or classroom situation are called for in an executive development program. The relation of leader to the executive participants is not analogous to the relation of teacher to student. For one thing, there is not the dependency and subordination that characterizes teacher-student relations in the classroom; for another, the degree of experience and maturity possessed by the executive participants differs markedly from that ordinarily possessed by the student; for another, the objectives of a development program with respect to the needs of the individual participants differ markedly from formal course instruction for students; and for still another, the range of subject matter and the variety of techniques that are necessary for development of the executive participants are not to be equated with coverage and instructional technique in seminar or classroom. Those who are to be responsible for the development of others need themselves to be developed emotionally, intellectually, and in the use of the necessary techniques.

2. *To amass a bank of materials suitable for use in executive development programs that can be loaned out to interested agencies and universities.*

Text materials are not enough, although there is always a use for some readings. Guest experts help, but their presentations are usually in the form of lectures. And here a pub-

lic expression of thanks is due the top business executives with sufficient feelings of social responsibility to participate in the development of public executives. They gave generously of their time to the programs I conducted and much of the vigor and quality of these programs was due to the stimulating presentations of alert executives from the world of business. What the executives from business who appeared as guest experts contributed was the liberating experience of contact with something different in the way of executive perspective, organization practice, and experimentation. To be sure, these have an informative and educational value, but still the occasions are too few when the specific materials used for the development of the business executive can be adapted for the use of the public executive to assist him in structuring his own milieu. I have reference, the reader should recall, to a program grounded in technology and not in the humanities. What is needed are development materials drawn from, related to, or specifically designed for, the experiences, the environment, and the social orientation of the public executive. Case studies are no longer enough. One need only look at the range and variety of developmental materials brought together for the development of the business executive (of which organization simulation materials are the most recent) to be impressed with the sparseness of such materials for the public executives. The financial base of a particular program may not support an investment in the research task of bringing together the most suitable developmental materials, as it did not for the programs I conducted.

3. *To support research into areas of inquiry opened up by particular executive development programs.*

The absence of research into an on-going program means that some questions that bear on evaluation cannot be answered with reliable information. An executive development program raises some very serious learning questions. My own program did not research the learning experience of the executive participants while they were going through it, and so, except for some judgments of an intuitive sort, I am none the wiser about the

learning problems connected with the development of executives. Was progress through the program content appropriately paced so as to coordinate with the speed of the learning process? The program content for state executives, for example, was highly information-loaded and deliberately so. With several choices before me, I decided to cover as wide a range as possible of the new organization technology within the twenty-eight meetings. What we had was a learning situation analogous to top quality graduate seminars. For purposes of learning (as distinct from exposure), my own judgment is that the state program was too information-loaded. Did we pitch the content at the appropriate conceptual level to facilitate rapid understanding and assimilation? Actually, at what level should communication with the participants be attempted? I have no fact answers to these questions. The basic concepts that have to be understood are complex, make no mistake about that. But their presentation in a learning situation can be simplified somewhat with the goal in mind of the greatest "take home" content.

Political Appointees and Executive Development

Do executive development programs secure the top executives as participants? The

career executive ladder stops short of the highest positions in the agency hierarchy, which are occupied by political appointees. We should recognize that there is a gap to be closed between those career personnel who participate in a program of executive development and the politically-appointed agency heads. The latter are not career oriented and they may or may not be indoctrinated in the traditions and technology of professional management, but they are not necessarily hostile to management sciences. Some Michigan state political executives were interested in becoming participants in a program of executive development. Politically-appointed agency heads—the top executives—need to know what it is that is being attempted through executive development; they need some familiarity with the content of a development program so that meaningful communication between them and the participants about the experience is possible; they need some understanding of its possible effects upon their relations with their own career executives and agency activities; they need the information that will enable them to assess the program relevancy to their conceptions of their executive responsibilities. And if they have a thrust for participation to develop themselves, there is no reason why they should be excluded from an executive development program.

Training Middle Management in the Field

By HARRY W. REYNOLDS, JR.

University of Southern California

EXECUTIVE development has perceptibly evolved during the last decade into perhaps the most serious approach yet taken to ameliorate the shortage of capable management talent at several levels in public hierarchies.¹ Throughout the federal government

in particular, this type of program has assumed a position alongside selective recruitment, leave to attend school, and intensified specialist training as a means of strengthening the career service. Broadly conceived, executive development has endeavored to look beyond proper placement, conscientious super-

¹ Leonard D. White has distinguished three levels of administrative responsibility: (1) general management, involving duties of policy formation and the coordination of governmental machinery at the departmental level; (2) intermediate management, relating to the leadership of agency subdivisions and the preliminary

preparation of policy; and (3) first-line supervision, involving maintenance of output and preservation of morale. See his *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (4th ed., The Macmillan Co., 1955), ch. 14 and 15.

vision, planned transfers, and augmented responsibilities to insure an adequate supply of competent public managers. Its purpose is to identify and cultivate administrative ability as a skill distinct from professional, vocational, or technical proficiency, consisting rather of understanding and directing the work of others, accepting responsibility, learning the attitudes and habits of teamwork and coordination, and analyzing situations for decision-making.²

Federal Management Needs

WHEN the First Hoover Commission pointed with alarm to the inadequacy of administrative talent throughout the national government,³ there were approximately 3,300 general management positions (GS-15 to 18) and the 50,000 intermediate management positions (GS-9 to 14) in the federal career service. Of these nearly 400 and 1,400, respectively, were located in a seven-county area of southern California. So extensive was the Commission's documentation of personnel and civil service imperfections that many federal government units, including several in southern California, seized upon it as a basis for launching requests for more and better administrative personnel with which to handle effectively the mounting managerial burdens spawned by hostilities in Korea.⁴ Seeking to substantiate more thoroughly the nature of the managerial weaknesses in and near Los Angeles, the Twelfth Civil Service Region scrutinized particular personnel and supervisory practices in concentrated samplings in that area in 1951 and 1952, eventually extending its analysis to almost every federal function in southern California. The evidence pointed to chronic weaknesses in top- and

middle-management with which the Twelfth Civil Service Region could cope only incidentally.

The Hoover Commission's inquiries and the Civil Service region's consequential soundings placed the blame for the insufficient management talent, to a great extent, on three factors:

Unmethodical recruitment and promotional programs for career employees: The Hoover Commission had detected that 37 per cent of a sample of 81 top career administrators throughout the national government had taken no specific measures to designate or train their successors; in nearly 60 federal agencies in the seven-county area of southern California, the frequency of neglect was double. Systematic in-service training of promising junior managerial personnel was found to be largely nonexistent throughout the government—only 200 or 300 junior management people in federal installations surrounding Los Angeles had training opportunities. Induction procedures everywhere were dilatory and aloof. Finally, line agencies played no perceptible role in placement of their own management personnel.

Excessive turnover rates for top- and middle-managers: The turnover rate among top- and middle-management personnel both in the Los Angeles region and in the whole government was found to approach 10 per cent annually. This necessitated the use of nine out of each ten new inductees simply as replacements for those vacating.

Obsolete legal and salary limitations complicating promotional opportunities for the career service: Federal salaries at higher levels are not attractive and most of the highest-paying positions are outside of the merit system. Transfer opportunities for career administrators within or between agencies were virtually nonexistent in Los Angeles or nationally; only 12 per cent of 1,400 positions scrutinized by the Hoover Commission were occupied by transferees.

Both the Hoover Commission and the regional office of the Civil Service Commission noted that too many federal administrators had an overly narrow conception of the role and obligation of public administrators in a dynamic, democratically governed society.

² U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 67-77.

³ U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Task Force Report on Federal Personnel* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 29-36; and the same Commission's *Report on Federal Personnel* (1949), pp. 37-51.

⁴ U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Sub-committee Report on Special Personnel Problems in the Department of Defense* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 9-28.

Executive Development as Antidote

IN 1953, the Joint College-Federal Service Council of Southern California gradually developed a plan to combat these weaknesses, though only indirectly. Consisting of one representative from each of ten institutions of higher learning and fifty-five federal agencies functioning within the seven-county area centered on Los Angeles, the joint council had followed closely the portentous revelations of the Hoover Commission and the Civil Service region. The council selected executive development as the ameliorative instrument most clearly within its reach. Academic and Civil Service Commission representatives in the joint council particularly championed the concept of management development.

Participation of federal field services in the Los Angeles area in undertakings of this kind had been infrequent, and about half of the agencies manifested no interest in the program from the beginning; 15 per cent gave it full endorsement; the remainder, pleading indifferent support from superiors, wavered. After almost a year of probing and calculating, the joint council resolved to move ahead, notwithstanding the lack of interest among portions of its membership. In the opening months of 1954, a special committee of the council labored to draft and win support for a management development program broadly adapted to what seemed to be the most chronic needs of potential participants.⁵

Seven premises underlay the Joint College-Federal Service Council's executive development plans:

1. It is desirable to bring together persons from varied positions and programs so that dissimilar backgrounds might cross-fertilize both participant ideas and program.
2. Primary emphasis should be placed on preparation for management responsibilities in the broad sense, i.e., stressing the management skills

⁵On executive development in general see John J. Corson, *Executives for the Federal Service* (Columbia University Press, 1952), ch. 1-8; Robert A. Walker (ed.), *America's Manpower Crisis* (Public Administration Service, 1952), Parts I-IV; American Assembly, *The Federal Government Service: Its Character, Prestige, and Problems* (Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 1954), ch. 5; and Paul T. David and Ross Pollock, *Executives for Government* (The Brookings Institution, 1957).

that signify an ability to grasp the interrelatedness of administrative problems and issues instead of mere functional techniques.

3. Concentration should be on middle-management employees, including both program specialists and generalist administrators, as the group and the place in the hierarchy most in need of change.⁶

4. The program should supplement on-the-job training through special instruction and outside assignments.

5. An academic critique of the theory and literature of public administration should be combined with realistic problem-solving.

6. A college or university should administer the enterprise.

7. Enrollment should be limited to two dozen persons so that an informal, face-to-face relationship among participants can be developed.

For several months, plans were delayed while legislation was expected which would allow non-Defense Department agencies to pay for management training. When it did not come, the joint council decided to go ahead with the program for defense agencies, even though it deemed varied participation important.⁷ The University of Southern California, an early protagonist of management development for government, was entrusted with responsibility for it.⁸

Each cooperating agency had primary responsibility for picking its enrollees, subject to two main guidelines laid down by the Civil Service regional office at the request of the

⁶In the two twelve-week training sessions that took place at the University of Southern California, during 1957 and 1958, forty middle-management employees from civilian hierarchies in six Defense Department installations adjacent to Los Angeles participated. Eight were GS-11; fourteen, GS-9; the remainder, GS-7. Only seven had bachelor's degrees, but all were high school graduates. Twenty-two had taken one or more college-accredited courses at an earlier time while working for the federal government. In their present employment, 9 dealt with program specialties, 17 were staff aids in finance or personnel, the others shared in directing or controlling the work of agency subdivisions.

⁷Installations eventually participating in the middle-management development program in one or both years included Los Angeles Ordinance District; Norton, Maywood, and Edwards Air Force Bases; and Point Mugu and Point Hueneme Naval Centers.

⁸This is only one of several USC educational programs in public administration for government employees and should not be thought of as the only type of course or approach used by the University.

joint council: 1. Candidates must do well on a battery of probative examinations, especially devised but drawing upon various recognized prototypes, to eliminate those who might be little interested or otherwise unsuited and to afford the academic leadership a preview of the social science background of selectees. 2. Management appraisal panels were recommended, to provide supervisory and top-level evaluations of candidates' management potential, self-confidence, conscientiousness, and ability to get along with others. The results of examinations and panels have provided at least ancillary guidance to sponsoring installations in their selection and have given academic and Civil Service Commission personnel an opportunity to participate in—and in part to control—the designation of matriculants.

Program Content

THE central features of the program were (1) an introductory course in governmental administration at the graduate level and (2) visits and conferences with practicing administrators in a number of federal and state agencies.⁹ One day a week over a twelve-week period matriculants met with academic personnel in morning conferences to consider, through lectures and discussions, pertinent literature relating to the objectives, practices, and problems of public management; and in afternoon sessions to consider, through consultations with administrative practitioners, the relation of the morning's discussion to their own needs and experiences. Thus theory and practice of public administration were juxtaposed in their broad outlines so that participating students might comprehend and proceed to reconcile them. Weekly reading assignments were drawn from both textual and case materials.¹⁰ Completion of the twelve-week training program earned each

⁹ A full-time faculty member of the School of Public Administration was placed in charge of the curriculum and arrangement for conference visits. Participants who did not possess baccalaureate degrees were admitted to the same course of instruction but did not qualify for full standing in the university's graduate division.

¹⁰ Harold Stein, *Public Administration and Policy Development* (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1952); Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (4th ed., The Macmillan Co., 1955); U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, task force and final commission re-

matriculant two or more units of university credit.¹¹

Although recognizing that middle management is more concerned than top management with intra-agency responsibilities and procedures, the program planners started with the premise that the participants were being prepared for higher management positions. Therefore, this kind of subject matter ought to be subordinated to those topics which contribute to the broadening and deepening of over-all administrative perspective and ability. Accordingly, directing and coordinating others and making decisions and accepting responsibility for them became the principal targets for systematic cultivation among matriculants. The course organization reflected this, covering the following major topics:

1. The origin and characteristics of American public administration as a result of political and economic change;
2. The theory and characteristics of administrative structure, including forms, purposes, and controls;
3. The essence of planning in administrative policy-making and execution;
4. The role of staff services—including budgeting, personnel, and auditing—in management, and recent refinements in their role;
5. The dimensions and importance of discretionary authority for administrators;
6. The mechanics and objectives of administrative coordination;
7. The anatomy of managerial decision-making;
8. The suitability of various methods for achieving line administrative objectives;
9. The accountability of administrators to the political and judicial organs of government.

Besides contributing to the amplification of classroom topics and the personalizing of selected management situations, the field trips served to bring high-level administrators into the instruction. Nearly half the total time went into conferences and discussions with these administrators and with program spe-

ports on *Departmental Management, Independent Regulatory Commissions, Government Corporations and Federal Business Enterprises, National Security Organizations, Personnel and Civil Service, Budgetary and Financial Administration*, etc. (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949 and 1955).

¹¹ Matriculants could enroll for additional academic credit (at their own expense) that would build on the initial course. Two students have done this.

cialists.¹² Since enrollees were from military, naval, or air force installations, the university chose nondefense agencies for a considerable portion of the conference visits to expand the discernment of participants. Question periods and discussions were frequent and effective. A number of the topics considered in conference sessions were supplemented by lectures of university faculty members. Organizational theory, the facets of administrative leadership, human relations in management, and operations research particularly were accented this way. At the same time, problems and issues raised in conference visits provided an abundance of suitable materials for subsequent classroom reflection and for critical evaluation of textual assignments.

Some Conclusions

ON the basis of two years' experience with middle-management training under university auspices in Los Angeles, a number of conclusions may be ventured. First, the training program pointed up the ample supply of latent talent within public agencies which can be drawn on to ease managerial deficiencies. In final written examinations, enrollees evidenced a real understanding of course materials and of administrative problems. They

¹² These outside experts included:

1. the Los Angeles district director, Internal Revenue Service, who explored problems of superior-subordinate relationships, staff coordination, and task fulfillment within a regional setting, as these existed prior to, and were modified by, agency reorganization in 1959;
2. the commandant, Long Beach Naval Shipyard, together with the chief budget officer, incentives supervisor, and management planning supervisor, who took up in detail the issues associated with installing and administering performance budgeting, industrial fund accounting, incentives and awards, and management analysis programs;
3. the deputy regional director, Twelfth Civil Service Region, who, with members of his staff, reviewed the present state of therapy for chronic administrative issues in federal personnel management, e.g., performance ratings, integration of civil service functions with line operations, wage board autonomy;
4. the associate justice, Superior Court of California, a former assistant city solicitor of Los Angeles, who explored at length the aura and media of administrative discretion, the role of the lawyer in government, and the inherent problems of fact and value that arise in the exercise of discretion in making administrative decisions.

did about as well in the course as students in the introductory graduate course in public administration, after which this was patterned.

The previous educational attainment of participants appeared to correlate directly with their individual examination scores, but employment levels did not seem to have a bearing upon written performance. The serious academic approach of the training programs lent heavily to their prestige in the eyes of enrollees. A great preponderance of matriculants admitted that their prospects for advancement improved not only because participation demonstrated their interest in self-development, but also because agencies considered success in the course a genuine indication of increased competence for the job. (At the participant's request, the university apprised each one's immediate superior of his performance.) Evaluations of all participants by their supervisors improved almost immediately after the completion of the course, and the course also was accorded great weight in the promotion of four matriculants.

The participants themselves saw the course as contributing specific management skills, according to a survey of the first course students. Twenty-five per cent stated that improved delegating and coordinating techniques were their most significant gain, 15 per cent indicated that better decision-making processes and evaluative methods were their greatest acquisition, 10 per cent listed a better understanding of human relations skills in personnel management, and 10 per cent pointed to an improved capacity for meshing line and staff. Specialized skills such as writing position classifications or inaugurating management analysis programs were listed as significant gains by only one or two persons. Forty per cent of the participants felt that a deeper understanding of the ecology of public management was a valuable benefit from the course, but this factor was listed as a second or third most important gain in most cases.

In all, the dynamic, artful aspects of management were clearly deemed to be the most pregnant benefits which had issued from the training program. A familiarity with these, the joint council and the academic leadership had insisted, underlies substantial and continuous individual growth in the administrative art.

Brookings' Executive Conference Program

By WILLIAM T. McDONALD and CARL F. STOVER

The Brookings Institution

THE career executive holds a key role in the operation of the federal government. He must provide the essential continuity and depth of understanding required for sound policy-making and effective execution of government programs. In significant measure, the welfare of our own citizens and of others around the globe depends directly upon his knowledge, ability, and moral character. The demands upon him require an unusual amount of understanding and insight concerning the operation of large organizations, the federal government, and the relationship between government and society.

Meeting well the responsibilities and realizing fully the opportunities of such positions pose a significant challenge to the individual. Under the federal career system, which generally emphasizes specialization and encourages the development of careers within particular agencies, many able individuals rise to executive positions without the general background and broad perspectives essential to their task. In the past, no adequate provision has been made for the further development of these individuals. The Brookings Institution's Executive Conference Program is directed toward meeting this need.

Original plans for the Program¹ envisioned an experimental series of residential conferences, two weeks or longer in duration and removed from Washington, D. C., where small groups of carefully selected top-level career executives could be given a significant developmental opportunity. Following such conferences the participants would be brought together in Washington for a succession of monthly seminars, where the interests developed during the conference and the work

begun there could be continued. This program would have these main objectives:

1. Provide a stimulating and broadening intellectual experience that would qualify participants for wider responsibilities in government.
2. Kindle interest throughout the federal government in more effective development of executives, and
3. Test methods and acquire experience in an uncharted area of executive development.

The Program began in July, 1957, with the financial support of The Ford Foundation for a two-year period. Following the selection of an advisory board² on major policy questions and the appointment of a staff, more definite plans were drawn for the first conference, which was held in December. Two conferences took place in the spring and summer of 1958 and four more will be held before July, 1959.

The Nature of the Conferences

THE scope and basic rationale of the first three conferences were essentially similar; all were built around the theme, "Exploring Executive Responsibilities." The common subject matter was organized under four main topics:

1. What Is the Job of the Career Executive?

² Original members of the board were: John J. Corson, director, McKinsey and Company; Lyle S. Garlock, assistant secretary of the air force for financial management; Roger W. Jones, deputy director, Bureau of the Budget; John W. Macy, Jr., executive vice president, Wesleyan University; Richard E. McArdle, chief of the forest service, Department of Agriculture; James M. Mitchell, associate director, National Science Foundation; John A. Perkins, President, University of Delaware; and Robert D. Calkins, President of The Brookings Institution. In August, 1958, Arthur S. Flemming, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, joined the board, and in September, George A. Graham, director of governmental studies at The Brookings Institution, and Warren B. Irons, executive director of the U. S. Civil Service Commission, accepted membership.

¹ The proposal for this program sprang from a small group which met at The Brookings Institution in 1954 and 1955 to discuss methods for strengthening the career service. Among its members were: Robert D. Calkins, John J. Corson, Eugene M. Zuckert, John W. Macy, Jr., James M. Mitchell, and several members of the Brookings staff including Maynard Barnes, Paul T. David, and Milton Semer.

By beginning with the study of the career executive's job, the common interest of individuals from diverse programs, specialties, and backgrounds was established. The main dimensions and requirements of executive work in government and business were analyzed and discussed. The career executive's role in decision-making and policy formulation and his working relationships with appointed political executives were carefully studied. Questions of the proper objectives and standards of career executives led naturally into consideration of the objectives of the newly created Career Executive Program and the problems facing it.

2. *Working in an Institutional Setting.* After two intensive days on the demands and requirements of the career executive's job, the focus widened to the total governmental environment in which he functions. The decision-making process in the federal government was discussed. The distribution of authority between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches and the modes of cooperation and conflict among these branches were considered. Special attention was given to the organization of the Executive Office of the President and relations between departments and central staff agencies and between bureaus and their departments.

3. *Management in the Federal Government.* Following study and discussion of the over-all governmental mechanisms for problem-solving and administration, attention was concentrated on major management problems facing career executives. Emphasis was placed upon management policy and on the responsibility of the executive to take full advantage of insights arising from research in the social sciences to secure effective management. This section closed with an analysis of executive skills and possible ways to improve executive performance. Thus, the conferences began and ended with a focus on the requirements of the executive's job.

4. *Interaction Between Government and Society—Problems of National Policy.* Throughout the conferences, a number of sessions were devoted to the consideration of policy issues. They were approached principally through discussions of factors influencing policy-making in many areas. Current economic

and manpower trends, the significance of advances in science, maintenance of national security, and America's role in world leadership were all considered. Increased attention was given to this area in the third conference with the addition of study group assignments on three major policy questions: The Role of the National Government in Education, The Testing of Nuclear Weapons, and Foreign Economic and Military Assistance.

The methods employed have been calculated to encourage participants to evaluate critically their own ideas and opinions and to permit a maximum sharing of insights and experience. Clearly, men of high caliber at the executive level have a great deal to teach each other and an effort has been made to structure situations in which the maximum benefits could be derived from this resource. Another major goal has been to stimulate interests sufficiently to help to ensure that study and inquiry in areas covered by the conference would be continued after its close.

The basic method has been the use of informal talks by stimulating speakers,³ followed by group discussions led in a manner that would bring about a full and critical exchange of experience and viewpoints. Panel discussions were occasionally used and, even

³ The Program has received excellent support from leaders in government, universities, and public affairs. In addition to the members of the advisory board, speakers have included such persons as Chris Argyris, associate professor of industrial administration, Yale University; Lloyd V. Berkner, President, Associated Universities, Inc.; Frank Church, U. S. senator from Idaho; Reuel N. Denney, professor of social sciences, University of Chicago; Hugh Dryden, director, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics; Max Freedman, Washington correspondent, *The Manchester Guardian*; John M. Gaus, professor of government, Harvard University; August Heckscher, director, The Twentieth Century Fund; H. Stuart Hughes, professor of history, Harvard University; Max Lerner, professor of American civilization, Brandeis University; C. Northcote Parkinson, Raffles professor of history, University of Malaya; E. Barrett Prettyman, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; Wallace S. Sayre, professor of public administration, Columbia University; Robert Sprague, chairman of the board, Sprague Electric Company; Donald C. Stone, dean, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh; Arnold J. Toynbee; and York Willbern, director, Bureau of Government Research, University of Indiana.

less frequently, formal addresses followed by question periods. Daily provision was made for informal discussions among participants and between participants and resource people. The case method was used during the second and third conferences, employing cases especially prepared for the Program. Participants in these two conferences also were assigned to one of three study groups and asked to analyze a problem, present an oral report on it to the full group, and submit a written report following the conferences. Study group assignments concerned both administrative and substantive policy questions.

An extensive conference manual was given to the participants at the opening of each conference, containing introductory material about all subject matter areas, major questions in each area, and reprints of pertinent articles and other readings. In addition, reading lists were furnished and a library of 300 titles was made available throughout the conferences.⁴

The Participants

AMONG the most distinguishing features of the Executive Conference Program are the unusual competence and significant official responsibilities of its participants. The group is small in number, but a cautious and thorough selection procedure in which departments and agencies participate has helped to ensure a broad representation of capable and strategically situated officials.

The sixty-nine participants in the first three conferences came from thirty-four departments and agencies. Four out of five held top-level line responsibility for administering substantial programs, and the rest held top

advisory or staff positions. The average grade level, for those in positions covered by the Federal Classification Act, was between GS-16 and GS-17; the average salary about \$15,000 under present salary rates. A career military officer of general officer rank participated in each conference. Men of corresponding rank came from the Public Health Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Reserve System, the Panama Canal Company, and the Tennessee Valley Authority.

As a group, the participants possessed career characteristics similar to those found by John J. Corson⁵ and others in earlier surveys of federal executives. Most were between forty-five and fifty years of age and on an average had completed more than twenty years of federal service. More than half of these men had worked in only one department or agency, and very few had any significant work experience outside government. Their general educational background was quite varied. Fourteen had received no collegiate degree while six held Ph.D. degrees in various fields. Out of sixty-nine, only three had significant training in public or business administration in college. Only a small percentage had participated previously in any kind of management training or executive development activity. The participants, in short, constituted a selected sample of the higher career executives who provide continuing administrative leadership across the executive branch of our government.

Participant selection began with an invitation to the heads of all federal departments and agencies to nominate one or more of their ablest executives—persons of demonstrated ability who were expected to move to still more difficult assignments and higher levels of responsibility. Significant screening took place within the departments and agencies because it was known that not all could be represented and that no more than one representative would be finally selected from any agency. For each conference, many more were nominated than could be accepted. Since every

⁴ The Williamsburg Lodge in Williamsburg, Virginia, has been used as the site for these conferences because it combines excellent accommodations, facilities for meetings, and recreation opportunities with a historical setting which relates directly to the theme and objectives of the Executive Conference Program. The Williamsburg restoration has been of significant interest to conference participants, and the attention it draws to the fundamental principles of American democracy has enriched conference discussions. Officers of Colonial Williamsburg, Incorporated, are interested in the objectives of the program and have been exceptionally helpful in making all of their resources available.

⁵ John J. Corson, *Executives for the Federal Service* (Columbia University Press, 1952).

agency could not send a staff member, the agencies were very careful to pick outstanding candidates for final selection by Brookings.

A group widely representative of programs and occupational fields and balanced with regard to experience in line and staff roles was sought. Before final selections were made for the second and third conferences, those who had been nominated were invited to small get-acquainted dinner meetings with the conference staff. These took the form of group discussions of conference objectives and public problems in a semi-social setting, beginning before dinner and continuing for an hour or so afterward. These discussions yielded useful information about interests and expectations of the nominees and proved to be a desirable "warm-up" activity for those selected. More significant, however: the preliminary meetings provided important assurance that those selected would both contribute and learn well during the conference. The element of competition in the whole selection process seemed to sharpen the anticipation of those finally chosen.

Results of the Conferences

THE test of the effectiveness of a program of this kind is its impact upon the attitudes and behavior of the participants and, through them, upon their organizations. This is difficult to measure accurately because of the complexity of the processes involved and the absence of tools that can be relied upon to produce valid indications of results. In the face of these limitations, some modest beginnings have been made in assessing the Program's effectiveness, but this remains an area in which substantial work must be done.

At the close of each of the first three conferences, participants submitted written comments in response to a brief questionnaire. Flushed with the excitement of the conference and the contagion of the group's spirit, observations received at this point were very positive. Some said that the conference had been the most significant two weeks of their entire careers. They stressed the importance of getting acquainted with and learning the viewpoints of colleagues in other areas. Many wrote of new insights gained with regard to

the purposes and operations of the federal government and a significant number spoke of having experienced a rebirth of interest in questions of public policy and basic concepts of democracy. Although some reservations and criticisms were offered about certain aspects of the experience, the over-all response was definitely enthusiastic.

An outside consultant⁶ conducted intensive interviews with each participant in the first conference approximately six months after it ended. These interviews show:

1. Participants feel they are better executives as a result of the conference. They now have a broader perspective of government operations, their sense of values has deepened, they have a fuller understanding of the human and social dimensions of the executive's job in government.
2. Participants emerge as militant advocates of executive development and management training for their own departments. Many programs now in the planning stage have been heavily influenced by the conference experience. This, coupled with the recent passage of legislation authorizing training throughout the government, may have a great impact on future career development programs.
3. Meeting and associating closely with fellow executives was a highlight. Although most had been working for years in the Washington area, they had not met before the conference.
4. Most participants were impressed by the fact that everyone had essentially the same kinds of administrative problems, with major differences occurring only in the substantive area.
5. Most felt that the conference had given them renewed confidence in their capacities. The awareness of other approaches to problems, plus the knowledge that their own approaches stood up in the light of common experience, seemed to contribute most to this feeling.
6. Personal relationships developed at the conference have in several instances facilitated the resolution of important interagency problems that previously had been impossible to solve.
7. Most participants were stimulated to improve their reading habits which admittedly had fallen victim to the extreme pressures of official business. Some are reading more in the field of public administration; others are trying to allow more time for general reading.
8. All participants wanted to discuss "Where do we go from here?" Many suggestions were made

⁶ Raymond L. Randall, Adviser on Executive Development to the U. S. Civil Service Commission.

for ways to continue meeting and working together. The most common suggestion favored long week end sessions on single topics of high interest.

9. All participants were enthusiastic about continuing this kind of program for government executives. They felt it was long overdue. Most felt it must be sponsored by an organization operating outside of the government.

The Future of the Program

EXPERIENCE during the first year provides the direction for further growth. The essential idea of the Executive Conference Program and the need for it have been accepted generally, both by the top-level career executives who are potential participants and by their career and political supervisors. Much has been learned about conference methods effective with groups at this level and a growing corps of speakers and resource persons who can communicate effectively with and stimulate such groups has been identified. Association as conference participants has revealed a desire and need for group study and action and a marked capacity for group identification that had remained latent during the long official consideration of the Senior Civil Service concept.

Alumni groups from all of the conferences will continue to meet at least once each month to hear speakers and participate in discussions of major governmental policy and administrative problems. Small committees cutting across the individual conferences are being estab-

lished to study and report on important professional issues, such as the responsibilities of the Senior Civil Service, the role of the career executive in negotiations with Congress, and the relationship between career and political executives. Plans also are being made for at least two week-end meetings for the combined alumni groups and for other special sessions that will bring together the men from different conferences.

A special conference for a group composed predominantly of Administrative Assistant Secretaries was held in October at Williamsburg. In December, a two-week conference was directed to the problems of executives who administer scientific organizations in the federal government, with the participant group made up of scientists who have risen to executive positions. One of the later conferences may involve experimentation with the "humanistic studies" approach to executive education, and serious consideration is being given to the possibility of directing one conference to the needs of executives in agencies with international responsibilities.

In all program appraisal and planning for the future, one of the key elements will be the consideration of ideas for the continuation and growth of developmental opportunities for senior career officials, both inside of the federal government—perhaps in conjunction with the Career Executive Program—and outside, as additional activities for The Brookings Institution and other organizations.

Benefits from Management Training

By ROBERT J. MOWITZ

Wayne State University

IT is too early to determine whether management development training programs for public administrators are merely a passing fashion or are here to stay. As yet, there is a dearth of empirical findings on the results of such programs. The purpose of this article is to report some of the findings of a study of an executive development program for federal employees in the Detroit area in the hope that

they will be useful to those now contemplating or currently engaged in such programs.

This program was planned and developed jointly by the Detroit Federal Personnel Council and the Department of Public Administration at Wayne State University. Although no systematic research was done to determine levels of skill and knowledge of federal administrators there, it was generally

felt by those involved in the planning that a need did exist for management training which would expose management to new ideas, concepts, and theories, as well as to techniques and skills. Conferences with agency heads bolstered this feeling of need and indicated a willingness to go along with the program. This was a new venture for all concerned, and it was approached with an experimental attitude. Of necessity, the initial decisions concerning eligibility and course content were based upon collective judgments, and although there were strong feelings about who would profit most from such a program, there was no evidence available concerning how benefits would, in fact, be distributed. After the program had been in operation three years, this study was undertaken to determine the reactions of participants to the program, as an aid to future planning.

The two parts of the program to be dealt with here are: a series of eleven Executive Development Seminars (XD) "arranged specifically for present and potential top administrators" each of which ran for eight weeks with one two-hour session a week;¹ and an Intermediate Management Development Program (IMD) consisting of a series of twenty-four lectures covering, in the main, the subjects included in the XD seminars. Members of the public administration faculty were responsible for the conduct of the program, although a good many lecturers from business management training circles were employed for the IMD group.

The XD seminars varied from fifteen to twenty-five participants, the size and the setting were designed to facilitate informality. Although regular assignments were not ordinarily required, bibliographies and mimeographed materials were distributed. The faculty mem-

ber responsible for each seminar conducted it according to his own teaching style. In contrast, the IMD group met in one of the campus lecture rooms with about 100 participants in each group. Originally, the first hour was devoted to a formal lecture; then following a short break, the remaining time was devoted to questions and answers. After the first year, this method was replaced by the lecture-conference method. The formal lecture was still employed during the first part of the period, after which the class was divided into small discussion groups for the purpose of discussing the lecture. The period, extended to two and one-half hours, closed with reports from each discussion group and comments by the lecturer.² Suggested readings and mimeographed materials also were distributed to the IMD group.

The first XD seminars were begun September 1953, and the IMD program got underway a year later. By January 1956, 186 persons had completed one or more of the XD seminars, and 484 had participated in IMD. During the spring of 1956, personal interviews were conducted among participants in the program, including all of those in the XD seminars who were still available in Detroit and a sample of the IMD group.³ The following findings are based upon the interviews.

Who Attended

BEFORE proceeding with the responses, it will be useful to compare the two groups, XD and IMD, in terms of grade, age, and edu-

² At the time of the study the lecture-conference method had not been in use long enough to make a fair comparison between it and the formal lecture-question and answer method. It should be noted that the 47 people in the sample who had experienced the lecture-conference method were overwhelmingly (85%) in favor of its continuation.

³ Interviews were completed with 127, 68%, of all those attending XD. The reasons for failure to accomplish an interview were: transfer, resignation, illness, death, vacation, and in a few cases, inability to schedule interviews due to the mobility of the respondent. There were no refusals.

The IMD group was divided into strata according to agency contributing forty or more students. Five agencies were in this classification: Ordnance Tank Automotive Command, Internal Revenue, Post Office, Detroit Arsenal, and Detroit Ordnance District. A sixth class included 73 students distributed among 18 agen-

¹ The subject matter covered is indicated by the following seminar titles: Modern Organization and Management, The Administrator and the Community, Communication and Organization Behavior, The Dynamics of Personnel and Employee Relations, Quality Control and the Organization, Organization Goals: Formulation and Achievement, Identification and Assimilation of the Individual with the Organization, Administrative Analysis and Research, The Executive and the Budgetary Process, Accounting as a Tool of Management, and Case Studies in Public Administration.

cation. The promotional literature for the Executive Development Seminars stated that they were intended for "those serving in positions equal in difficulty and responsibility to the classification GS-11 and above," whereas the IMD brochures stated that this program was aimed at "those in the intermediate management category, which includes supervisors, junior executives, and others who are potentially qualified for such positions."

The agencies nominated candidates for each of the two programs and submitted their nominations to the Federal Personnel Council's Committee on Executive Development which made the final selection—for XD on performance in a standard group oral interview and for IMD on ratings on the U. S. Civil Service Commission's supervisory selection test battery. The value of wide agency representation also was considered.⁴

Although a given grade was not necessary for admission, it will be seen in Table 1 that

Table 1
Percentage Grade Distribution in XD and IMD

Grade	XD	IMD
GS-5 or under	—	9%
GS-6 or 7	1%	15
GS-8 or 9	6	42
GS-10 or 11	33	22
GS-12	30	4
GS-13	15	2
GS-14	9	—
GS-15 or over	2	—
Other	4	6
TOTAL	100%	100%

the GS-11 suggestion provided in the XD literature tended to be taken as the determinant as to whether one was to receive "executive" development or "intermediate management"

cies. Within each strata, a one-third random sample was drawn. Interviews were completed with 127 IMD participants, 26% of the total group.

*Some agencies paid tuition for their employees and some did not. The study revealed no significant difference between responses from respondents for whom tuition was paid and those who had to pay their own way. Fees were not high. At the time of the study, the 24-week IMD sequence cost \$30 and the XD seminars \$5 each.

development. It is interesting to speculate as to where the grade break point would have occurred if a particular grade had not been suggested and agencies had been asked to base their nominations on a description of the purpose of the two programs, formulating their own concept of "executive" and "intermediate management" personnel.

No clue was given relative to age and education. It is evident from Table 2 that in gen-

Table 2
Percentage Age Distribution in XD and IMD

Age	XD	IMD
30 and under	4%	11%
31-40	34	33
41-50	34	31
51-60	24	22
61 and over	4	3
TOTAL	100%	100%

eral the IMD program was considered the appropriate place for younger people, but not very much younger.

The ten-year interval used in Table 2 is somewhat misleading for the 31-40 category, since a five-year breakdown reveals that 20 per cent of the IMD people are in the 31-35 group as compared with only 11 per cent of the XD trainees. Nevertheless, the similarity of the age distribution in the two groups is evidence that age was not the primary criterion for determining whether one was chosen for training as a "junior executive."

When compared in terms of education, a striking difference is revealed between XD and IMD personnel. The comparison in Table 3 shows that 40 per cent of the XD

Table 3
Percentage Education Distribution in XD and IMD

Highest Grade Completed	XD	IMD
Less than high school diploma	4%	11%
High school diploma	27	44
Some college (no degree)	29	20
Bachelor's degree	30	21
Graduate training	10	4
TOTAL	100%	100%

group as compared with 25 per cent of those in IMD had received college degrees. Looking at it from another perspective, for 55 per cent of the IMD people, this was their first contact with a college classroom, whereas this was true for less than one-third (31%) of those in XD.

The age and education distributions for the IMD personnel show that this group was not composed primarily of young college people being groomed to move from "junior" to "senior" executive positions. Although some would fall in this category, the majority were over forty years old with no more than high school training. Many of the latter may have reached the top of the promotion ladder and consequently are being trained in order to discharge their current responsibilities more efficiently. This suggests a possible ambiguity surrounding concepts such as "intermediate management development." There would seem to be some real differences between the preparation of those in the middle grades for positions of higher responsibility and the training and improvement of those destined to remain in the middle positions. As will be shown, there is evidence to support a more discriminating grouping based upon age and education.

Distribution of Benefits

THERE is no simple device for measuring benefits derived from a training program going beyond the teaching of simple mechanical skills that may be tested objectively. Certainly management development training is far removed from this. A desirable measure would be one showing the extent to which an employee's job performance was influenced by his participation in the training program, but the number of variables affecting job performance is so great that the measure of the influence of the single variable, training, is beyond the capacity of available methodology. Nevertheless the experiences of the trainees as reported in personal interviews do provide some insight into what is occurring. A pretested interview schedule was employed, and standard procedures were followed to protect the confidential nature of the interview and to maximize candor in responses.

The limitations as well as the values of this technique are well known to social scientists.

In order to arrive at an over-all estimate of the distribution of benefits derived from the training, as viewed by the trainee,⁵ the negative responses to two key questions will be examined. These questions were designed to determine whether or not respondents had obtained new ideas or concepts and new skills or techniques from their training. The questions were: "Keeping in mind your experiences in the program, did you learn any new skills or techniques that have helped you in your work?", and "Have any of your ideas or concepts about management and administration in general changed as the result of this training?" Each of these questions was followed by a probe for specific examples of skills or techniques and ideas or concepts.

Regardless of what other benefits one might derive from training, if one's ideas or concepts remain unchanged and if no new skills or techniques have been acquired, the impact of the training has been negligible. The distribution of negative responses is shown in Table 4.

Although one-third said that they did not learn any new ideas and one-third said that they had acquired no new skills, a comparison of the two columns in Table 4 reveals that these two groups were not composed entirely of the same people. The old saying about teaching old dogs new tricks was not borne out by these data. Those over 50 gave the lowest percentage of negative responses for both ideas and skills, whereas those 35 and

⁵ Although resources did not permit the interviewing of the supervisors of all of the trainees, 59 supervisors of XD students and 74 supervisors of IMD students were included among the respondents, since they themselves were participants in the training. Fifty-one per cent of the XD supervisors said that they had observed changes in the behavior and/or attitudes of their people attending the XD seminars that could be attributed directly to the training. A similar response was given by 54 per cent of the supervisors of IMD students. Fourteen per cent of the IMD supervisors said that they had observed changes in their employees since their enrollment but that they were not attributable solely to the training; a similar response was obtained from seven per cent of the XD supervisors. Forty-two per cent of the XD supervisors and 32 per cent of the IMD supervisors said that they had observed no changes in their employees resulting from the training.

Table 4
Percentage Distribution of Negative Responses Regarding Skills
and Ideas Obtained by Training

		<i>Per Cent No New Ideas or Concepts</i>	<i>Per Cent No New Skills or Techniques</i>
All respondents (n = 250)		33	33
Program	XD (n = 127)*	33	35
	IMD (n = 127)*	33	31
Age	35 and under (n = 57)	37	46
	36-50 (n = 125)	33	35
	over 50 (n = 68)	28	22
Education	less than college degree (n = 167)	32	28
	college degree(s) (n = 83)	35	44
Grade	under GS-12 (n = 169)	31	28
	GS-12 and over (n = 81)	38	45

* Some respondents were in both XD and IMD, thus the sum for the two programs appears greater than the total number of respondents.

under gave the highest percentage of negative responses to skills or techniques and the second highest to ideas or concepts. Although there are marked differences in negative responses to new skills or techniques depending upon the education of respondents, the education variable does not show up significantly relative to new ideas or concepts. The highest percentage of negative responses for ideas or concepts came from those in grade GS-12 or above. The range for ideas or concepts, from a low of 28 per cent to a high of 38 per cent, is much less than the range for skills or techniques, 22 per cent to 46 per cent. The age, education, and grade of respondents had a more decided effect upon responses relative to new skills or techniques than upon responses relative to new ideas or concepts. But a much larger percentage of the older trainees claimed that they had acquired new ideas or concepts than did the younger trainees.

It will be noted that the percentage of negative responses is about the same for both XD and IMD. This is especially noteworthy since the teaching methods employed were considerably different for the two groups. Apparently these methodological differences did not have any significant effect upon the percentage of negative responses in the two groups.

This does not mean that trainees found both techniques equally enjoyable. The study revealed that there was some objection to the large lecture technique among IMD people and general satisfaction with the seminar approach among XD people.

In addition to age, education, and grade, the distribution of benefits derived from management training appears to be related to the opinions and attitudes of the trainee concerning the effect of the training upon his chances for promotion. Each respondent in the study was asked if he thought that participation in the training affected a person's chances for promotion, although there was no way of determining from the study whether or not the respondent's perception of the relationship between the training and promotion was accurate. Thirty-eight per cent of all respondents said that the training had no effect upon a person's chance for promotion, and 54 per cent said that they thought it improved chances for promotion. The remaining 8 per cent were undecided or had no opinion. When these responses concerning training and promotion chances are broken down in terms of the negative responses on skills and ideas some obvious differences appear.

Table 5 shows a striking difference in eval-

Table 5
 Percentage Distribution of Negative Responses
 Regarding Skills and Ideas by Responses
 Concerning Effect of Training upon Promotion Chances

	<i>Per Cent No New Ideas or Concepts</i>	<i>Per Cent No New Skills or Techniques</i>
All respondents (n = 250)	33	33
Training <i>does not</i> affect promotion chances (n = 96)	47	44
Training <i>does</i> affect promotion chances (n = 136)	21	26

uation between those who thought the program did affect promotion chances and those who felt it did not. It may be that those who thought that the training improved their promotion chances were eager to demonstrate, or at least to assert, that they had benefited by the training. Perhaps there is nothing surprising about this, but it is a reminder that expectations of personal advancement are closely associated with the distribution of benefits claimed by the trainees.

Some Possible Meanings

These findings lead to possible generalizations. In comparing the data, it is apparent that although both programs seem to have had the same degree of success, only one-third negative on the average, benefits were not distributed equally in both groups. In XD, the people in higher grades who had completed college and in IMD, those under 35 with a college education said they benefited to a lesser degree than others. Counterbalancing these in both XD and IMD were those older trainees in the middle grades (GS-8 through 11) with less than a college degree. (See Tables 1, 2, and 3.)

This would suggest that in order to obtain a more equal distribution of benefits within each program, the selection process should be

more discriminating in terms of age and education and the course content should be related more closely to the educational and skill level of each group. This is especially true where skill and technique training is to be included. This degree of discrimination in selection does not appear to be as necessary where the objective is to teach ideas and concepts, although the responses on this item probably are less accurate and include more false positives than those on skills and techniques.

Beyond these rather obvious conclusions, however, there is something further suggested by these results. There appears to be a "training prone" population. It consists of middle-aged or older men holding positions in the middle grades (GS-8 through 11) who have not completed a college education and who have expectations that training will lead to promotion. Their eagerness to claim benefits from training, however, is probably related to something more complex than the content of a training program. This group provides an extraordinary opportunity for the trainer, but at the same time involves certain hazards. As management development training toys around the edges of group therapy, more sophisticated research than this will be required in order to avoid unanticipated consequences.

The President and Administration— Eisenhower

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TO evaluate a President as administrator is a very exacting task, and criteria for such a judgment are likely to be misleading. In reality, the President as administrator does not exist alone; he is a complex amalgam of administrator and politician. By combining the President as administrator with the President-as-many-other-things, it becomes feasible to attempt an evaluation of the total performance of the whole person. Clinton L. Rossiter and others have discovered reasonably reliable criteria¹ to measure the relative greatness of our Presidents; but these measurements inevitably are made against the Presidents as composites and not as administrators pure and simple.

A President must be judged by results, by accomplishments, by successes against failures; and administration, while playing an important part, cannot really be weighed in the scales so one can know just how important were administrative factors standing alone in the achievement of this success or that failure. An examination of Rossiter's criteria for ascertaining presidential greatness shows rather conclusively that presidential politics and administration are very closely related and appear at times as a blend.

¹ Rossiter judges a President and fixes his place in history by means of eight criteria of greatness: his times, how he led the nation and reached his hard decisions, his philosophy of presidential power, technical performance, his appointees, his personality, his influence on the Presidency, and finally his impact upon history. *The American Presidency* (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1956).

➤ Ordinary concepts of staff and line, when applied to the Presidency, run afoul of the bigness of the federal government. For example, the President's staff is really not a single unit; we must distinguish three levels: close personal advisers, the White House Office, and the Executive Office of the President. Similarly, it may be too simple to point to the growing regularity and staff of Cabinet meetings as an indication of increasingly direct relationship of the President to his immediate line subordinates, department heads—for the Cabinet's secretariat is the President's staff and may be more barrier than channel and, in recent Cabinet meetings, department heads have been equalled or outnumbered by presidential staff. The often subtle line and staff relationships at the apex of power are dissected here, with some comparison to long-accepted ideas on staffing the Presidency.

Since it is conceded by all students of the Presidency that policy politics, power politics, domestic and international politics, even party politics comprise the foundation for nearly all of the President's official concerns, the question naturally follows, why worry about presidential administration? Why be concerned about staffing, budgeting, planning, organizing and the rest of the administrative catalogue? Because while politics may be the principal presidential irritant, proper staffing and expertness in administrative management can reduce its sting, can control corruption, can prevent embarrassment along the political front, diminish criticism, allay frustrations, and assist the President in the fulfillment of his presidential objectives. As staff facilities grow to help the top manager manage, administration becomes even more immersed in the political liquid. Today's top staff specialists

themselves must truly be political executives. Mere managers will no longer do.

The President as administrator normally suggests implementation, the follow-through, the down-side of policy hill; and yet out of implementation, execution, and administration come revision and politics. The President, then, must deal with administration and politics as President and not as chief administrator alone. He must come to understand the composition of his role or he will not meet satisfactorily the challenge of his times. A good President must be both a good administrator and a good politician. Categorically to answer the question, "Is Eisenhower a good administrator?", you must know first if he is a good President, and historians probably will debate this question for years.

Presidential Succession: Policy and System

THOSE who expected an abrupt reversal in the march of the welfare state and the sudden dissolution of international strife with the advent of a Republican President in 1953 were among the romantics or political neurotics. Such changes are virtually impossible—given our structure of government, the built-in stabilities of our society, and the facts of world politics. Not only are many substantive policies of the Eisenhower regime carryovers from preceding Presidents, but so also are many of the presidential institutional aids established by Roosevelt and Truman.

The carryover flavor of both policy and administration is possibly one of the most pronounced characteristics of the Eisenhower Administration despite all of the noise to the contrary. And yet real differences in style and approach are discernible. Eisenhower is about as far removed from Truman as Truman was from Roosevelt in the degree to which the Presidency has been converted into a systematic, "businesslike" administrative organization. There is a progression here away from the personal type of Presidency to the systematic Presidency, system which often suggests efficiency fused with depersonalization of the thing systematized.

Even in legislative-executive relations, system is now emphasized. Eisenhower and his legislative liaison men customarily work

through the leadership, maintain the recognized but often ignored channels within the parties, and rarely, if ever, make personal appeals and petty compacts with the rank and file.

Truman maintained an executive establishment which was essentially efficient but which retained an air of senatorial informality; Eisenhower has insisted upon order, formality, and precise staff work. According to one publicist, "Instead of brilliant improvisation, he believes in good organization, thorough staff work, and an orderly play of many minds upon every issue before it is resolved."²

The President has more regularly scheduled meetings than any of his predecessors, further evidence of his love of system and schedule.

Eisenhower: Staffing and Organization

ONE of the principal purposes of presidential staffing has been to make the President more efficient by diverting necessary but routine chores away from him and into the hands of assistants. These assistants were expected to clear matters with appropriate officials and then dispose of the problems themselves or facilitate presidential action when required. The obvious effect of this, it would seem, would be to give the President more time for thinking out and dealing forcefully with non-routine matters and high-priority routine affairs. To many critics it appears, in the case of President Eisenhower, that the staff principles of public administration have been applied with such vigor as to suggest intemperance. Other observers contend that the staffing has been good enough but that the President has not always put time gained to the best uses. It is odd that a man with a background in large-scale military administration and an interest in and knowledge about staff usage and organization would be the first President to be widely accused of abusing the staff system.

Some segments of the political science profession are alarmed by the precipitate mechanizing of the Presidency and wistfully look back to those disorderly but very human days

² Merlo J. Pusey, *Eisenhower, The President* (The Macmillan Co., 1956) p. 87.

of Franklin D. Roosevelt. It is interesting to pause for a moment to recall how few caution signs were posted by the reformers of the Presidency and the professional advocates of presidential staffing in those good old days. Perhaps President Eisenhower's heavy reliance upon a large personal staff as well as upon an institutional staff³ of no small dimensions suggest that the public administration profession take care to draw attention to the limitations of its proposals both in terms of their application in specific settings and the general range of their effectiveness under varying circumstances, not ruling out the influence of the personal equation.

Mr. Eisenhower has avoided top-heaviness in the Executive Office as a whole insofar as the number of employees is an accurate measurement. The general impression abroad in the land is that the President has constructed a colossus around him, has materially changed the Truman staff system beyond recognition, and is completely captured by his own staff assistants.

Figures published by the Senate Committee on Government Operations and others supplied by the Office of the Director, U.S. Bureau of the Budget, contradict the first of these impressions: the Executive Office of the President in 1951 and 1952 (Truman years) had a personnel strength in excess of any Eisenhower year, including 1957.⁴ It is true that the White House Office staff, growing from 250 employees in 1953 to nearly 400 in 1957, has been augmented substantially, and of more importance the rank structure has been raised. Increasing use has been made of spe-

cial assistants with rank equal to or just under the Cabinet. When Truman left office there were only one or two of these superdepartmental assistants; there were as many as eleven special assistants to the President plus the assistant on June 1, 1958.⁵

Predictions are that in 1959 the White House Office staff will reach at least 422,⁶ which would be a percentage increase of 68.8 over Truman's. The White House budget jumped from \$1.6 million in 1953-54 to \$3.57 million in 1958-59, and these are significant benchmarks in the growth of this organization. Certain officials in the executive and legislative branches of the national government who have wanted to establish a direct working relationship with the President and who might have been able to do so under a Truman or a Roosevelt have been aware that Mr. Eisenhower has relied on a personal staff of such a size and character as to make this quite difficult. Franklin D. Roosevelt counted a personal staff of only 14, Truman 15, but it is reported that Eisenhower, starting with some two dozen in this category, now has 46.⁸

In contrast to the rapid and persistent growth in the President's personal entourage, changes in the institutional staff, specifically the Executive Office of the President, since Truman really have been gentle mutations and not revolutionary. All principal units of EXOP were left intact with the exception of the Office of the Director for Mutual Security which was taken out of EXOP in June 1953. As for being captured by one's own staff, it is a pitfall which all Presidents have had to guard against. President Truman alluded to this matter in his memoirs: "A President, if he is to have clear perspective and never get out of touch, must cut through the voices around him, know his history and make certain of the reliability of the information he gets."

³ *United States Government Organization Manual 1958-59* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958).

⁴ Lester Tanzer, "Changing Presidency," *Wall Street Journal*, April 3, 1958, p. 1. The full number is not shown in the White House Office budget. Estimated figures for Special Projects must be added.

⁵ This figure includes estimates for Special Projects as well as for the White House Office, which alone budgeted for fiscal 1959 only \$2,051,970.

⁶ *Ibid.*

³ One must distinguish between EXOP, which is institutional staff, including The Bureau of the Budget, National Security Council, Council of Economic Advisers, Central Intelligence Agency, Operations Coordinating Board, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, and the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization, and the somewhat more personal staff of the White House Office—still too large to be really a personal extension of the President, and finally his close aides including mainly assistants to the President.

⁴ In 1952, Truman's last year in office, 1,252 employees were employed in EXOP; in 1957, 1,217 were employed there. See Table I, in Committee on Government Operations, *Organization of Federal Departments and Agencies*, Committee Report No. 17, 85th Congress, First Session, p. 65.

Evidence available to this writer is certainly not strong enough to suggest that President Eisenhower consistently is locked in by staff and denied opportunity for independent reflection and access to diverse channels of information. His famous stag dinners, although held only intermittently, have been arranged to open him to wider views. Some reputable authorities on the Presidency claim that Eisenhower accepts staff recommendations too uncritically and that his role is therefore reduced to ratifying decisions made several layers down in the hierarchy with the result that he does not get into decision-making early enough. One-page memos have been a favorite target of his critics.

Countering the inferences that President Eisenhower is too dependent upon his staff personnel is the criticism that he employs too many special commissions, interdepartmental committees, fact-finding groups, consultants, and so forth. This may be a complaint against the President as administrator, but at least it may be argued that his critics cannot have it both ways. The insistence upon thorough investigation by special bodies can be defended on the grounds that it enables the President to buy time on his own terms when he needs to do so, that it enables him to obtain a broader field of participation, representation, and democratic response—thus a way to escape personal staff domination. Both the ultimate results and the intentions behind the creation of these special bodies have been questioned, but students of public administration should recognize advantages in an administrative system against which much of our literature is prejudiced.

At least two authorities⁹ claim in favor of close staff work that it can prevent Presidents from coming in contact with controversial problems which might lower their prestige and thus their leadership capacity. Another student of presidential staffing¹⁰ avows that staff routine and schedule will tend to raise issues with the President and thus prevent future Chief Executives from pursuing the

course of do-nothingism followed by Buchanan and Coolidge. In any case, little evidence exists to warrant the conclusion that EXOP, as institutional staff, is today structurally very different from the Truman office, that it has grown outlandishly in size under the direction of Eisenhower, and that the President has lost his own identity through staff intrusions. The principal changes have occurred close to the President, i.e., an augmentation of personal advisers, introduction of the Cabinet secretariat, and the formalization of procedural and organizational relationships in the White House Office.¹¹

The End of the Cycle for EXOP

MANY procedural changes, some of them very important, have taken place in EXOP under Mr. Eisenhower. Perhaps his successor will make as many or more, but this seems doubtful. In a sense, the Eisenhower Presidency represents what might be regarded as a concluding phase of an evolutionary cycle in presidential staffing. This is not to suggest that there will be no new emphases or approaches in presidential staffing in the future; rather that the Eisenhower Administration has, but for one minor exception, gone to the extent of public administration theory on the subject—adopting the basic essentials of the recommendations for presidential staff reform that have been urged for the last forty years.¹² Since 1920, administrative reformers

¹¹ Additional evidence of White House Office expansions is revealed in the following comment: "That unit, which is designated in the legislation as the White House Office, is the most important segment of the Executive Office and also the one most seriously affected by the overcrowded, makeshift conditions that prevail in the East and West Wings of the Executive Mansion, in consequence of the need to install more officials and assistants than the space available can accommodate." President's Advisory Commission on Presidential Office Space, *Presidential Office Space* (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 31, 1957) p. 11.

¹² These basic recommendations recur:

- (1) surround the President with the highest quality executive assistants,
- (2) formalize a systematic network of interdepartmental committees,
- (3) establish additional high policy co-ordinating units,
- (4) create a staff chief to pull the components of the executive office itself together, and,

⁹ John R. Steelman and H. Dewayne Kreager, "The Executive Office as Administrative Coordinator," 21 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 690 (Autumn, 1956).

¹⁰ Louis W. Koenig, "The Man and the Institution," 307 *The Annals* 13 (September, 1956).

have sought to introduce a Cabinet secretariat plus a staff chief roughly comparable to the position formerly occupied by Sherman Adams, known as The Assistant to the President. (The position in most of its major characteristics was retained with the resignation of Mr. Adams and the subsequent appointment of Mr. Wilton B. "Jerry" Persons.)

Although refining some of its features to his own tastes, Eisenhower for the most part has accepted Truman's institutional staff in EXOP, and most of the refinements have supplemented rather than replaced the old. It is doubtful if government in Washington can become much more centrally directed and controlled through presidential staff than it is today, and it also seems highly unlikely that future Presidents will be able or inclined to reduce this control substantially in the foreseeable future. Certainly President Eisenhower's military background, his habits of work, and his outlook on the administration of public affairs all contributed to the fulfillment of this cycle. The man and the hour met, so to speak; but the President's institutional staff today, I submit, would not look a great deal different had Mr. Stevenson occupied the office or some other man. Different Presidents and changing times no doubt will require different arrangements in respect to the personal staff side, but the EXOP pattern has acquired a firm, if not inflexible, base. One new wrinkle, which may be the least durable of the Eisenhower staff innovations, is the emergence of a strong Vice President, but who can tell that this development too, even with the odds against it, will not be a permanent feature of American presidential government.

The Cabinet and the Staff

THE President's appointments to staff and Cabinet posts may indicate something of his reliance on these positions. President Eisenhower has kept a relatively even consistency of talents in his appointments in both the domestic and foreign affairs fields; Tru-

man tended to put his first string appointees, e.g., Marshall, Harriman, Finletter, Symington, Acheson, in the international field only. Diplomatic and military interests of the nation were served under Truman through incredibly strong and intelligent department heads concerned with defense and diplomacy. While Truman succeeded in the conduct of foreign affairs largely because of his appointees, it is wryly observed by some that Eisenhower has achieved his diplomatic successes despite his advisers.

He has over-ridden his Secretary of State, his Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council on a good half-dozen occasions. On one occasion, during the crisis over Quemoy and Matsu in early 1955, his exercise of the veto power may well have meant the difference between an uneasy peace and disastrous war, and for it the free world's gratitude may be as great as for Harry Truman's decisions to support Greek independence in 1947 and to resist aggression in Korea in 1950.¹³

The President's appointees within the White House Office have tended to be more representative of his progressive Republican views than his other appointments. In a sense, the White House came to serve as a bastion against the Hollisters, the Humphreys, the McKays, the Hobbys, et al. And what is said here to a lesser extent is true of the appointments made to other Executive Office of the President agencies. Within the framework of EXOP is closeted the great majority of the President's main aides.

The Administration does point with pride to the Cabinet secretariat as if it is the living embodiment of a campaign promise fulfilled, i.e., the Cabinet regenerated. But inasmuch as its secretary is really responsible to the President or his chief of staff, the secretariat may in reality be more of a centralized staff tool than a restoration of government by the departments.

Also the proliferation of rank at the special assistant level possibly reveals that (1) the incumbent President has delegated a generous share of his coordinative responsibilities to super-Cabinet coordinators, and (2) the de-

(5) convert the Vice-President into an executive official." See the author's "An Historical Review of Plans for Presidential Staffing," 21 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 662-87 (Autumn, 1956). The "one minor exception," of course, is number 5, and headway has been made here.

¹³ Richard H. Rovere, *Affairs of State: The Eisenhower Years* (Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, Inc., 1956) p. 351.

partment heads of Cabinet rank rarely feel disposed on their own to initiate interdepartmental missions, leaving this job either to the Cabinet secretariat or to White House staff coordinators. Top-side initiative in this area has become so pronounced as to result in the creation of a new deputy assistant [to Mr. Persons] for interdepartmental affairs. What might be achieved through less formal means, as in the days of Truman and Roosevelt, is achieved through a neatly and rigidly contrived system which operates in a management setting of businesslike formality. Rather than less White House control of line organizations there appears to be more under this Republican President.

On the other hand, R. H. Pear has written that "The core of the Eisenhower reforms is the Cabinet. Notwithstanding President Truman and other eminent students, he has made the Cabinet work and work hard and effectively, to a definite schedule and as a team. The Cabinet supports him and ministers support each other in a way unknown in American history in the past."¹⁴

This widely heralded innovation grew out of a study of the White House organization in 1954 made by Carter Burgess who recommended the creation of a Cabinet secretariat and the improvement of the White House staff secretariat. In November, 1954, Maxwell M. Rabb was appointed to the post of secretary of the Cabinet of the United States and associate counsel to the President. In this capacity, Mr. Rabb worked as chief aide to the assistant to the President. A serious and intensive effort has been made by Eisenhower's staff to rationalize the relationship of the President to the Cabinet and of department head to department heads. In the past, Presidents have become infuriated or at least frustrated with Cabinet meetings and have blown hot and cold in dealing with their department chiefs on a collective basis.

The secretariat is small. The Secretary has only one assistant, who is a career civil servant. They are responsible for preparing agenda for Cabinet meetings and only subjects of interdepartmental consequence, such

as civil defense, water resources development, budget, transportation etc. are customarily included. *Ad hoc* Cabinet committees and the sub-Cabinet, composed of under secretaries, engage in prior screening of items of interdepartmental scope. Position papers asserting the advantages and disadvantages of a proposed policy or policy alternatives are circulated in advance of meeting time. After sessions, "a succinct written record of decisions calling for action is compiled and distributed."¹⁵ Implementation of decisions is also furthered by a post-Cabinet meeting chaired by the secretary and attended by a group of young officers known as special assistants for cabinet coordination. As departmental representatives they are briefed and return to their departments to make arrangements for follow-through. Between Cabinet sessions, these special assistants are in constant touch by telephone and otherwise with the secretariat, preparing agenda and auditing policy execution. Action Status Reports also are drafted periodically to summarize the status of all outstanding things yet to do before implementation is complete. "These staff procedures, all new in the last three years, have made the Cabinet into a dependable organ of advice-giving and of action supervision."¹⁶

The first secretary of the Cabinet secretariat insists that every effort is made to maintain flexibility and to guard against procedures which would kill off "candidness and spontaneity" of discussion. He has stated that the new Cabinet procedures have promoted interdepartmental cooperation and provided assistance to the President through "interaction and cross-fertilization" of the viewpoints of his advisers, who come to their jobs with a great diversity of backgrounds and of experiences. He sees the new system producing teamwork as a consequence of each department head being given a voice in major decisions at the pre-decision stage. It is also claimed that the intimacy between the Cabinet and the President, engendered by the new system, has developed a broader perspective for depart-

¹⁴ R. H. Pear, "The American Presidency Under Eisenhower," 28 *Political Quarterly* (January-March, 1957).

¹⁵ Maxwell M. Rabb, "The New Cabinet," *First Annual Lectures on Public Affairs 1956-57* (Jacksonville University Press, 1957) p. 18.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

ment heads who now seek what is best for the executive branch, the President, and the nation rather than attempting to do what is best for their own departments or themselves. A final advantage of the new Cabinet system as described by its charter secretary is that the "new Cabinet has helped reduce the burdens of the office of the President."¹⁷

Certainly much about the secretariat idea and about this particular setup can be defended, but an observer could suggest that while most of Mr. Rabb's claims for the Cabinet system contain a high degree of truth, some seem optimistic. Intense rivalries among the services, well-aired differences between Defense and Treasury judgments, other deep-rooted departmental squabbles raise questions as to "perspective," and Donovan's version of the so-called sketchy, "succinct" minutes appearing in book form also raise questions about confidence and free speech.¹⁸

One may ask if agenda and minute keeping of Cabinet meetings are all gain. The Cabinet—having no constitutional or statutory powers to act, having never been defined as an official body of the government, having been used in various ways by sundry Presidents—at times has served as advisory council, forum for discussion, and political workshop. In these ways it has been useful to Presidents willing to listen. But is not the new system running the risk of curtailing rather than stimulating advice by the promise that what is said at Cabinet meetings is said for the record? And was not the precedent of making a journalist privy to official Cabinet papers an even more serious and dangerous precedent? Today a Cabinet member undoubtedly must fear that his comments at Cabinet sessions either may appear in a post mortem published several years after he has passed from the political scene or may jump at him while he is still in office, from the pages of a widely-circulated set of Cabinet

minutes or from a book on the best-seller circuit. While these facts do not themselves indict the secretariat system, given such facts we can guess that at present it is more form than substance. However, such characteristics are not inherent in a Cabinet secretariat system; abuse of minutes could be eliminated.

Despite the fact that the Cabinet may have been organized in such a way as to make it more susceptible to the dictates of presidential staff discretion, the secretariat is justifiable if the system can be converted into a means of pitting collective departmental and agency¹⁹ advice against White House staff advice. Massive White House influence²⁰ has lowered the prestige of Cabinet members and made it increasingly difficult to obtain incumbents for assistant secretary positions. The system does afford formalized and regular contacts for department heads with White House policy-makers, if not with the President, and possibly serves as an extremely necessary channel of communication as well as an effective coordinative arrangement among departments. Having originally built upon the experiences of the National Security Council secretariat, the Cabinet secretariat now can build on its own and make changes and improvements as they become necessary. Facilitating access of department heads to the President might well be first among such improvements.

The White House

APPARENTLY the present organization for central direction and planning in national administration is built upon a strong and powerful foundation, the White House. Stretching about this seat of power are staff agencies indispensable to presidential government today but somewhat shadowed by the intensity of White House dominance and the vastness of the national line bureaucracies.

While not shown on the organization chart, a real distinction exists between the White House Office and other EXOP agencies. In

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁸ Robert J. Donovan's book *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (Harper & Brothers, 1956) by any other title could never have been written for a previous Administration since the book is based largely on Cabinet minutes which were handed over in a gesture of complete trust to the author. No other Administration ever bothered seriously to keep a set of systematic minutes.

¹⁹ Roughly 50 per cent of those in attendance at Eisenhower Cabinet meetings are not department heads; they may be outnumbered at times.

²⁰ White House machinery is now so massive that a new office, "The Executive Branch Liaison Office," was established to facilitate external White House contacts within the government itself.

the first place, all organizational units in the Executive Office of the President except the White House Office have been headed by staff aides to the President. These units were considered to be separate agencies headed by separate agency heads. Previous Presidents, however, always reserved the immediate supervisorship of the White House to themselves; this President Eisenhower has not chosen to do. The assistant to the President keeps the White House Office running and in a sense has given it agency status, thus blurring the old distinction somewhat.

Secondly, White House spokesmen—who speak for the President—are themselves immune from direct quotation most of the time and rarely are requested to testify before the committees of Congress. Also White House appointments are within the absolute control of the President while other EXOP agency heads, except the director of the Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary of the NSC, must be confirmed by the Senate. All White House staff assistants of any policy consequence resign after the inauguration of a new President, but this may not be the case with top aides in other EXOP units.²¹ Some continuity in the presidential institution is thus secured in bright contrast to the days when a new Chief Executive would walk expectantly into the official presidential setting to find not only that all staff members of the previous administration had vacated but also that filing cabinets and even the walls had been stripped bare. Of EXOP units, only the Council of Economic Advisers was handled clumsily during the transition between the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.

What has happened to the men with a "passion for anonymity," the six administrative assistants to the President brought into the White House as a result of the Brownlow Report of 1937?²² Although still rendering important services, it is surmised that they do not occupy positions with as much quiet prominence as they did during the times of Roosevelt and Truman. They have simply been swamped in the presence of a White

House staff corps of unprecedented numbers and rank.

One observer has averred that such centralization is a plus factor for the Eisenhower Administration on the grounds that matters which frequently get to the White House are "often better handled than those that do not." For example, scandals in the government mortgaging business contrast unfavorably with the impeccable honesty associated with foreign aid administration, the latter constantly before the White House, the former rarely.²³

There have been many organizational and procedural changes in EXOP since Truman, but they have largely been pragmatic and evolutionary in character. The basic structure has remained much the same. The most unique creations within the Office are that of the assistant to the President, a position not entirely without antecedent, and the Cabinet secretariat.

Outside the White House, EXOP agencies seem weakened. Although the Budget Director now sits in on Cabinet and NSC meetings at times, the importance of the Bureau, according to some, has been diluted under Eisenhower as the White House Office staff has managed to grab control of the final expenditure estimate figures. The Office of Defense Mobilization's influence also has been weakened as resources-centered departments and agencies have taken a firmer grip.

Through the intelligent centralization of staff services in the White House Office, possibilities for a more personal kind of leadership may be enhanced. Presidential leadership is not likely to flourish if over-organized and rigidly decentralized even within an Executive Office. A balance must be struck between order and disorder, centralization and decentralization at the top, and how well this is done in any one Administration can be measured only from different vantage points, at different times, by different people often with politically-conditioned and biased yardsticks. The hallmarks of the Eisenhower Administration have been the preeminence of personal staff and the maturing of the White House into a central staff directorate.

²¹ Steelman and Kreager, *op. cit.*, p. 694.

²² The President's Committee on Administrative Management, *Administrative Management in the United States* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937).

²³ Harlan Cleveland, "Survival in the Bureaucratic Jungle," 15 *The Reporter* 30 (April 5, 1956).

Science Democratized: Advisory Committees on Research

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THOUGH farming is typically considered a conservative, tradition-oriented way of life, American agriculture is built upon faith in the practical value of science. The key scientific centers for agriculture have been the state land-grant colleges and the U. S. Department of Agriculture. In an attempt to "democratize" agricultural research, giving the users of the information more influence upon researchers and administrators, Congress provided in 1946 for nonscientist advisory committees for USDA research. What influence have these committees exercised?

To the extent that it had a single purpose, the Research and Marketing Act of 1946 (RMA)¹ was a broad charter for USDA to improve agricultural marketing. It provided for research, service, and education, but not regulation to help create a marketing system capable of disposing of surpluses and to protect the farmer's position in that system. Enacted in a time of scarcity and high agricultural prices, the act was based on widespread predictions of agricultural surpluses and depressed prices once wartime prosperity should fade. A second purpose of the act, partially integrated with the major theme, was to authorize new funds for research in the state agricultural experiment stations. A portion of these funds was intended for marketing research. The politicians put their faith in science, but they put their faith, too, in the untrained man, and provided for citizen advisory

► "What has been the history of accomplishment of [citizen] commissions?" Rufus E. Miles suggested this as a sample of the kind of question practicing administrators would like researched. (18 *PAR* 108 (Spring, 1958).) Here, citizen committees on agricultural research are examined not only in terms of their accomplishments but also of their administration, problems, strengths, and weaknesses. In addition to improving our sense of advisory committee behavior, the study dwells on one of the more pressing administrative questions of today: democratic responsibility in research programs.

committees to make the program more practical, dynamic, and responsive.²

The act prescribed a national advisory committee of eleven members, including six representatives of producers or their organizations, and authorized creation of other committees. The statutory functions of the na-

² For a general discussion of advisory committees, see David S. Brown, "The Public Advisory Board as an Instrument of Government," 15 *Public Administration Review*, 196-204 (Summer, 1955). Respecting the use in federal research of advisory committees of experts, see Don K. Price, *Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy* (New York University Press, 1954), ch. 6. For a defense of the RMA advisory committees by a responsible administrator, see Harry C. Trelogan, "Research and Marketing Advisory Committees," 38 *Journal of Farm Economics*, 1-7 (February, 1956). Respecting the RMA program, see Charles M. Hardin, "Political Influence and Agricultural Research," 41 *American Political Science Review*, 668-86 (August, 1947); Edward C. Banfield, "Planning Under the Research and Marketing Act of 1946: A Study in the Sociology of Knowledge," 31 *Journal of Farm Economics*, 48-75 (February, 1949) and throughout. My own sources were mostly USDA files and personal interviews, both largely confidential.

¹ P.L. 733, 79th Congress, August 14, 1946.

tional advisory committee are to consult with the Secretary and other appropriate department officials, to make recommendations relative to research and service work authorized by RMA, and to assist in obtaining the cooperation of producers, farm organizations, industry groups, and federal and state agencies in the furtherance of such research and service programs. Of the other advisory committees, the act states simply that the Secretary is authorized to establish "appropriate committees, including representatives of producers, industry, government, and science, to assist in effectuating specific research and service programs." The national advisory committee (now the Agricultural Research Policy Committee—ARPC) and some seventeen commodity (fruit, for example) and eight functional (such as transportation) advisory committees have been established.

In 1949 the scope of the committees was extended from RMA work to all of the department's research and marketing service work, a move applauded in Congress. This extension removed difficulties involved in asking committees to distinguish RMA work from similar activities supported by other funds and reassured the committees that their role would continue despite the transfer of the program from a special RMA Administrator to the Agricultural Research Administration. A further demonstration of good intentions has been the addition of new committees for some of the most glaring omissions, chiefly functional areas not in the domain of any one commodity. In response to congressional insistence, the Research Administrator has achieved almost total coverage of the research program by committees. It is a political liability not to be able to claim an advisory committee recommendation for one's work.

Committee Membership

THE ARPC was appointed after obtaining recommendations from the major farm organizations. For nominations to commodity and functional committees, the department turned to the general farm organizations, many national commodity associations, some private firms, and some scientific and government officials' groups—over 300 groups in all—asking them to recommend "persons qualified to

serve on the membership of these committees and who would be representative of the particular segment of our economy which your organization covers." Some names were suggested within the department, and the commodity specialists in USDA had an important part in choosing among the nominees. Original and replacement members have been chosen, in effect if not formally, as representatives of interests and frequently of organized groups, though personal ability, experience, and interest have been important additional considerations.

Balance has been sought on each committee in geographical distribution, specific commodities within a commodity group, and marketing functions (assembling, processing, wholesaling, retailing). The "little man" is seldom chosen, for the organization leaders and those best known within their industry and within the department generally are large operators. Some groups urged farmer representation, viewing the committees as scenes for power conflict in which processors would serve their own interests, but "producer" representatives usually are not dirt farmers. There has been some feeling, too, that consumers should be systematically represented on the committees, but this has not been done. Others argued that the problems to be attacked were primarily in the field of marketing and required technical experience which should be emphasized in selection. The department has tried to represent "all" major interests in a commodity area, but spokesmen for small farmers, consumers, and labor are seldom named. These are businessman committees, even including the "producers." Committee membership reflects the same interests which are influential in the department apart from the advisory committee structure.

Technical research competence was not sought in the advisory committees. After experience with the committees, however, department and state researchers urged inclusion of members with research experience, and ARPC seconded the policy. The practice has been adopted of placing two "research" men on each committee. Frequently one is a land-grant college official and the other an industrial research manager. They are not likely to be practicing researchers, but they have

brought a more sophisticated view of research to the committees. The land-grant college representatives, especially, have been effective on the committees.

The cotton committee sought technical competence by establishing a technical subcommittee which performs staff work. The industry is well organized and the National Cotton Council (a trade group) is interested in research. The cotton technical subcommittee consists of representatives of the department, the experiment stations, and private organizations—men with research training. This subcommittee and one or two similar groups used by other committees probably enhance the influence of their parent committees, for the research experts supply ideas and reliable information.

The Committee Role

THE foremost test of committee influence is the question: do the committees propose and select research projects? Congressman Jamie L. Whitten, probably the most influential member of the House Subcommittee on the Department of Agriculture Appropriations, has been concerned lest RMA should be merely "more of the same." At the hearings on the 1950 bill and subsequently, congressmen and especially Mr. Whitten emphasized that the framers of RMA intended to shift the evaluation or selection of research projects from USDA to "the field," that is, to farmers, processors, and marketers. The House Subcommittee on Department of Agriculture Appropriations has insisted, following the 1951 hearings, that each agency provide information on the percentage of its work bearing advisory committee approval. To guard one's appropriation, one must generally have the support of an advisory committee before undertaking research on a particular subject.

Within the committees and the department there has been uncertainty as to how specific the recommendations made by the committees should be. When the program was new, some committee members and congressmen were skeptical about the actual good faith of administrators in using advisory committees, because they knew about government advisory committees by wartime experience or by hearsay. The RMA Administrator's Office, seeking

to reassure the committeemen and in response to repeated congressional expressions of interest and confidence in the committees, encouraged the committees to select projects. This willingness to have committees make decisions reflected also the absence of any careful plans for an integrated RMA program.

E. A. Meyer, first RMA Administrator, stated in 1949 his certainty that the committeemen would serve only if they were convinced their recommendations were being accepted—that they were not mere "window dressing." He reported one committee's approach: "They said, 'We know you real well. Now unless we are all serious about this and our recommendations are really going to be used, we will go back home now, and you can run this program.'"³ Another example: a subcommittee of the House Committee on Agriculture proposed that the department not undertake a project against which an advisory committee had recommended until ARPC had given its recommendation to the Secretary of Agriculture. (The Research Administrator, however, opposed this.)⁴

After initial USDA indecisiveness, the department has sought to impress on committees that they are to give advice, not to make final decisions. The department's view, and one in which the committee chairmen have concurred formally, is that the committees are a source of project ideas and evaluations, but not the sole source. Advisory committee recommendations merit serious consideration but are not binding. Most committee members, at least after they have served for a while, accept this position, in light of the evident responsiveness of USDA to their views. Committees vary in assertiveness, depending on such factors as the personalities of the members, the executive secretary's approach, and the organization of the industry and its previous relations with the department.

Department research administrators recognized, after some experience, that project-by-project discussion within the committees, with detailed reports at the meetings, did not leave

³ Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings on the Department of Agriculture Appropriations Bill for 1950*, 81st Congress, 1st Session, p. 90.

⁴ House Committee on Agriculture, *Federal Agricultural Research, Hearings*, 81st Congress, 2d Session, July, 1950, Serial ZZ, pp. 21 f.

enough time for general discussion. The Agricultural Research Administrator's Office has made real efforts to systematize its experience with committee meetings, in order to maximize committee effectiveness and satisfaction. The executive secretary now prepares a progress report prior to the meeting and sends it to each member of the committee. Each report may run 100 or 200 pages or more, listing projects under way and proposed. The committee generally breaks down the report, giving one member primary responsibility for each section. There is now more dependence on the written progress report, less on oral presentation, than earlier in the program. Where a committee member or USDA administrator has a question or comment, a project is discussed; otherwise it is likely to be put under a "continue" label.

Following discussion of the report, the committee votes, listing projects for expansion or initiation in priority order, in production, marketing, and utilization, respectively. At first formal voting was discouraged because it gives too much the aura of decision, not advice. Now, the department has asked the committees to vote, though not secretly, in order to lessen the likelihood of domination by a strong member. In voting, members sometimes must choose among projects when they would be content to leave the decision to the department.

An official in the Research Administrator's Office with over-all responsibility for the committees tabulates the priorities. He prepares a book listing each research project and its relative priority as voted each year by each committee that considered it. The book is used in the budget process. This systematization, which followed Secretary Benson's 1953 reorganization of the department, is a rather impressive demonstration of the intent of the Research Administrator's Office to make the committees effective participants in decision-making.

Results of Committee Action

IN 1952 the department calculated that 87 per cent of research projects had committee endorsement. The value of statistics on compliance with advisory committee recom-

mendations is limited, however. Some committee suggestions are fairly specific; others are extremely broad, perhaps suggesting only that more funds be devoted to work in some general area. Also, a project recommended by a committee may be initiated but with inadequate financing. At times there are conflicting committee recommendations: some agencies have offered projects before several committees, securing approval from one if not another. Finally, committees urge some matters strongly, nod an assent elsewhere. Nevertheless, committeemen do call attention to or dramatize some problems which would not otherwise receive careful official consideration, and it is clear that some projects were undertaken only because they were recommended by a committee.

Though committeemen can suggest the need for new knowledge or techniques, they are seldom in a position to set forth detailed projects, for they are not researchers. The department ordinarily must devise a project to accomplish the purpose broadly indicated by the committee. Even with cotton (which has a technical subcommittee) and with commodities of other well-organized industries which retain researchers, preparation of projects is left to USDA. Occasionally committees originate a problem for research, but generally they merely approve or reject projects suggested by the department. The department, after all, has other sources of information on commercial agriculture's apparent difficulties, and, as in the past, it is anxious to respond to these needs. The influence of organized interest groups in agriculture is effective, with or without committees.

Testimony within the department respecting committee influence varies. Some say that great weight is given to committee recommendations either out of respect for the committees or because of Budget Bureau and congressional badgering. Others suggest that, in reality, existence of the committee system has not much altered the research program, for the department does what it wants. Certainly the committees are not simply ignored. When a project which has committee approval is urged or undertaken, care is taken to tell congressmen and committee members that the

work was recommended by an advisory committee. Administrators are upset if committees frown on their work.

The Research and Marketing Act Administrator's Office, previously responsible for the committees, and the Agricultural Research Administrator's Office, now, have taken the committees seriously and have tried to make the advisory process effective. Support has been less firm elsewhere in the department, but the Research Administrator's Office has grown increasingly influential and the autonomy of the research branches has declined in recent years.

Even with their unquestioned power to influence, have the committees changed the basic course of USDA research? Though some informed persons within and outside the department disagree, wide opinion in USDA holds that they have not, because in the main the department has been able to persuade the committees to its point of view on projects. Also, the committees usually pass on only those projects which have been recommended to them by USDA. (It is probable, however, that USDA officials know and consider committee attitudes when they make project proposals, in advance of committee consideration.) Certainly a recommendation by a committeeman is not accepted without questioning its relationship to the going program, the cost and the budget, and the personnel, facilities, and technique available and required. Also, the administrator must consider such political data as congressional attitudes, which sometimes have diverged from committee recommendations placing the department in an uncomfortable position. There were many and there still are some instances of USDA abdication, but the department has refused to grant the committees a final right of decision, and committeemen ordinarily accept this limitation.

Committeemen are prevented by lack of time, interest, and knowledge from conducting a detailed scrutiny. The program is too complicated for the amount of energy they devote to understanding it. In 1949 there were reported to be some 3,000 research and marketing service "line" (specific) projects. The commodity and functional committees have

annual three-day meetings and the ARPC meets quarterly. Each commodity and functional committee elects its own chairman (generally an active, interested member), but the department provides the ARPC chairman. The executive secretaries to the committees (officials in the Office of the Research Administrator) play a major role; they prepare the agenda in cooperation with the chairman and serve as a source of information and guidance at and between meetings. Though the department services them well, advisory committees composed of nonscientists and meeting at long intervals for a few days cannot deal with the entire program at the detailed level of specific research projects.

Committeemen—usually businessmen—though often a bit skeptical about abstractions concerning the right to seek for knowledge, are not without respect for scientists. Experience on a committee generally increases willingness to accept scientists' judgments on research matters and strengthens confidence in the department and its research program.

While the department takes account of committee preferences, it would be hazardous to try to explain the shape of the research program in terms of the committees, rather than referring to Congress, interest groups, and participating agencies. If there has been a neglect of marketing work or of cross-commodity, controversial, and basic studies, more fundamental causes than the existence of the committees probably are at work. Though they have irked and angered many, the advisory committees seldom have come into dramatic conflict with the department, because both have accepted the same standard—the practical needs of "the industry"—as a guide to project selection. Department research administrators have been sensitive to politically effective organized interest groups and have emphasized applied research. So it is difficult for committeemen, as for others, to know whether committees have made a difference. Committees afford an opportunity for interest group influence through more official channels than these groups normally have, but also they afford the department a better opportunity to persuade interest group representatives of the soundness of USDA policy.

Planning: The Long and Broad View

Have the committees assisted in long-range program planning? The ARPC has sought to infuse the RMA program, and now the whole research effort, with an over-all view. Occasionally it has been suggested that all work should be centered on some specific commodity or problem for a period, but it was recognized that no single commodity project could draw support from all major farm interests, and there was uncertainty as to how to orient the whole research program toward any one problem. The Research Administrator's Office from time to time has formulated alternative long-range goals between which the ARPC was asked to choose, but the statements proposed usually were rather general and difficult to apply. Staff members present at ARPC meetings discern and take account of emphases, and ARPC has stimulated the administrators to think about an integrated research program, but ARPC has not known how to seize either the RMA program or the whole research program and point it firmly in a clear direction.

The organization of committees by commodity still predominates despite recognition of its shortcomings. There were strong pressures toward the commodity principle in: the commodity organization adopted for the Production and Marketing Administration in 1945, common interests among commodity specialists in the department and elsewhere, and the organization of interest groups in agriculture along commodity lines. The department has been disturbed by what it regarded as an excess number and poor distribution in committees, but attempts to abolish or combine committees were often blocked by interests which already had secured recognition.

Commodity interest groups and advisory committee members have been concerned that their respective commodities receive a fair percentage of the USDA research funds. Early in the RMA program, consideration was given to a formula (based largely on economic importance) for distributing funds among commodities, thereby avoiding criticism from any commodity group. This was not adopted, but the research program has been responsive to the political need of not ignoring any major

agricultural interest, and it has been especially responsive to those interests which have been well organized and active in seeking research funds.

The commodity and functional advisory committees were expected to formulate programs primarily for their specific areas of concern. Their existence has stimulated the use of interagency, cross-functional groups of USDA officials to draw up research programs for specific commodity areas. There have been complaints within the department, however, that the committees lack a programmatic view, that they treat each project separately rather than in relation to total needs and other work. The sporadic and non-professional nature of the committees makes them poorly suited to systematic program planning, though they have made the department more conscious of the need for such planning.

Basic v. Applied Research

Do the committees, by favoring projects promising quick results, menace basic research? USDA scientists and research administrators (generally former researchers) provide a force in favor of fundamental research which makes a substantial theoretical or methodological contribution to the development of science. Fundamental research permits theorization, inference, formulation of new scientific problems. Applied research utilizes the knowledge and methods of science, but results in findings that do not substantially advance the theoretical constructs of science.

Department officials complain that basic research must be "bootlegged"—hidden in projects which are justified in terms of applied research goals—because economic crises, insects, diseases, and the like are forever demanding immediate attention. Early in the RMA program, top department officials and the National Advisory Committee (now ARPC) placed considerable emphasis on service work and applied research in order to achieve visible results quickly, without which, they feared, it would be difficult to secure appropriations. The interests of commodity committee members generally have been restricted to their own commodities and to actual problems; they are not concerned with scientific generalizations.

The Agricultural Research Administrator's Office has attempted to convince the advisory committee members of the value of basic research and of the need for a better balance between basic and applied research in USDA work. The resulting public declarations by the committees in support of fundamental research are dramatic. However, a good many committee members probably lack any real understanding of what basic research is or that it might serve them ultimately. In spite of their manifestoes, one suspects, many committeemen will continue to insist upon the department's meeting such crises as occur in their respective commodities at the cost of research intended to advance the sciences upon which the applied research is based.

Nevertheless, the total effect of the committees may be to strengthen basic research. In committee meetings the department officials have presented the case for fundamental research and have won new, politically influential friends for it. These supporters may help counteract the congressional and interest group pressures for applied research which existed long before enactment of RMA. Within the department there seemed to be more confidence about the possibilities of doing basic research ten years after establishment of the advisory committees than at the time of their creation.

Controversial Research

In June, 1950 the advisory committee chairmen urged that "RMA funds should be used to conduct research on subjects relating to national policies as they pertain to agriculture, such as (a) matters related to foreign trade, (b) action programs, and (c) public policy related to transportation." Subsequently the chairmen reconsidered the problem and diluted their position. ARPC cautiously commented that RMA funds are used to develop factual information which may be useful in policy formation, though more than usual caution should be exercised in planning and reporting such studies. "However, RMA funds are not used to formulate policy or for specific appraisals of current policy issues. The evaluation of the effectiveness of an action program is an administrative function which should be

financed with funds other than RMA." ARPC has discussed the problem a number of times, and members have been reluctant to see RMA funds used on policy matters, though sensing the difficulty of defining that term. In general, the department has been cautious about initiating research in controversial areas.

An important controversy surrounds costs and margins research which attempts to discover the elements in the final cost of a commodity—what services, costs, and mark-ups have been added after the farmer sells the commodity. There has been congressional pressure for this work, but the marketing trades have been reluctant, and, in this sphere, cooperation from industry is essential to effective research. The department has proceeded, despite real doubts about the actual usefulness of the work, because of the strong political support for it. ARPC and a good number of commodity committees consistently have supported costs and margins research, but some commodity advisory committees have been divided on the issue, some have ignored it in making recommendations, and one attained a certain notoriety by urging that USDA not undertake such studies, arguing that competition in the industry would assure that costs are not excessive. Nevertheless, congressional pressure to "expose" the middleman's profits and clear the farmer of blame for high food costs has forced the department to win committee support and to undertake the research. The presence of the advisory committees probably reinforces the department's strong desire that its research program should not antagonize any of the politically effective agricultural interests, but it does provide a forum for persuasion.

In at least one case, a committee member raised strong objection to publication of natural science research findings, but the matter was resolved and the report published. The reluctance of research agencies in USDA to anger groups which may be able to influence Congress is a force toward modification, suspension, or non-publication of materials which may arouse protest. A critic's membership on an advisory committee is likely to be less important than his role in the industry and his influence in the community, though it may lend a little extra leverage.

Conduct and Termination of Projects

Department officials and committee members have given more serious thought to the question of the role of committees in project selection than to that of their role in scrutinizing the actual conduct of scientific investigation and termination of research projects. Congressmen have exerted consistent pressure on the department to terminate old projects and begin new research, and advisory committee chairmen have more than once listed the making of recommendations for the termination of projects among the functions of the committees. In one case, a study of the comparative merits of rayon and cotton bed-sheets was halted prior to completion because of objections from the cotton advisory committee, which feared findings adverse to cotton. At the urging of Congress (and, at times, of the research administrators) the advisory committees have been tempted to judge projects in progress and determine whether they should be continued. Probably the committees have increased the role of non-scientist judgments in deciding when to end projects, a decision previously resting heavily on the advice of the researcher and his scientist-administrator superior. Department administrators have not argued that scientific freedom is involved and that these decisions are solely for scientists to make.

The committees appear not to have interfered much with the actual conduct of scientific investigation. Aggressive committeemen have made comments and criticisms respecting all sorts of things, but department members, however critical of the committees, seldom speak of attempts to tell the scientist how to go about his work. The difficulty of dealing with matters at the level of the detailed project and USDA resistance to committee advice which threatens valuable work have protected most department scientists from interference.

Dissemination of Findings

The advisory committees have complained of the department's failure to disseminate research findings rapidly and effectively to producers and processors. Under RMA, new emphasis was placed on close relations between the marketing and processing trades and the research agencies of USDA. The advisory

committee chairmen have urged members to inform their trades about agricultural research, and the more active committeemen have attempted to do so. The public relations function of the advisory committees consists more in providing a general introduction to agricultural research for their publics than in reporting particular findings to be put into practice. The committees have established relationships between the department and some industries not accustomed to working closely with USDA or the state experiment stations and have systematized already close industry-department contacts. They have stimulated interest in USDA research and respect for the researchers and have made the research administrators more sensitive to the problem of industry utilization of research findings.

Appropriations

Until the House committee complained in its report on the 1958 appropriation bill that these committees were not helping Congress to economize in the research program, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on the Department of Agriculture repeatedly had expressed confidence in the committees and insisted that the department rely upon advisory committee advice. Several times, the commodity and functional committee chairmen and the ARPC have met with congressmen and Budget Bureau officials, generally at USDA initiative.

There have been those, probably including congressmen, who have been disappointed at the failure of the advisory committees to support appropriations more actively. Many of the committee members, important politically in their own districts, visit their congressman when they are in Washington for a committee meeting, though the extent of their effort on behalf of agricultural research appropriations is difficult to say. Advisory committee members appear on behalf of particular commodities at appropriations hearings since many members are active in commodity associations. Within USDA, those who work closely with them express confidence in the beneficial influence of the committees on research appropriations, but the measurement of this influence remains difficult.

Each commodity committee represents a

possible pressure group for one segment of agriculture which may seek funds at the expense of other segments. Congressman Walt Horan of the House Department of Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee posed sober warning in 1949 that "the procedure we are following in the utilization of RMA funds is almost giving countenance to Government by pressure."⁸ Some commodity groups have felt that they were not receiving a just proportion of the funds, but the department has been able to convince many committee members to subordinate the impulse to seek earmarked funds for their own commodity since those funds must come from the total program. There has been some broadening of loyalties.

Committees and a Good Program

GENERALIZING about the Department of Agriculture's research advisory committees is hazardous. Committee members are varied; their personalities, and especially that of the chairman, affects what the committee does. The methods of the executive secretary to the committee, a USDA staff member, make a difference. The organization of the industry, its experience with research, and its relations with the department and with Congress affect the committee's influence. Also, behaviors change over time. Yet there are common elements, deriving from the doctrine and working methods of the USDA Research Administrator's Office, the common experiences and outlook within the department, the limitations inherent in the organization and methods of the committees, and the impact of reason.

Questions of advice versus decision and specific versus general recommendations have generated ill feelings. On the other hand, committee supporters in the department argue that committees bring practicality to what might otherwise be "ivory tower" research. Committeemen and scientists have developed much greater mutual confidence, but many in USDA still fear that the committees are usurping departmental functions. The strongest anti-committee feeling generally is found

not in the Office of the Research Administrator, where committee contacts have been continuous, close, and wide, but in the branches and sections where administrators are closer to the on-going research. The feeling is strong, too, at some of the land-grant colleges, which resent committee inquiries into the college research program.

Effects have been mixed. Committeemen have made some outrageous statements, and committees have taken some shortsighted or selfish positions. They have hurt morale in some sectors and have consumed much time. Though they have strengthened the influence of nonscientific judgments in the research program, the right of the individual scientist to do what he wants is a very qualified right within the large applied research organization; the advisory committees did not destroy the freedom of the scientist. Committees encouraged some scientists by their interest, stimulated self-scrutiny and planning, and increased political support for the department in the business community. They helped ferret out more systematically the needs of agricultural producers, processors, and marketers and contributed to effective government-industry cooperation, which was especially needed for the marketing research program. They probably have not basically changed the USDA research program. Organized interest groups would influence the research program even without the committee system; with the committee system, their access is formalized, but the department has more opportunity to educate group leaders to a broader point of view.

The committees seem to be here to stay, though their functioning is subject to change. A good research program depends upon the department's educating the advisory committeemen and accepting full responsibility, in both of which it has sometimes failed. When committees do not take a long-run view, USDA should be able to resist demands for excessive allocation of resources to applied research. The USDA obligation to the life sciences is so significant that the department surely cannot forego fundamental research; in the long run, basic knowledge is necessary to real advances in applied work. Carrying on fundamental research also is necessary in order to

⁸ House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings on the Department of Agriculture Appropriations Bill for 1950*, 81st Congress, 1st Session, I, 1214 f.

recruit, retain, and stimulate able researchers. The department seems to be groping toward a solution to the question: how can fundamental research be better organized and supported within USDA while maintaining farmer and businessman, congressional and advisory committee support for the research program? Advisory committees can contribute political support and public relations activities to basic research; they cannot make useful specific decisions.

Maintaining applied research standards, too, requires departmental stamina. Basic and applied research are often inextricably joined—in appropriations, in administration, and in the scientist's investigation. Protection for the researcher in undertaking and conducting controversial work and in publishing embarrassing findings is necessary to self-respect and to standing in the scientific community. USDA can judge expense, feasibility, availability of personnel and facilities, and similar technical factors in project evaluation. The department can determine whether work is being done elsewhere and whether it fits into the broader research program or into long-range USDA plans or whether it contributes to action programs attacking serious social problems. Untrained men may take insufficient account of technical considerations, of departmental needs and plans, and of the apparently distant future, but they can present industry needs and build support for USDA research among and disseminate research findings to those most directly affected.

The department should supply the scientific, technical, and administrative knowledge for the program, but more too. Nonscientists

appointed as interest representatives can be taught a measure of respect for the judgment of experts and for research which goes beyond direct service to their own interest. If committees make the decisions, however, the groups that are strongest and best organized and have secured representation in the program will likely secure more than a just share. Even recognizing the imperfections of administrators and their deference to power, we cannot count upon educating most advisory committeemen to as broad, steady, and informed a view of the public interest as USDA officials may attain. Department of Agriculture officials, though they take great account of congressmen and of interest group organizations, can look ahead and around them; they sometimes can speak for the public interest and for those who are weak or who need help but know little of the value of research.

USDA is a public agency responsible for a governmental program. Those most directly affected should and do have special weight, but if committees administer, how can we hold administrators accountable? The department has enough political support for research to be able to say no to committeemen when it must, when persuasion fails and the issue is important. Committees deserve respect, but the department has a responsibility (1) to retain the right to make the final decisions and (2) conscientiously to inform the committeemen and to infuse them with a sense of the public interest. When it does this, the research program can be guided—imperfectly, of course—by a concern for what is just and by scientific and common sense knowledge.

Poetic License in the Civil Service

"When applying for office, if you are conscious of any deficiencies—moral, intellectual, educational or whatever else—keep them to yourself, and let those find them out, whose business it may be. For example, supposing the office of translator to the State Department to be tendered you, accept it boldly, without hinting that your acquaintance with foreign languages may not be the most familiar. If this important fact be discovered afterwards, you can be transferred to some other post. The business is, to establish yourself, somehow and anywhere."

—Letter of Nathaniel Hawthorne to Richard Henry Stoddard, a poet, quoted in Philip Kerker, "Patronage for the Literati" 75 *Good Government* 41 (September-October, 1958).

The Opposition to the Senior Civil Service

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IN the three-year interval between the Hoover Commission's recommendation for a Senior Civil Service¹ and the partial fulfillment of it in Executive Order 10758,² the Senior Civil Service was the subject of discussion in various professional journals and at a number of professional meetings.

It would be extraordinary if a plan such as the Senior Civil Service were received with unanimous acclaim, but there are peculiarities about the reception accorded it which merit consideration. It may be that certain negative reactions engendered by the proposals are symptomatic of some of the conditions intended to be improved under the Sen-

Men, though styling themselves rational, often are not. Therefore, in analyzing public affairs, the psychological must be considered along with the logical. Here a proponent of the Senior Civil Service looks at opposition arguments and suggests that they might mask personal considerations: concern of career administrators at being left out or, if included, at being transferred against their wishes; concern of former administrators that their opportunity for lateral entry to high-level positions would be diminished and that the positions would be drained of opportunity for policy leadership.

ior Civil Service. Similar but perhaps more serious is an undertone in some of the criticisms suggesting that a number of persons professionally concerned with government and public administration may not be entirely free from intellectual rigidity and emotional complacency.

It is not the purpose of this article to repeat the substance of the proposals for a Senior Civil Service (SCS) nor to reiterate the discussion of these proposals in the Commission and task force reports. It is important to state, nevertheless, that since the enactment of the Civil Service Act in 1883, the federal government has done little more to assure a supply of competent, top-level career administrators than to encourage the mass entry into service at the starting professional grades of college-trained young men and women. The assumption has seemed to be that somehow the best of this talent would percolate to the top. A concern for top management talents, as distinguished from specialized skills, has been conspicuously absent. Prior to the relatively recent intensification of college graduate recruitment, the sole advances have been the ex-

¹ U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Personnel and Civil Service: A Report to the Congress* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955); and the same Commission's *Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service* (1955).

² 23 *Federal Register* 1589, 1591 (March 6, 1958). *Good Government* (March, 1958) reported:

"President Eisenhower has authorized a Career Executive Program for the Federal service based upon recommendations of the Hoover Commission for a 'senior civil service'. Principal purposes are to (1) improve methods of selecting and utilizing high-ranking career employees in administrative and managerial posts; (2) facilitate transfer of executives to agencies where they are most needed; and (3) provide them with rewarding career opportunities and greater prestige.

"Scope of the program at first will be confined to about 800 positions in the three highest grades of the service (minimum salary, \$12,900). To be eligible, an employee must be recommended by his agency and meet standards set by a 5-member Career Executive Board. The Board will maintain experience records of career executives, develop methods for making regular appraisals, help the Civil Service Commission and operating agencies set up training programs for executives, and recommend ways to strengthen the program and make it flexible."

tension of merit appointments horizontally and vertically.

Little or no attention has been paid to how the civil service system would produce the top-level career servants with adequate comprehension and vision for dealing with the complexities of high public policy in modern society. Also, in the drive to protect against party politics, practically no attention has been paid to the need for harmonizing the values of a career public service with the larger values of responsible administration under the leadership and direction of top-level political appointees. In short, the federal government, either as a servant of the people or as an employer, has done nothing substantial or effective to secure top-management talent or adequate political executive personnel. Haphazard and fortuitous selection has become the rule for staffing top positions, and this situation has been accepted.

The Second Hoover Commission and its task force proposed the Senior Civil Service to help insure that top career positions are held by the best and the broadest-gauged men that the career system can produce, drawing its membership from and available to serve the whole government rather than a single agency or program. The recommendations also were designed to make it possible for top career and political officials to work together more effectively by delineating political responsibility as a primary role of the latter and expert, impartial, responsive, and even sophisticated administration as the contribution of the former. The Senior Civil Service idea was intended to make more meaningful the already existing requirement that the civil servant be as non-political on his job as is his selection for appointment in the first instance.³

The Senior Civil Service proposals also contain features which add stature and prestige

to the incumbents, increase salary, and augment their retirement benefits as well as providing tenure, in most respects better than that now accorded to civil servants. This was a conscious and deliberate objective of the Commission and its task force. Government must be able to attract and keep the finest talent for its career top-management positions. The best government for the American people requires the best personnel as former President Hoover has stated:

Government cannot be any better than the men and women who make it function. . . . We must make civil service so attractive, so secure, so free from frustrations, so dignified, that the right kind of men and women will make it a career. Then we can have the kind of Government that the United States needs and should have.

That is why our Report on Personnel and Civil Service is the nearest to my heart.⁴

Criticism of the Senior Civil Service

AGAINST this background it must be recorded that the SCS proposal has been received with something less than enthusiasm by the group from which its members would be drawn. Some students of political science and public administration also have provided an articulate opposition. The general style of the opposition from both groups has been to profess agreement in principle with its objectives (although the agreement in some instances may be doubtful) but to object to particular features of the Senior Civil Service idea as it was developed by the Hoover Commission and its task force. The reason given for objection in most instances is that particular features could be abused and carried too far. This venerable method of opposing change is well

Senior Civil Service and the Career System," 18 *Public Administration Review* 196 (Summer, 1958). A "representative bureaucracy" has been achieved for the most part but much remains to be done to keep it responsible to the people.

⁴ Neil MacNeil and Harold W. Metz, *The Hoover Report: 1953-1955* (The Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 29. The Second Hoover Commission made 314 recommendations involving many aspects of government. A *New York Times* story printed at the close of the Commission's efforts in 1955 quoted Mr. Hoover to the effect that he would choose the recommendation for the Senior Civil Service if he had a choice of only one recommendation out of all the recommendations of both Hoover Commissions.

³ Recommendations also were made for strengthening the corps of top political officials. *The Commission and its task force both recognized that, with or without a better top-level career service, a huge bureaucracy requires a sizable corps of able political officials at the top to help insure responsible administration.* This concern of the Commission and the task force with responsible government and responsible bureaucracy goes beyond the mere concept of so-called "representative bureaucracy" put forth by Paul Van Riper in his recent criticism of the Senior Civil Service idea. "The

known and much employed because it can be tactically effective, particularly where there is not strong leadership for change. It is a standard defense of the *status quo*.

An examination of the opposition's arguments reveals not only a lack of desire to do anything to improve this best of all possible worlds; it also reveals, on the part of many incumbents of the career service, an unenlightened self-interest and a psychological inability even to comprehend the proposals. I think it is fair to say that many of the arguments of the opposition seem more emotional than rational and somewhat overdrawn.

Perhaps this was to be expected. Public employees and ex-employees, now social scientists, are human. Proposals which threaten a familiar social pattern in which one has been successful are always disturbing, and it is difficult to view them calmly. Discussions at professional meetings, in office corridors, and over the lunch tables in Washington indicate major sources of worry on the part of some top career officials. As will be shown, some of these fears have developed to the point where discussions of the SCS proposal ignore points specifically covered by the Commission and task force reports.

Objections of Career Officials

Probably as good a clue to the career practitioners' fears as can be found in print is contained in the so-called consensus emanating from the Society for Personnel Administration's Executive Development Conference held in Annapolis in the summer of 1955.⁶ Therein the sources of anxiety are clearly suggested even though subtly presented. The questions raised with regard to the SCS are pertinent; but they are of interest to us here for the light they throw on the basic attitudes of top careerists who oppose the plan.

One group of questions raised at the conference shows concern that the discussants might not be admitted to the SCS. Of the seven points "... which need further study ...", according to the conference, in "... consultation with representative career executives who would be potentially affected," four

deal with problems of entry into, or qualification for, admission to the SCS. The points are:

a. Should applications for the SCS be permitted from career officials themselves as well as by nomination from the home department or agency?

b. Should admission to the service be by qualification and not by present grade?

c. Should the proposal be extended to a lower level than GS-15 so as to make possible more field participation?

d. Should a greater number than 1,500, and eventually 3,000, be authorized?

All of these points confirm the impression made by Washington conversations I have had that there is an underlying anxiety in the minds of some: "Will the SCS be large enough to include me?" There is also reluctance to rely on nominations by superiors and rigorous selection on the basis of merit. In other words, there seems to be a substantial feeling that career servants above a certain level should be guaranteed entry.

Opposition to the proposals on this ground not only are inappropriate but irrational, for civil service history reveals that extensions of the competitive service almost always include incumbents. Unfortunately the points are so phrased as to imply a rigidity which is not to be found in the proposals themselves. For example, as to the size of the SCS, neither the task force nor the Commission report was inflexible. The task force report stated: "The size should be determined by the number of positions in which senior civil servants can be used appropriately,"⁷ and suggested minimum and maximum figures based on the data available at the time of the study. The Commission in effect reiterated the task force language.⁸ In addition, the task force report stated: "The President should have authority to fix the strength of the service, within broad limits set by law."⁹ This is certainly a flexibility beyond that, for example, which Congress has been willing to grant with regard to the so-called super grades. Though the tone of the conference implied opposition to the SCS proposal on this point, in fact the Commission and task

⁶ 19 *Personnel Administration* 3 (January-February, 1956).

⁷ Task Force Report, p. 51.

⁸ Commission Report, p. 40.

⁹ Task Force Report, p. 51.

force were on the side of continuous study and flexibility.

As to nominations by the head of the agency versus self-nomination, there is nothing novel about the idea of being selected for special recognition by one's supervisors.⁹ The notion of self-nomination misses completely the thought that members of the SCS must be judged for their breadth of outlook and capacity to serve political executives, at least in the first instance, so that selection by those whom the SCS is designed to serve—responsible heads of agencies—is quite appropriate. Nor is it news to career men that top officials normally make such decisions after consultation with—career men.

The question on admission by qualification alone without consideration of grade level is similarly misleading, for qualification is the basis for selection clearly set forth in the official documents, with references to grade level only to suggest minimum qualifications.¹⁰ The reports assumed there is some validity in the present classification system.

A great bug-a-boo in the minds of some careerists has been the suggestion that members of the SCS might be asked to change jobs, perhaps to move from one agency to another, or even, perish the thought, to a regional office. The reaction of many top careerists shows that they are unwilling to move at all, even in Washington. But the mention of regional offices seems to have brought forth the most violent of negative emotions among Washington employees—as though it were a kind of banishment. The point was treated thus by the Annapolis Conference and it seems to represent the feelings of a good many careerists presently in high positions:

⁹ Van Riper also presents the con side of this argument at some length, principally by drawing an artificial distinction between nomination and appointment. (Op. cit., pp. 193, 197-198.) The fact is that, once made eligible by competitive examination, no one enters the classified (competitive) service or advances even one grade without the definitive action of his superiors including political executives.

¹⁰ See Task Force Report, p. 55: "It [the Senior Civil Service Board] should look for professional or technical competence at least of the quality now expected at the GS-15 level. . . ." See also other qualifications suggested.

d. More attention should be given to the concepts of "transferability" and "obligation to serve." It is felt that the fundamental American right of freedom of choice in vocational matters should not be violated. The proposal appears to borrow much from the military service in this regard.

The idea of transferability is not new, "un-American," or militaristic—civil servants now are obligated to serve where they are assigned. But all this anxiety is far-fetched. The Commission and task force were not so unreasonable or naive as to fail to recognize willingness as an important factor in personnel management. Said the Commission:

Subject to a rule of reason and, of course, with a right to have his views considered in the decision, [the Senior Civil Servant] could be expected to fill an appropriate position in Washington, in the field service, or abroad, as needed.¹¹

Certainly, an open-minded reading of the SCS proposal would yield the conclusion that it envisioned a fair balance between the needs of management and the desires and situation of the individual. No one, however, can argue convincingly either that there should be no transfer or even that most transfers should be dictated solely or primarily by "freedom of choice in vocational matters." At present, the head of an agency has the final say on where his civil servants will serve. In the SCS, the judgment of a board would be an additional factor. Some people may not like change; but it is hard to argue convincingly that some movement, as proposed, is unfair, unreasonable, or, in this highly mobile society, un-American.

Finally, the fears of the top careerists have led to crediting statements to the Commission and task force reports which never were made. Let us hope that this is only a transitory aberration and not a permanent phobia. An illustration of this is the following point from the Annapolis Conference:

¹¹ Commission Report, p. 40. The report continued: "For example, a senior civil servant might be moved from a position as head of a division, in an operating bureau, to be the aide to an assistant secretary, and from there he might later be assigned to . . . a regional office." See also Task Force Report, p. 52. Both said substantially the same thing.

c. The concept of "political neutrality" should receive more consideration. This concept should not deny a government employee the fundamental rights of citizenship, including the right of franchise in primaries.

Now, anyone reading this statement without checking the contents of the reports would conclude that the SCS proposal included a ban on voting in primaries. On the contrary, the task force report specifically says:

But this neutrality should not impair his [the senior civil servant's] right to vote, in primaries as well as final elections, and his right to be active in civic affairs.¹²

Academic Opponents

If consideration of the SCS proposals manifests shortcomings in the judicial temperament of some top careerists, what can be said of their academic colleagues in the opposition?

Two of the articles which have been published by academicians suggest the types of arguments used by most. The first of these, "Some Reservations about the Senior Civil Service" by Herman M. Somers,¹³ gives the reader no more concept of the reports' actual contents than can a pile of lumber convey the form and structure of the tree from which it was cut. This article expresses a point of view that there can be no nonpolitical career servant, yet at the same time it does not accept the full implications for the higher career service of this viewpoint.

The first argument starts by calling attention to three italicized words of the Task Force Report (p. 59): *neutral in politics*. Having taken three words from some 7,000 for his springboard, Somers proceeds to treat of the distinction between allegiance to party and allegiance to policies. Then he constructs an image of a ridiculous intellectual eunuch and attributes this creation of his own to the SCS proposal. Finally he asserts that the report did not face up to the problem of civil servants identifying themselves with program or policy. Nowhere is there mention that the first and most basic point of the reports is that

there must be a delineation and reallocation of functions between the political executives and the top careerists along with a strengthening of the political group so that the political executives could effectively relieve the top careerists of their political duties.

The reports did not overlook or minimize any of the problems involved; they were specifically discussed at some length. But after thorough consideration,¹⁴ the Commission and the task force believed a division of functions essential both for real political responsibility and for a better top career service. Unfortunately there is no hint of this discussion or the real spirit and direction of the task force report in Somers' article. Another writer attributes to the task force a "... strange image of a projected senior civil service made up of men who would presumably live in an uncertain and emotionless limbo" and lets it go at that.¹⁵

Harlan Cleveland takes a different tack. He does face up to the full implications of active and complete emotional involvement by career executives in program objectives—to the exclusion, I believe, of the career executive's usefulness as a civil servant. His article¹⁶ is full of excited phrases about the alleged need for senior government officials to be emotional about the policies they administer. After more than ten pages of crashing prose, he reaches the climax: A bureaucrat, he asserts, when his program is under attack "... has the responsibility—not just the obligation to his administrative superiors but the duty to his own concept of the public interest—to be very active in the effort to build a congressional coalition in support of his program." He points out, too: "... There are political executives and senior civil servants working side by side to develop the policy and sell it to the Congress and the public at large."¹⁷ Working side by side is one thing, but, if the tenor of Cleveland's remarks were to be followed in prac-

¹² All of Chapter I of the Task Force Report is devoted to this problem, and pp. 28-35 deal specifically with "The Question of Feasibility."

¹³ Stephen K. Bailey, "The President and His Political Executives," 307 *The Annals* 33 (September, 1956).

¹⁴ "The Executive and the Public Interest," 307 *The Annals* 37-54 (September, 1956).

¹⁵ Cleveland, op. cit., p. 53.

¹² Commission Report, p. 41.

¹³ 19 *Personnel Administration* 10-18 (January-February, 1956).

tice, certainly a career service in the higher ranks would become impossible.

In effect, Cleveland is saying that a career service is not desirable at the higher levels and that men coming up the career ladder should not shrink from moving into the political executive category and then out of the government:

... But even if it be true that the road to glory is strewn with turnover statistics, all is not lost. At this level a senior government official can often find an equally useful job outside the government. . . .

To get the best young people into the civil service, civil servants need to be encouraged to cap their careers by becoming political executives, with the glory as well as the risks that choice entails. I see no other course that will enable the government to compete successfully for the very best talent coming out of college.¹⁸

If all men had the same values, views, temperament, and resources as Cleveland, one might agree. How this prospect of getting one's precious head lopped off, due to political party change or even change of personalities within an administration, would encourage persons generally to enter the *career* service is not made clear.

What emerges as the real feeling of this academic group of critics is opposition to the whole idea of divorcing politics from the higher civil service. Cleveland very clearly doesn't like the idea of a career civil service in the higher ranks. He believes that in all levels of administrative responsibility, political duties must be performed. This is the boldest and most extreme statement of the case for higher-level career servants becoming identified with policy, so much so that they must move into political executive ranks. Carried to logical conclusions, the argument of this whole group of critics is that they would rather see the heads of civil servants rolling gloriously on the ground than give up overt political activity for the civil servant. These critics refuse to accept a division of functions, although only Cleveland is logical enough to accept the consequences—ultimate ejection from the government service through political turnover.¹⁹

¹⁸ Op. cit., p. 51.

¹⁹ Some students do seem to believe reconciliation is possible between SCS and political involvement by

The weakness in the argument for "political" civil servants lies in a false generalization about civil servant types, perhaps in Cleveland's case based on self-analysis during his tenure as a wartime official. He urges "vigorous advocacy that overcomes inertia in our big bureaucracy."²⁰ But is this "vigorous advocacy" such a dynamic factor? Vociferous advocates may advocate inaction; particularly with an entrenched bureaucracy is this likely. An inflexibility to the point of disregard of public needs and desires is most characteristic of an entrenched bureaucracy concerned only with its program. Without an SCS, experience indicates that we can expect executives to be entrenched specialists, reared in one agency and program, who contribute very little "vigorous advocacy"—or breadth of outlook either.

Somers recognizes that he is against change in these guarded words, which are the last in his article:

There is much that is faulty in our system and much that should be rapidly and forthrightly dealt with. The Hoover Commission has ably called attention to such matters. But let us as a people refrain from the self-denigrating view that almost any change would be an improvement. Such an attitude does not accord with the facts and is not a state of mind which leads to wise reform.²¹

Another major objection of the critics is an alleged elimination of lateral entry at the top civil service levels. Somers (after denying the validity of a nonpolitical career service) states

civil servants, e.g. Richard M. Paget, "Strengthening the Federal Career Executive," 17 *Public Administration Review* 91-96 (Spring, 1957):

"I disagree with the Second Hoover Commission task force on an arbitrary separation between political executives and career administrators. Actually, large numbers of bureau chiefs cannot avoid making policy or carrying political responsibility. The real trick is to be able to work conscientiously to promote the political policies of the party in power, both parties being presumed to operate in the public interest.

"Most career executives are better politicians—in the best sense of the word—than are their political supervisors. . . ." (p. 93)

.....

"The Hoover Commission task force laid down some sound general principles for some type of senior civil service, but the concept needs to be made much more definite before too much happens." (p. 94)

²⁰ Op. cit., p. 54.

²¹ Op. cit., p. 18.

that the only real nonpolitical civil servants have been those recruited directly from outside into higher civil service posts. He goes on:

It has frequently been argued with substantial evidence and logic that one of the great strengths of our public service has been its ability to call upon quantities of outside talent from all elements of the community for civil service jobs as well as political jobs, men from industry, the universities, and elsewhere who may be available for only two, three or five years. The Report suggests that the political posts be increased for such talents. But a high proportion of the talents I refer to are not affiliated with party in any fashion and often would not wish to become so identified.

The fact that large numbers of such people have served the government as non-party men has given a high degree of vitality, imaginativeness, and social responsibility to our service. Such interchange of persons between public and private life has contributed to democratization of the nation through wider citizen understanding of and participation in governmental problems. It is a reflection of the valued fluidity of American society.

The Report would go a long way towards curtailing such movement by insisting that admission to S.C.S. be confined to those who have spent a minimum of five years in the civil service. Once a privileged "in-group" of this kind is firmly established *it may be assumed that the period will be extended.* [My italics.] With all or the large majority of high executive posts shut off from lateral entry by non-career professionals, the door will be effectively closed at a vital level.

It can be accepted that generally the best professional administrators can be developed within the national administration. But it is not invariably so, as our experience demonstrates so vividly. This is not only because of the direct value of the skills and experience of men who have chosen to spend their lives primarily out of government but also because the permanent career administrators are strengthened and broadened by working in association, even in competition, with the outside professional. The political official is a different kind of animal.²²

We must note that the task force report did not recommend ending, or even limiting, any existing forms of lateral entry into federal employment. Even for the proposed SCS, intended to be a career service, entry would be possible after a "career" of only five years. Un-

less the career principle is to be completely disregarded, some prior-service requirement is essential; and the five-year period recommended is in fact the length of service traditionally required for re-employment in the federal government without examination.

If Somers is prepared to stand upon the last paragraph quoted above, it is difficult to understand why rationally he should object to the proposed SCS. Lateral entry into government employment would still continue, and any who chose to make government a career could shortly qualify for the SCS, too. Could it be that here again there is reflected subconscious anxiety that immediate access to the highest posts, short of political responsibility, may be limited? Do these critics want Uncle Sam to be dependent upon them for normal as well as emergency service?

I have italicized the words in the quotation above to bring them to your attention. Why should it be assumed that the proposed five-year period will be extended? The American tradition, the widely accepted belief in the value of lateral entry (concurrent in by the Hoover Commission), the probable success of persons who qualify for the SCS after the minimum governmental experience, and the influence of political executives all would be arrayed against lengthening the experience requirement. Furthermore, why would those who already have passed into the SCS have an interest in extending the prior service requirement?

Men from academic life who served the government with distinction in the great emergencies of depression and war may be pardoned their pride and satisfaction in emergency roles well done. But this does not argue against creating a career service at high levels of responsibility to cope with the normal problems of the present and the future.

The Opposition: A Summary

CRITICS both among higher civil servants and academics seem to oppose the SCS because of personal considerations rather than intellectual conviction on the proposal taken as a whole (and as it is actually written). Higher level administrators—the potential senior civil servants—oppose it because of their

²² Op. cit., pp. 15-16. Van Riper reiterates many of Somers' arguments in the article cited.

concern about being left out and, on the other hand, about being transferred against their will if not left out. Academics object because they do not want to lose any opportunity to enter or re-enter the upper levels of government at any time for short periods and because—upon entering—they want to be policy-makers. Their arguments do not convince. The civil service has grown and demonstrated its usefulness because of the faithful, effective, and, yes, nonpolitical service that successive political executives and legislators of differing viewpoints and political persuasion have obtained from American civil servants. Testimony on this point from many political executives and legislators should be at least as persuasive as the argument of a few former administrators—now academics—based on their

own experience when they were, and perhaps had to be, politically-active civil servants.

A Senior Civil Service, such as that proposed by the Commission and the task force, is a necessity for better government and a logical culmination of American experience. But the facts, the analysis, and the arguments can best be obtained directly from the Commission and the task force reports. Let us not in a matter so important to the nation's welfare get our knowledge of these reports second hand. The comments and the sparkling prose of the critics can best be appreciated after a first hand reading of the basic documents. They should be required reading for all those who are themselves practitioners or professional students in the area of public administration and political science.

Keep Employees Informed

A distracted shopkeeper presented himself before the Commissioner of Health of one of our larger cities to inform him that one of the Department's employees had inspected his premises, had pointed out alleged violations, and had suggested that the matter could be "taken care of" for \$100. He had told the inspector to return at 3:00 the following afternoon, but during the night his conscience had bothered him and he had decided to see the Commissioner the first thing in the morning.

A review of the photographs on file and the inspectors' schedules identified the employee, whom we'll call Arthur Smith. The Commissioner provided the storekeeper with some marked bills and arranged for a delegation to be present at the right moment.

A uniformed sanitary policeman was ordered to report at the designated address at 2:30 p.m. but was given no further information. The Commissioner and two assistants arrived by automobile well ahead of time; the policeman, traveling by bus, joined them at 2:30. The four waited in the rear of the store, behind a portiere which would enable them to see and hear what was going on without being observed.

Three o'clock came and passed. Another full hour went by, but nothing happened. Finally the Commissioner remarked to one of his aides:

"Looks as if Arthur Smith isn't coming here after all."

"Arthur Smith?", interjected the policeman, "that's a funny one. I haven't seen Art for months, but I met him on the bus on the way here. I told him where I expected to get off, but he left the bus a few blocks before that. Guess he ought to be here soon."

—WILLIAM BRODY, Philadelphia Department of Public Health

Reviews of Books and Documents

Great Cities, Great Problems, Great Possibilities?

By COLEMAN WOODBURY, University of Wisconsin

GREAT CITIES OF THE WORLD; THEIR GOVERNMENT, POLITICS AND PLANNING, by William A. Robson, editor. Second Edition. The Macmillan Company, 1957. Pp. 814. \$11.00.

GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA, by Leverett S. Lyon, editor. The University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pp. xii, 283. \$8.00.

CITIES IN FLOOD; THE PROBLEMS OF URBAN GROWTH, by Peter Self. Faber and Faber, Ltd. 1957. Pp. 189. \$5.00.

URBAN LAND USE PLANNING, by F. Stuart Chapin, Jr. Harper and Brothers, 1957. Pp. xv, 397. \$8.00.

METROPOLITAN COMMUNITIES: A BIBLIOGRAPHY, prepared by Government Affairs Foundation, Inc. Public Administration Service, 1956. Pp. xviii, 392. \$10.00.

THE recent surge of interest and concern over metropolitan affairs and problems is in some respects an amazing phenomenon. Writing about a year ago, Luther Gulick said: "Up till about the beginning of 1954 nobody would admit that America has a 'metropolitan problem.' I was personally brushed off politely and incredulously by mayors, governors, cabinet officers, legislators, newspaper editors, and various professional and reform organizations and foundation officials many a time. In fact I narrowly avoided being added to the population of several State Hospitals for the Insane, but they didn't have any wards for megalometropolitanians, I understand! In those days we were crying, not in the wilder-

ness, but above the traffic roar. And Nobody except a few planners paid any attention."¹

The Growing Concern

OF COURSE some exceptions could be noted, but more recently the pendulum has swung far toward the other extreme. In my files are copies of fifteen or twenty special series of newspaper and magazine articles on various phases of metropolitan growth, and I have not tried to keep up with all of them. Program committees for learned society meetings probably have scheduled more sessions on this subject in the past four years than in the preceding twenty-four. Committees of Congress and of state legislatures, as well as commissions appointed by mayors and governors, are looking into metropolitan problems in various ways and in many localities. Nationwide organizations as diverse as, for example, the American Bar Association, the Council of State Governments, National Municipal League, National Planning Association, Government Affairs Foundation, Tax Institute, United States Chamber of Commerce, Union for Democratic Action Educational Fund, American Institute of Planners, and the American Public Health Association have set up committees, issued statements, published pamphlets, or given the matter special attention at annual meetings. At least five major foundations and several local ones have made grants, which must total several million dollars, for studies and "action programs."

¹ Luther Gulick, *Changing Problems and Lines of Attack* (Governmental Affairs Institute, 1957), p. 2. Substantially, the text of this pamphlet was presented by Dr. Gulick at the 1957 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Universities not only have been urging their proposals for research grants, but a few have undertaken exploratory inquiries with their own funds. Of the latter, *The Atlantic Urban Region* of Yale's Graduate Program in City Planning² is notable. Although work on it started before 1954, *The Urban South*, edited by Rupert B. Vance and Nicholas J. Demerath,³ is another example.

Possibly even more significant is the boiling pot of discussion in the newspapers and organizations of literally dozens of urban localities. No accurate measure of the volume or character of much of this debate is at hand, but one may get more than a fair sample of current activity from the *National Municipal Review* and from *Metropolitan Area Problems*, the recently established newsletter of the Conference on Metropolitan Area Problems, which, in turn, resulted from the overflow meeting held by the Government Affairs Foundation in 1956 at Michigan State University.

One may well say, of course, "It's about time." From 1940 to 1950, about 80 per cent of the national population increase was accounted for by the 168 Standard Metropolitan Areas (SMA's) recognized by the Bureau of the Census. From 1950 to 1956 this proportion, according to Census estimates, rose to 85 per cent, with almost 69 per cent of the national increase in SMA's outside of their central cities and more than 41 per cent in their rural-urban fringes—i.e. outside of both the central cities and the more or less densely built suburban areas as marked out by the Census in 1950. Also, in 1956 the SMA's had nearly 59 per cent of the total population of the country—on some 7 per cent of its land area.⁴ Their proportions of production workers in manufacturing and of persons in wholesale, retail, and service trades ranged from about two-thirds to four-fifths of the national totals. Surely here, in the SMA's, are very large and rapidly growing parts of the population, wealth, productive power, human resources, and persistent problems of the na-

tion. Metropolitan matters, therefore, are no esoteric, specialized area to be relegated, more or less casually, to some small band of scholars, local officials, and civic organizations with nothing better to do or, at any rate, not quite qualified to deal with "larger affairs."

Quite surely, for every person whose present concern over metropolitan affairs stems from some appreciation of the kind of facts just indicated, several thousand owe their awakening to firsthand contact with existing conditions, commonly recognized as problems, in metropolitan areas: e.g. traffic, transport, and parking snarls; shortages of school facilities; air pollution; spreading and deepening blight in older districts—residential, industrial, commercial, and mixed; shortages of decent housing for lower and middle income families; rising tax rates—especially in suburban and rural-urban fringe areas; actual or impending water shortages; racial tensions in residential districts; inadequate park and playground areas; inability to find out what official or agency is responsible for dealing with conditions that are commonly thought to be matters of public concern; apathy of one's neighbors or associates in respect to most public and civic affairs—"you can't fight City Hall"; the stagnation or relative decline of central business districts; shortages of space for industrial expansion; longer, more costly, and wearing journeys to work; and increased borrowing by local governments without appreciable inroads on arrearages in public facilities (outstanding local government debt in the United States, most of which must be for units in metropolitan areas, went up by more than 92 per cent from 1950 to 1956).

A Danger and Warnings

ONE may welcome this awakening to some of the facts of metropolitan life and also recognize a serious danger that comes with it. Just because most of the awakening is due to various combinations of inconveniences, frustrations, and shortages, the probabilities are that we will propose and may well undertake an unending series of hit-or-miss, *ad hoc*, superficial remedies none of which will be more than a palliative and some of which, in

² City Planning at Yale, Number 2 (mimeo., 1957).

³ University of North Carolina Press, 1955.

⁴ For 1950 and 1956 figures see U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports—Population Characteristics*, Series P-20, No. 71 (December 7, 1956).

the longer run, will create more difficulties than they will ameliorate. This, of course, will be done in the name of the practicality, hardheadedness, and common sense of Americans "solving" problems. Thus, if water supplies are becoming short, let us create a special district or authority to serve the entire metropolitan area from an adequate source. Only a few professors or civic reformers will object that this simply adds one more local governmental agency to the present hodgepodge that averages now about 90 units per SMA. These same impractical persons may also point out that the new authority is more or less irresponsible politically. So what—if it brings in good, clean water? Or, if the voters of a metropolitan locality, despite a *post facto* public relations campaign, turn thumbs down on an experts' plan for reorganizing the local government structure, let us arrange that the state government may take a strong hand in the future in the interests of order and efficiency. If property taxes are rising sharply and seem to be near their ceiling of practicable yield, let us devise supplementary levies and service charges without worrying too much about their incidence or nuisance characteristics.

This is not to imply that we should rule out special authorities, all forms of state action, all the newer local taxes, or any other special remedies. In some circumstances and as parts of a thoroughly studied and widely discussed program, each may have a place. The danger is that without such study, discussion, and planning, we will be treating symptoms, not attacking underlying conditions—putting poultices on serious ulcers and taking cathartics for pains in the stomach due to an inflamed appendix.

The volumes under review, each in its own way, are warnings against and antidotes for this danger—this likelihood of ill-considered, superficial treatment of deep-seated metropolitan ills. Although none of them emphasize this point, no thoughtful reader could fail to see the implication. In this respect, as well as in the caliber of the works in general, they constitute most heartening additions to the literature of metropolitan life and local public affairs.

In *Great Cities of the World* Professor Rob-

son, of the London School of Economics and Political Science, has added materially to the substantial debt owed him by all students, professional and other, of metropolitan government and political life. This book was conceived before World War II but not actually started until well after it. Part Two and Supplementary Studies, some 640 pages in length, consist of 21 essays on 24 metropolitan centers: Amsterdam, Bombay and Calcutta, Buenos Aires, Chicago, Copenhagen, London, Los Angeles, Manchester, Montreal and Toronto, Moscow, New York, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Stockholm, Sydney, Wellington, Zurich, Cologne, Johannesburg, Tokyo and Osaka. All except the last four were included in the first edition.

The contributors are professional scholars and officials, appointive or elective; some are, or have been, both. Most of them are, or have been, residents of the localities they write about. Determined to avoid simply formal, legalistic description of governmental powers and structure, Professor Robson attempted to direct his collaborators' efforts to those subjects indicated by the book's subtitle. This try for consistency and comparability, he frankly admits in the Preface, was not completely successful. Some of the prospective contributors failed him completely. The essays included, after some five years of corresponding, editing, and discussion by Professor Robson and his editorial assistant, Arch T. Dotson (now of Cornell University), understandably are somewhat uneven, but all are informative and many are stimulating reading.

Valuable as are these essays and their accompanying charts and photographs, in my opinion they must take second place to Part One. It is an essay of some 80 pages—"The Great City Today"—in which Professor Robson condenses, compares, and evaluates many of the salient facts and ideas from Part Two and adds to them comments and insights from his many years of thoughtful and productive scholarship. One does not have to agree completely with all of his ideas and emphases to say that this is a most valuable, a masterly performance. In the next to the last section, after referring to the many differences brought out in the various essays in Part Two, he writes:

But in general there is sufficient similarity between the difficulties which have arisen in many different countries to enable us to say that great cities all over the world are facing common problems which are mainly due to similar causes.

These problems may be classified under the following five headings:—1. *Organization of areas and authorities*. . . . 2. *Popular interest and democratic participation*. . . . 3. *Efficiency of the municipal services*. . . . 4. *Finance*. . . . 5. *Planning the metropolitan region*. . . . (pp. 98-102)

His concluding paragraphs are:

The metropolitan city has played a great part in the history of mankind. It can continue to play a great part in the future, if we guide its destiny wisely and well. I have referred in these concluding pages to some of the severe criticisms which have recently been levelled at the metropolis. But there is much to love and admire in the great city. It is the home of the highest achievements of man in art, literature and science; the source from which the forces of freedom and emancipation have sprung. It is the place where the spirit of humanism and of democracy have grown and flourished, where man's quest for knowledge and justice has been pursued most constantly, and truth revealed most faithfully and fearlessly.

Let us bear all this in mind, and remain the friends and lovers of the great city in all that we do to improve its government, its politics and planning, and thereby raise the quality of life of its citizens. (p. 105)

To these eloquent words I would only add an underlining to the second clause of the second sentence: *if we guide its destiny wisely and well*.

Governmental Problems in the Chicago Metropolitan Area, edited by Leverett S. Lyon, is the first report of the Northeastern Illinois Metropolitan Area Local Governmental Services Commission. This body was authorized and its mouth-filling title supplied by an act of the Illinois legislature in 1955. Mr. Lyon served as executive director of the Commission. The eighteen papers that make up the volume were prepared as part of its educational program. Four papers deal with broad, essentially nonservice topics: "National Setting and the General Issues," by Carl H. Chatters and Leverett S. Lyon; "Chicago Metropolitan Area Problems," by Frederick T. Aschman *et al.*; "What Certain Other Metropolitan Areas Have Done," by Victor Jones;

and a brief "Summary and General Comments," by Mr. Lyon. Each of the other fourteen papers takes up one major public service—from surface drainage to fire protection and from public health to police.

The contributors are persons of recognized competence in the service fields they discuss. Many of them are officers of public or quasi-public agencies; some are professional consultants. In Mr. Lyon's words: "Each was asked to avoid definitive conclusions and recommendations but to prepare an expository monograph, analyzing the problems in the field discussed when viewed in area terms and indicating what he believes to be the more important issues requiring consideration." (p. ix)

Here lies the special, almost unique value of this symposium. Each service is discussed "in area terms"—i.e. as it and its problems are affected by the great extent and complexity of metropolitan Chicago (rather strangely defined, to be sure). By virtue of this characteristic and the space limits necessarily imposed, most of the essays strike a happy medium between the glibly superficial, overgeneralized treatments that often are served up for the nontechnical reader and the detailed, labored, and often ingrown treatises and survey reports on particular services.

Not many readers will find this volume easy going. As a venture in education, it clearly seems aimed at a rather select audience, though a potentially influential one. Those who persevere with it, however, should find more concrete meaning than they may have had before for such terms as economic service areas, the interdependencies of municipal units, or intergovernmental relations in metropolitan areas.

Planning: What and How

PETER SELF divides much of his time and talents between *The Economist* and the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is a coolheaded, acute observer of the metropolitan scene in Britain, and he has thought about what he and others have observed and analyzed. Besides, he writes a beautifully lucid and effortless prose that makes his *Cities in Flood*, a book of less than

200 rather small pages, an excellent example of its kind. He "... deals with the attempts made in Britain since the war to plan a better distribution of population and employment, with the present crisis which has overtaken these attempts, and with the prospects which lie ahead."

These attempts make up the most ambitious and imaginative set of measures put into effect for this purpose in any country of the Western world: the required preparation and periodic revision of land use or development plans by all counties and county boroughs (generally the larger cities outside London), with provision for establishing advisory regional committees by action of planning authorities within larger areas; the orderly dispersal of some residential and industrial development in the great metropolitan areas by means of the development plans, the New Towns built by public corporations, and controls and inducements as to industrial location administered by the Board of Trade; the complex scheme of government purchase of development rights in land, which, in its original form, has been given up but which still colors official policy in respect to compensation to owners of land to be kept vacant or in rural uses as greenbelts in and around metropolitan areas; a central Ministry of Town and Country Planning, now absorbed in the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, with substantial powers including the review and approval of development plans; plus a number of lesser but by no means insignificant programs.

These are complex measures in structure and in action. It is a measure of Mr. Self's discussion that he does not get bogged down in details but keeps the readers' attention on major purposes and on accomplishments, failures, and difficulties. Perhaps at some points he assumes more familiarity with the earlier programs than some American readers have, but no one should pass up his book on this account. Quite a few competent summaries are available to fill in this background.⁵

⁵ *Progress Report by the Minister of Local Government and Planning on the Work of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning*, Cmd. 8204 (H. M. Stationery Office, 1951) is more than adequate for this purpose.

As to the crisis in urban planning in Britain, Mr. Self sees it as essentially a loss of spirit, enthusiasm, and the sense of high purpose. Instead, too many planning authorities are coming to look upon themselves as simply umpires among various claimants for land for various purposes. One result is the definition of false or insubstantial conflicts as, for example, that between the "passion for space" of the rapidly increasing urbanites and the "preservationists" of the rural countryside. Although he has many wise and persuasive comments on the whys and wherefores of this weakening of spirit, I cannot believe he has satisfactorily explained it. If the promising tree of the new urban planning begins to wither, maybe it has grown too rapidly and some blight is attacking its foliage. Maybe, also, something is wrong with its roots—the popular understanding, hope, and support for planning among many classes of urban populations.

I feel certain, however, that Mr. Self would not say he has written the final words on this matter. Quite possibly some of the social science research he urges might throw new light on it. Certainly it is encouraging to read a book about planning that treats urban governments not as grubby institutions that have to be manipulated so that the planner may have his obviously superior way, but as the core agencies in metropolitan life for formulating public policies that, among other objectives, will further the building of more attractive, livable, and efficient cities for the future.

Over the past generation at least, many urban planners have been among those most sensitive to the problems and implications of metropolitan growth and sprawl, and most active in calling attention to them. For various reasons, however, planners as a professional group have not been very effective partners in the joint efforts of adding to our understanding of metropolitan phenomena and in mounting attacks against their ills. Probably the reason has been less the inadequacy of planners than confusion, hazy understanding, and outright misconception on the part of many persons as to what most urban planners are trying to do and how they go about it.

One of the merits of Chapin's *Urban Land Use Planning* is that it deals with just these matters in relation to land use planning. It is important to recognize and emphasize, as Chapin does, that this is only one part of current urban planning practice, although a substantial and significant one. Also, he makes clear that present day planning practices are changing rapidly and, therefore, differ considerably among agencies and individuals of comparable experience and competence. Where the techniques discussed vary with size of area, the treatment has been "... slanted primarily toward the small to medium-size urban centers, with metropolitan populations ranging from 100,000 to 500,000." (p. xv)

Chapin's well organized book summarizes first our uneven and, at many points, painfully weak knowledge of land use determinants—economic, "socially rooted," and policy determined—and some of the relationships among them. In Part II, he turns to the more common kinds of studies, surveys, and projections that planners undertake in trying to arrive at defensible estimates of future land use needs. These include inquiries into the economic bases of urban growth, population and employment studies, analysis of land use itself and of the relationships of land use to transportation facilities. The final section explains how the information from these studies plus the understanding of currently operating determinants are employed in preparing estimates and recommendations for guiding future land use in a sizeable urban area and for its major subsections.

Although specialists in these methods undoubtedly could (and will) quarrel with Chapin on various points and questions, nearly all of them, I believe, would agree that he has done an honest, able job. From his competent summary, planners will appreciate anew the advances made in recent years on this front, as well as the many serious weaknesses in method and rationale that still remain. Nonplanners have here a new road to understanding in a sizeable sector of planning thought and practice. We can hope that many will take the road and, as a by-product of their journey, discover how they may collaborate with planners more intelligently than they have often in the past.

That Library Shelf

IF THERE is anything more baffling than reviewing an encyclopedia, it may be trying to review a bibliography of the range and scale of the Government Affairs Foundation's *Metropolitan Communities*. Its subtitle is *A Bibliography*; its sub-subtitle—*With Special Emphasis upon Government and Politics*. Despite its 5,120 items, 6 chapters, and 54 sections, it is a selected bibliography. In fact, much of the toil and grief of its preparation stemmed from the process and criteria of selection. Responsible for most of the work were Victor Jones, director of the project, and three persons then on the Foundation's staff—William N. Cassella, Jr., Marilyn J. Gittell, and Edgar Rosenthal. In addition, the usual introductory sections list 7 persons "who assisted us in preparing whole sections or chapters," 27 who advised on scope and organization, and 96 names of helpers, reviewers, and suppliers of suggestions on chapters and sections.

Looking at the impressive results, what can one reviewer do? Should he pick minor flaws, look for omissions, suggest that, in his opinion, some items listed could well have been left out? It is a temptation to say only that no metropolitan home—oh, well, certainly no agency, office, or scholar seriously interested in metropolitan affairs should be without a copy, and let it go at that.

This bibliography, however, does reveal, indirectly but rather dramatically, one fact about the field that deserves emphasis. A short table based on the contents of the volume will make it clear.

	Number of Items	
Government and Politics in Metropolitan Areas	4095	821
Functions and Problems†	2164	418
Governmental Organization	1851	394
Politics in Metropolitan Communities	80	9
Socio-Economic Background	1025	—
Social Structure and Process	289	—
Population	320	—
The Metropolitan Economy	416	—

* "... may be of special interest to survey groups making inquiries into metropolitan problems. . . ."

† e.g. finance, police, sewage, water, planning, transportation, etc.

The proportion of items in Parts One and Two is not too significant because the bibliography, as indicated by its complete title, is primarily about government and politics. Nevertheless, the fact that 80 per cent of the items are in Part One reveals, at least to me, an unfortunate distortion or imbalance—not of the bibliography, but of the literature in the field. And here I am not concerned with the literature *qua* literature but as a rough indicator of interest, effort, and understanding. Again, look at the distribution of items within Part One: 98 per cent of the total items and almost 99 per cent of those starred have to do with operating and staff functions and with the organization of government in metropolitan areas; only 2 per cent and 1.1 per cent respectively are in the whole complex, crucial area of metropolitics—broadly defined.

Probably I should revise my earlier suggestion that the danger of ill-advised, partial, ineffective remedies for metropolitan ills comes from the fact that most of the snowballing concern stems from annoying personal experiences and frustrations. Surely, the professional students, officials, consultants, and reformers, at least those who have committed their ideas and experience to writing, have not supplied much corrective perspective or statesmanship.

Let me emphasize: my concern rests only incidentally on the contents of the bibliography. It does, however, afford a very crude confirmation of a condition that has been clear to some observers for some time past: we have much useful knowledge and experience on various services and on how they might be fitted together, very little understanding of the complex of human groups, classes, loyalties, values, perceptions, aspirations, tensions, and antipathies that make up metropolitan communities and that condition, in one way or another, every attempt at metropolitan organization, program, and action; much good mechanics, hardly the rudiments of a scientific understanding of aerodynamics to enable us to tell how or even if any proposed contrivance or invention can be put into safe and successful flight.

Two Questions

HERE, in my opinion, are both the most urgent need and the sharpest challenge to those concerned with metropolitan life and affairs. Anyone who grasps the central idea will not have to be convinced of the need for basic research in the ways and processes of metropolitan communities, particularly in respect to difficult issues of public policy and organization. It is important to recognize that such research will not provide pat answers to this or that detail of, say, a proposed program for governmental reorganization, planning, public finance, or recreation. It should, however, throw light on how such programs can best be approached, formulated, and presented. Most important of all, it should help responsible officials, leaders, and their advisers put into policies and programs the substance that will contribute most to the well-being of metropolitan residents.

Useful research, however, requires careful preparation based on a defensible rationale or philosophy of metropolitan life. Of the hundreds of identifiable facets of metropolitan affairs, which seem most worth inquiring into? Which of these are researchable now or in the immediate future? How are they most accurately and meaningfully defined? Without a philosophy of metropolitan community affairs, no satisfactory answers can be made to questions of this kind. Without reasonably clear answers, further research, of whatever scope or order, is almost certain to be disappointing.

Two questions, not new but often neglected, may indicate the kinds of basic issues with which our philosophy must be concerned:

1. Is there any such thing as "the metropolitan problem"? Among or within the clusters of problems and issues that now beset metropolitan communities, is there any one question or element central or, at least, common to all or most of them, which, if identified and dealt with, would clear up many of our difficulties and give us the upper hand with the rest?

Some experienced persons say the answer is no. The "metropolitan problem" is simply a loose, generic term for specific problems of water supply, policing, fire protection, public

recreation, public health and so on. Some say, perhaps there is a central, core problem, but no one has discovered it yet. Some say it is the endemic weakness of local systems of public finance; if they could be made strong and equitable, most of our other troubles would be quite manageable. Others say the core problem is how to make local governments, in jurisdiction, structure, and administration, commensurate with the boundaries and complexities of metropolitan areas. Luther Gulick, in the paper referred to at the beginning of this review, says: "It is the discontent of millions of human beings. It is a vast and growing dissatisfaction with life in and around the great cities."⁶ I think it is the inability of metropolitan residents to reach any substantial degree of consensus as to what should be done, in the public interest, about the generally recognized issues of their common life—government organization, finance, blight and redevelopment, schools, race relations, land use control, and so on. Professor Robson, I believe, is near the same conception when he speaks, in other contexts, about the weak sense of community in metropolitan localities.

In my opinion, trying to answer this question is much more than an exercise in definition. Unless we have some agreement as to what is the heart of our interest and concern, are we not self-condemned to endless years of futility and frustration?

2. What is our conception of the essential nature of local government? Is it simply a purveyor of certain services necessary to our accepted standards and ways of life—police and fire protection, sewage disposal, streets and highways, and so on? Apparently many, probably most, officials and others who write and talk about metropolitan affairs accept this view. Or is it basically, as philosophers and prophets from at least the time of Pericles have held, a form of human association that, in providing certain services, more importantly fills some of the deepest needs of man as a sociopolitical animal? This clearly is not a prevalent view today. Is it primarily a provider of services that ought, whenever possible without lessening its efficiency, to encourage nongovernmental forms of group

organization and action? An example of this kind of encouragement is the so-called "neighborhood-unit theory" of residential development over which planners and others have argued for some years.

In the value systems of those directly concerned with and likely to have a major part in shaping public policies in metropolitan communities, what are the relative rankings of order, efficiency, political responsibility, and public participation in governmental affairs? No one, of course, would expect complete agreement, but nothing is to be gained by continuing to play down the question or by accepting one view more or less by osmosis from our environment. If the unexamined life is not worth living, perhaps it is not too farfetched to suggest that the unexamined local government is hardly worth reorganizing—or even administering.

Research in metropolitan-community life and attempts to formulate a more satisfactory philosophy of local government and local public affairs need not replace our grappling with the urgent problems harassing many officials and non-officials in metropolitan areas today. We should do all three. But the grappling is more difficult today than it need be if we had paid more attention in years past to research and philosophizing.

In conclusion, I would suggest one probability and one fact for the consideration of grapplers, researchers, and philosophers alike.

According to the best projections available, the probability is that in 1975 there will be almost 60 million more people living in metropolitan areas in this country than in 1950. This increase over a short generation would be more than 70 per cent of the total metropolitan population in 1950. Peter Self and his countrymen have no monopoly on "cities in flood"! Unless the resources of men, money, and ideas, and appreciation of the tasks facing metropolitan communities are substantially increased, this flood may well become a disaster.

Of the traditional three levels of government in the United States, local government contributes most to the quality of our civilization and its day-to-day life. To point this out is not to deny the realities and possibilities of collaborative federalism in which more and more

⁶*Op. cit.*, p. 3.

governmental tasks are carried on by various combinations of federal, state, and local agencies. Neither is it to suggest that only governmental organizations contribute to the quality of a civilization. It is to deny that local government is adequately and fairly typified, as it so often has been, by the garbage collector and traffic policeman. The national government, as everybody knows, faces awesome responsibilities in keeping the nation at peace and its volatile economy reasonably steady. But keeping tens of millions of people from being burned alive and in jobs does not make a civilization—certainly not a high one. To be sure, the national government has other tasks, but I submit that local public agencies, in educating our children and some adults, protecting the public health and safety, maintaining peace

and order, providing most of our facilities for noncommercial recreation, making more nearly tolerable the frictions and costs of urban circulation, influencing markedly the amenities and satisfactions of our residential areas, guiding the intricate processes by which newcomers to urban areas (many of them poor, ignorant, and inexperienced in urban ways of living) learn to adjust to new conditions and responsibilities, and providing opportunities for direct participation in public affairs, play a more significant role in determining the quality of our increasingly urban civilization.

In what we do about metropolitan communities and their problems, therefore, the stakes are high—very high. They fully justify all the attention, funds, and brain power they now attract—and much more besides.

Informing Government with Economics

By JESSE BURKHEAD, Syracuse University*

FEDERAL EXPENDITURE POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY, *Joint Economic Committee, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957* (Papers Submitted By Panelists Appearing Before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy). pp. xix, 1203.

FEDERAL EXPENDITURE POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILITY, *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, Joint Economic Committee, 85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957*, pp. xi, 663.

ON November 5, 1957, the Joint Economic Committee published ninety-seven papers which had been submitted at the invitation of its Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy. On November 18 the subcommittee opened hearings attended by those who had previously submitted papers. Approximately ninety of the authors appeared at these hearings, which continued through November 27. Each hearing lasted from two to three hours. The con-

tributors, now called "panelists," were organized into fifteen groups, each directed toward a common theme related to federal expenditures. This considerable effort was organized by the Staff Economist for the Joint Economic Committee, Norman B. Ture.

The Joint Economic Committee organized a similar project in the field of federal taxation two years ago. At that time, a Subcommittee on Tax Policy assembled an impressive group of papers and organized the contributors into a series of panel discussions for examination of specific federal tax problems. These efforts were generally well received inside and outside the Congress, and the Joint Economic Committee evidently was emboldened to attempt a similar venture on federal expenditures.

The topics covered fall into three general groups. The first consists of an examination of the historical development of federal expenditures. The second group might be called "general theory," the topics including: (1) considerations in determining government functions, (2) the level of government at which

* The author is very much indebted to Paul H. Appleby for discerning comments on the material under discussion here.

public functions are performed, (3) economy and efficiency in government expenditures, (4) federal expenditures and economic growth, (5) federal expenditures and economic stability, and (6) procedures for determining federal spending programs. The third group of topics centers on specific areas of federal expenditures: (1) national security, (2) foreign aid, (3) natural resources development, (4) regional development, (5) housing and urban redevelopment, (6) human resources, (7) transportation, (8) research and development. The approach is fundamentally academic; almost all the participants are economists, and public finance economists at that. There are a few panelists from the staffs of the major interest groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the AFL-CIO. Very few of the papers were contributed by government economists, none of whom appeared as panelists.

"Determining the Proper Role of Government"

THE objectives of this considerable effort are broad and a little vague. Congressman Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the subcommittee, in the introduction to the published papers, points out that the study is related to the stabilization and growth objectives of the Employment Act. In opening the hearings, he said, "We are seeking economic facts and analysis on the basis of which broad guidelines can be developed to assist in the formulation of future Federal expenditure policy." (p. 1) The subcommittee was concerned, Mr. Mills said, "... with economic principles which are basic to determining the proper role of government in the setting of a private enterprise economy." (p. 1) He expressed the hope that looking at expenditure programs in a context of growth and stability, rather than in terms of more immediate objectives, might provide fresh insights and that this study might suggest opportunities for reducing the level of federal outlay or changing the composition of federal expenditures in ways which would better contribute to progress in the private sector of the economy.

These broad objectives in no way detract from the usefulness of the papers as submitted

and published, but the hearings inevitably have a certain indecisive character. Although the subcommittee presumably was interested in that timeless epoch known as "the long run," two short-run events unhappily had intruded. Between the time the papers were written and the time they were published the Russians had put the first Sputnik in orbit. And, by November, 1957, it was evident that the American economy was in the midst of its third postwar recession. Both the subcommittee and the panelists found it difficult to concentrate on broad impacts on economic growth and stability without reference to these more immediate events.

Before adopting a critical tone, I should stress that these volumes are an important addition to the literature of public finance. On the fact-gathering side alone, the contribution is magnificent. University students of government affairs undoubtedly will read this material.

A Theory of Public Expenditures

DURING the last three or four years, public finance economists have spent a good deal of time and energy in the elaboration of a theory of public expenditures. These recent efforts have not been in any sense revolutionary; they are grounded firmly in traditional thinking and, in fact, their theoretical underpinnings go back to the theory of marginal utility. This notion, as any school boy will remember, states that if one has eaten five apples, the sixth doesn't taste as good.

The recent contributions to a theory of public expenditure seem to have been touched off by an essay by Paul A. Samuelson in 1954, which depended heavily on the possibilities of making direct comparisons between private and public economic activity.¹ Many of the papers submitted by the panelists reflect this approach and elaborate and contribute to it. Richard A. Musgrave's paper will serve as a starting point for a description of the theory. His approach is shared, to a considerable extent, by the other panelists who are concerned with expenditure theory. To quote directly:

¹ "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," 36 *Review of Economics and Statistics* 387 (November, 1954).

The budgetary activity of the Government is needed because the pricing system of the market cannot deal with all the tasks that must be met in order to operate a sound economy and a healthy society. . . . [It is] . . . useful to distinguish between three major functions of budget policy, including—

1. The provision for social wants, which requires the Government to impose taxes and make expenditures for goods and services, to be supplied free of direct charge to the consumer;
2. The application of certain corrections to the distribution of income as determined in the market requiring the Government to add to the income of some by transfers while reducing the income of others by taxes; and
3. The use of budget policy for purposes of economic stabilization, rendering it necessary under some conditions to raise the level of demand by a deficit policy and under others to curtail demand by a surplus policy. (p. 108)

These functions or budget components can be separated for analytical purposes, and any desired combination can be chosen. For example, it is possible to have a small budget function for services but a large budget function for income transfer purposes. Musgrave suggests (p. 114) that these components might be measured separately and then tabulated as a net budget to show the separate effects of taxes, transfers, and outlays for goods and services in relation to the total of the three budget functions.

As for social wants,

The basic problem . . . arises because their satisfaction, by their very nature, requires that the goods and services in question must be consumed in equal amounts by all. (p. 109)

. . . the basic process is one of transforming individual preferences into social wants. (p. 110)

Decisions about the size of the public sector and the size of particular public programs are difficult because voters are unable to signal their preferences. Everyone benefits from government services whether he contributes a little or a lot. The taxpayer knows he cannot be excluded and, therefore, he will become disputatious about how much he is required to contribute to the support of the service.

The rational citizen-taxpayer

. . . votes for the level of public expenditures where the satisfactions created through Govern-

ment by the outlay which necessarily accompanies the last dollar in personal taxes equal the satisfactions he would have secured from a dollar of private expenditure. He equalizes at the margin the satisfactions secured from alternative avenues of expenditure. (Thomson, p. 151)

Whether government should produce goods and services—socially beneficial ones, public goods, or other goods—is simply a question of whether governmental organization of production will result in a given amount being produced at a lower cost than would be achieved by private producers. (Brownlee, p. 225)

The government should value resources at their opportunity cost in the private sector and utilize market information wherever possible to ascertain the value of such resources in alternative uses.

It is pointed out that there are some areas in which, because of special circumstances, the public sector must join with the private sector in the control of resources. These include the cases where social benefits extend beyond those immediately accruing to individuals, as with public education. Government intervention may also be required to assess properly indirect costs, as in the classic case of smoke control. In some instances, government, for technical reasons, may organize a service as a monopoly, as with the Post Office, and there may be cases like streets and sidewalks provided by government as a common service because of the difficulty in selling or metering the use of such facilities.

The principles governing public demand are in large part the same as those governing private demand.

Much of what the study of consumer demand in the private economy has taught us about people's private behavior is also applicable to their communal behavior. (Soloway, p. 24)

This, in a general way, as set forth in these volumes, is the prevailing economic theory of public expenditures. There can be little quarrel with the framework suggested for analyzing the redistributive and stabilization functions of government. But the approach to the determination of social wants is another matter. The foregoing conceptual scheme encourages a way of looking at government activity that gives rise to consequences that may be un-

intended and in some cases are denied by the authors of the theory.²

The first consequence is that this conceptual framework centers attention on the private sector, on the private control of resources, and on private pricing. Market allocation of resources is accepted implicitly as superior to public (political) allocation of resources, and the valuation placed on resources in private use implicitly controls valuations for public purposes. The public sector, in this view, is judged by its support for and strengthening of the private sector and private markets; market prices and market allocations take on an aura of the absolute. It is forgotten somehow that the market is a social institution, organized for social purposes. Indeed, this approach almost seems to suggest that the market itself—not the administrators of business firms—makes decisions about resource allocation—a sort of anthropomorphic view of private economic activity.

That which has been lost from view is an appreciation of something akin to the old-fashioned notion of sovereignty. A modern democratic government expresses a public purpose and a public interest which is quantitatively, and perhaps qualitatively, greater than private interests. The sovereignty of government is on a different plane than the "sovereign consumer."³

The second consequence of this approach, closely linked with the first, is that if the market is the starting point and the guideline for resource allocation, the importance of public activities necessarily will be limited. This consequence is not appreciated by most of the adherents of the theory who feel that their approach is neutral with respect to the valuations placed on private and on public goods.

The difficulty arises in efforts to "maximize the value of output minus costs." This sounds like an objective standard for the determination of priorities between the public and the private sector. But, in fact, the standard cannot be applied to public goods. For private goods the measurements of net profitability

are always possible and in a market-dominated economy the primacy of these measurements always will be emphasized. If the formal maximization criterion is neutral as between public and private goods, then it cannot be quantified and has no significance for policy decisions. If it can be supported by measurements, its neutrality is lost because net profitability will inevitably be understated for public activities; these are not undertaken for profit but for other considerations.

The undervaluation of public goods is everywhere evident. As Galbraith has pointed out brilliantly in his recent book, *The Affluent Society*,⁴ we are so happy to keep resources profitably and fully employed in the private sector that we shamefully neglect the social consequences of our private economic actions. We spend a billion dollars a year retooling the automobile industry for new models, for which a market must be found by inducing consumers to regard last year's car as obsolescent. Then we drive our new Cadillac through slums and past dilapidated school buildings.

The pressing problem of public finance in the year 1958 is that there isn't enough of it. There are very many areas where the federal government could spend additional funds in a productive fashion, and there are certainly places where state and local governments could allocate additional resources to alleviate some urban and rural blight. It is reasonable to suppose that additional outlays here might produce increasing, not diminishing, utilities. The events of the past year, with a Detroit recession and the post-Sputnik concern with education, suggest that our society is in more danger of undervaluing than overvaluing the resources that are devoted to public purposes. Too many of our private dollars are dedicated to "marginal" uses, to a repackaging of everything from food to the female figure.

A few of the panelists are aware of the danger of overvaluing private goods:

There is a lot of chrome, to use the language of the day, in our private economy and private expenditures. (Barkin, *Hearings*, p. 61)

The basic challenge is, therefore, not to distin-

² See, for example, Musgrave's conclusion about the efficiency of satisfying social wants. (*Papers*, p. 115)

³ "You are the king in the Land of Brands," as sloganized by advertisers, is an extremist expression of a market-dominated concept of private sovereignty.

⁴ John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958).

guish between public and private goods but to determine the effectiveness of the operation of the private society and economy. . . . (Barkin, *Papers*, p. 91)

[The economist] . . . can perform the valuable service of identifying those deficiencies in the market mechanism and those inherent economic characteristics of government which make it economically advantageous to have certain services provided by government rather than by private initiative. In other words he can show where government intervention in resource allocation and use promises a greater return per unit of input than untrammelled private use. (Heller, *Papers*, p. 103)

It is interesting to speculate as to why, in a time when our society needs more public finance, the majority of economists should support a theory which would lead to less public finance. If our national concern over juvenile delinquency, schools, urban blight, and scientific education is to be taken as more than a wringing of hands, we are very much in need of a theory of public expenditure which will rationalize these concerns and contribute to a solution of our most critical public problems. Economists thus far have failed to provide such a theory.

This recent emphasis on a market-oriented theory of the public sector can be explained partially in terms of the patterns of thinking that economists have developed in the past twenty years. In these years, economics and economists have done well in their suggestions for the solution of problems of public and private resource allocation. This success has been matched by a discernible improvement in the prestige of the profession. The reason for this is not hard to find: economists have been able to quantify their basic data. National income accounting is the most dramatic development, but there have been other significant techniques devised by the profession. Input-output analysis and linear programming are useful and merchantable commodities.

The economist finds a particularly useful role when he is able to measure with precision. But in the public sector, such measurements are seldom possible. Here the subject material is non-quantifiable political pluralism, at which economists almost instinctively rebel. If there is an economists' view of the

political process, it is that allocation of resources by this process is irrational, inefficient, and wasteful, i.e., "uneconomic."⁵

The efforts of economists to bring in constructs from the private sector in the hope that they will be of equal usefulness in the public sector also may be explained—in part—as a seemingly natural drive of social scientists to generalize. Similarly, sociologists, for example, are groping for a general field theory of social behavior. But overbroad generalizations and conceptual structures that attempt to embrace both public and private activity are misleading and become useless in application to reality.

This prevailing general theory of public expenditures, as fashioned by economists, is of little use to public administrators or legislators who are faced with decision-making in the public sector. Perhaps the major difficulty is that the theory starts at the wrong place. It starts with the consumer or the voter or the citizen or some similar discrete and abstract economic particle. This particle is built into an aggregate of particles: the sum total of individual demands in the market is an aggregate market demand curve.

But the starting point for the decision-maker in the public sector is not the individual voter-citizen-taxpayer-consumer; the starting point here is organization. The preferences which must be recorded and measured are those of political parties, producers' groups, trade unions, chambers of commerce, manufacturers' associations, organized teachers, and organized parents. These are the utilities which must be analyzed, and these are the values which must be balanced. Government goods and services are *not* consumed equally by all; the economic essence of government programs is their differential character. Some people win and some people lose, and some groups are made better off, and others, at least relatively, are made worse off. The presi-

⁵ An interesting attempt to apply concepts of optimization to the political process is Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (Harper & Brothers, 1957) esp. pp. 164-204. Downs concludes that vote maximization by political leaders always results in a less than optimum utilization of an economy's resources. He finds, however, that both "private planning agents" and "government" are "perfectly rational."

dent of Inter-Stellar Ballistic Missiles, Inc. benefits more from national defense expenditures than does T. C. Mits, draftee.

And the purposes served by government budgets are completely intertwined. The satisfaction of collective wants may also stabilize levels of economic activity. The satisfaction of collective wants may also redistribute income in accordance not with societal views but with the views of an economic minority. A workable framework for examining the economics of public finance must start with the reality of organization, public and private, and with the needs and capacities of groups and factions.

What then can the economist contribute to an improvement in decisions about public expenditures? Not general guide lines for choices about the size of the public sector or choices among alternative government programs—yet. He can, however, describe, with reasonable accuracy, the volume of total expenditure needed to keep resources adequately employed. Beyond this, economists can analyze the specific kinds of consequences which may be expected to flow from specific kinds of government expenditures. An economist should be able to provide a reasonable appraisal of the economic effects of an urban redevelopment program or to project, with reasonable accuracy, the effects of an increase in the price support program for corn. But there is simply no way by which the benefits from expenditures on urban redevelopment can be compared with benefits from expenditures on price supports for corn.

The best of all maxims about public finance is the nineteenth-century British one that "Expenditure depends upon policy." The full meaning of this is that there can be no general theory of public expenditure divorced from the political, social, and economic objectives of a government.

Federal Expenditures for Specific Programs

ADMINISTRATORS, executives, and legislators are likely to find little comfort and inspiration in the prevalent economic theory of public expenditures for there the public decision-maker has a different frame of reference than the economist. But the problems of communication and the differences in concept be-

tween academic economists and public decision-makers are not a barrier in the study of specific programs. These papers and hearings are of particular usefulness to practitioners who need general background in a program field or are looking for a careful reading of historical experience or for an analysis of the consequences of particular government outlays. The papers assembled around particular topics are, at minimum, informative; some of the contributions are outstanding in their insights.

The papers in specific areas are generally straightforward, nontheoretical recitals of experience and problems. Again, these are written from the standpoint of the economist. There is no effort here to analyze patterns of political behavior as applied to program areas or to investigate the role of political parties in the formulation of expenditure policy or to examine the part played by interest groups in shaping and modifying expenditure patterns. Neither is there a discussion of the procedures and organizational patterns used for the implementation of specific expenditure programs.

While this reviewer cannot comment with assured competence on each of the groups of papers it might be useful to point out those which seem of outstanding value. Some of the best papers are those on federal expenditures for the development of human resources—health, education, and social security. The papers on education are a cut above the kind of generalizing that has been current in this field in recent months. The papers on natural resources development are similarly exceptional. The latter include an examination of techniques used for the evaluation of resource development projects together with three excellent papers on atomic energy. The papers on foreign aid likewise come to grips with some of the difficult issues in this field.

On the other hand, the papers on expenditures for national security are handicapped by lack of access to the kinds of data which are necessary for an accurate appraisal of the economic and program effects of these outlays. In this field, where politics and economics are so firmly intertwined, most of the contributors make an unfortunate effort to effect a separation. The group of papers on procedures in federal spending programs contains significant

individual contributions but neglects to deal with such recent developments as cost-type budgets, nonbudgetary financing, and recent alterations in the activities of government corporations. Also omitted is any discussion of the procedural aspects of budgeting within the administration or within the Congress. It should be hastily pointed out, however, that the scope of the papers and hearings is already broad and some stopping point had to be found. Unfortunately, the stopping point was somewhat short of areas which would be of particular interest to students of public administration.

It is not possible to delineate any common thread of concern in the papers on specific program areas. These volumes do not reveal, for example, four or five basic conflicts permeating all of the considerations relevant to federal expenditures. Insofar as it is possible to single out any one general area of concern, it is with federal-state-local fiscal relations. By no means all of the participants deal directly or even indirectly with this point, but in a great many papers, explicitly or implicitly, fiscal federalism is at issue.

We have not, of course, made very much progress in this area, in spite of the work of the Second Hoover Commission and the Kestnbaum Commission.⁶ The year-old President's committee, coming so hard on the heels of the Kestnbaum Commission, testifies to the ever-present difficulties.

Somehow our governmental structure has come to be fiscally unbalanced. The resources available to the federal government vastly exceed those available to state and local governments. Their relatively inelastic sources of revenue leave them at the mercy of aggrieved taxpayers so that an increase in resources here must come by way of increased tax rates. The rising price levels of the past fifteen years have not impoverished the federal government, but state and local governments have felt the impact and felt it adversely. Taxpayers who are injured by the inflationary process can bring their pressures to bear effectively in holding down local tax rates. The recent increases in

state and local expenditures have been made in the face of formidable difficulties, and it is not reasonable to suppose that these units can continue to strengthen the quantity and quality of community services in the face of such odds. Ingenuity and invention will be required to refurbish the financial structure of governments below the federal level.

We will be fortunate if we find some way out of this financial imbalance in the next decade or two. This is the fiscal calamity of our time (a phrase which Harold Somers suggests, in the interests of economy, be shortened to "fiscalamity," *Hearings*, p. 201). The contributors grapple with this difficulty, sometimes in terms of a grandiloquent and meaningless cliché, "... If we give each governmental activity to the smallest governmental unit which can efficiently perform it, there will be a vast resurgence and revitalization of local government in America." (Stigler, *Papers*, p. 219) Sometimes the clear and resounding phrases give way to a serious effort to deal with the specifics. The papers on housing and urban redevelopment and transportation, for example, face up clearly to the necessity for channeling more resources into metropolitan areas if economic growth is to be assured.

The Joint Economic Committee

THE Joint Economic Committee, originally called "The Joint Committee on the Economic Report," was called into existence by the Employment Act of 1946. The committee was then an innovation in congressional staffing and should still be regarded as something of an experiment.⁷ It was given statutory authority to report on the President's *Economic Report* and has held hearings each year at which government and nongovernment witnesses give their comments on the *Economic Report* and their own views of the economic state of the nation. The Joint Economic Committee is a staff agency of the Congress in the sense that professional economists are made available here to provide materials which may be presumed to be significant for the work of the committee and possibly for other congress-

⁶ U. S. Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *A Report to the President for Transmittal to the Congress* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955).

⁷ See Ralph E. Flanders, "Administering the Employment Act—The First Year," *Public Administration Review* 221 (Autumn, 1947).

sional committees. The Joint Economic Committee also is a special investigatory agency. Its hearings have not been limited to the materials provided in or related to the *Economic Report*; the committee occasionally has ranged far and wide to look into subjects of current significance. The stuff of this congressional investigating agency is, however, not Communism, crime, and corruption, but such typically unexciting subjects as steel prices, middle-income housing, poverty in the United States, and the relationship of prices to economic growth.⁸

The Joint Economic Committee has no power to report legislation. Its investigatory power does, however, extend to the exposure of malpractice, albeit economic malpractice. Its influence on specific legislation must come from the prestige of its hearings and reports and the persuasiveness of its members. There have been a few memorable occasions on which the committee's influence was substantial and immediate. One of these was in 1950 after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. At that time, the House of Representatives had enacted a bill to provide for tax reduction, and the measure awaited action in the Senate. Hearings sponsored by the Joint Economic Committee dramatized the need for tax increases in the face of mounting inflationary pressures, and these hearings undoubtedly were a factor contributing to a rapid rewrite of the bill in the Senate Finance Committee. On other occasions, the work of the Joint Economic Committee has been considerably less spectacular.

There were some who hoped, at the time of the Employment Act, that the Council of Economic Advisers and the Joint Economic Committee, working together, would furnish new machinery for congressional-administration economic policy formulation. This has not occurred; one of the reasons is the uncertainty of the council as to its relations with the joint committee and with other congressional committees. The pattern has varied somewhat with the personalities, but, in general, a close

working relationship is not possible because of the council's position as a staff agency to the President. The council has conceived its role, as it must in accordance with the statute, primarily as a consultant and adviser to the President. In this semi-confidential capacity, the members of the council have been, on most occasions, reluctant to talk openly and frankly about the assumptions underlying the President's *Economic Report*.⁹

It may well be, however, that the things the Joint Economic Committee has done have been of importance equal to those things it has not done. The committee can take some credit for a rapid increase in congressional expertise in the field of economics since World War II. Congressional debate rather frequently is marked by references to the data of national income accounting, where the non-economist once would have feared to tread.

How is it possible to determine the influence of these papers and panelists on policy determination in the field of federal expenditures? Those who read the papers and the hearings undoubtedly will be wiser than they were before. But who, aside from academics, will read them? The outside observer has particular difficulty in appraising the impact of the hearings, and indeed, it may well be that the congressmen themselves are uncertain of what is accomplished. The sometime reader of congressional hearings, like the reader of the *Congressional Record*, is alternately amused and annoyed, bored and fascinated, informed and mystified. This set of hearings is frequently distinguished by incisive questions, well formulated, with a response that is superficial and evasive. Similarly, what sounds to the reader like a standard silly question occasionally elicits an unusually penetrating reply.

The following questions indicate the nature of some of the gambits:

Representative Mills: My first question is whether history suggests some necessary relationship between economic progress and either the size or kind of government expenditures. (p. 12)

⁸Two of the best known and most significant of these investigations have been in the field of monetary policy—the Douglas subcommittee and the Patman subcommittee investigations.

⁹See, for example, *Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, January, 1958, Economic Report of the President, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958*, pp. 4-32.

Representative Mills: The Fiscal Policy Subcommittee asked you to prepare papers on what must certainly be one of the thorniest questions in public finance, "What objective standards are there for determining what Government should do?" (p. 38)

Representative Mills: Let us also assume that the proposed \$10 billion increase in defense expenditures is generally agreed to be a minimum amount, on the basis of the most expert military views of our defense needs.

Under these circumstances, how should the expenditure policymaker approach the problem? Should he attempt to finance the expenditure by equivalent reductions in other Government spending, in private spending, or both? (p. 51)

Representative Curtis: If it is desirable for local governments to handle these things if we had our preferences, isn't the intermediate step a question of what might be done, if anything, to encourage the local governments to undertake to meet these needs and following that further, isn't that actually what the grants, many of the grants-in-aid, originally are attempting to do—stimulate the local and State governments to move into these areas? (pp. 85-86)

Representative Mills: Professor Harberger has suggested a rule for evaluating the economy of public works programs. Can any of you suggest how we can evolve some objective, generally applicable standards to apply to this problem?

Which of you would like to lead off?

. . . . What is the problem? (p. 123)

Representative Curtis: My concluding observation is, of course, the complete immobilization of labor is feudalism. I think that that is not a very good economic state. If I may turn it over to the panel for discussion: No. 1, is it the function of Federal Government to effect redistribution of wealth and, No. 2, if it does do that, does not the Federal Government have to be extremely careful lest they interfere with normal economic growth and development, and using immobilization of labor as one aspect where there might be an impeding effect.

Does anyone care to volunteer or comment? (p. 469)

As a panelist said at one point, "By the terms of your question you took us out of the ivory tower and put us into the operational atmosphere of Congress." (Heller, *Hearings*, p. 58)

If the value of the Joint Committee's contribution under review here is to be appraised

by the attendance of the subcommittee members, it must be concluded that the effort was close to failure. The subcommittee chairman, Congressman Mills, attended, presided, and made many effective contributions. Of the remaining four members, only one, Representative Curtis, attended with any regularity. There was occasional attendance by other members of the subcommittee and, less regularly, by members of the full committee.

However, the kinds of questions asked by committee members, the kinds of responses elicited, and the attendance of committee members are the indicia but not the measurement of effectiveness.

In a general and undefinable way, the prestige and influence of the Joint Economic Committee depend on the prestige and influence of its counterpart in the administration—the Council of Economic Advisers. It seems likely that when economic knowledge is respected within the administration, it is likewise respected within the Congress. The attainment of the "objectives of the Employment Act," a phrase become trite by overuse, depends more on the council than on the Joint Economic Committee.¹⁰

Unfortunately, the council recently has gone into a partial eclipse. During the years 1953-57, under the leadership of Arthur F. Burns, CEA was a strong and virile executive agency. The council and the administration were rather aggressive in meeting the 1954 recession and met it with considerable success, both in terms of combating the recession and in terms of the prestige of the council. But the 1957-58 recession has been handled differently by the administration. The council has not taken the lead in a stabilization program; executive quiescence has prevailed.

Interestingly enough, the vacuum in the formulation of an anti-recession program has not been filled by the Joint Economic Committee. In spite of the presence on the committee of a number of congressmen who talked a great deal about the recession, the majority leadership of the Congress did not choose to

¹⁰ For a recent appraisal of the work of CEA, with observations on its relation to the Congress, see Gerhard Colm, "The Executive Office and Fiscal and Economic Policy," 21 *Law and Contemporary Problems* 710 (Autumn, 1956).

make the committee an instrument for the formulation of a program to meet the recession.

The conclusion is a point often made. If the Executive does not propose to deal force-

fully with the economic state of the nation, it is not reasonable to expect that a congressional agency will be in a position to do so. The initiation of policy rests with the Executive.

The Perils of Popularity

By ROBERT C. WOOD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR IN THE UNITED STATES, by Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., University of Alabama Press, 1956. Pp. 417. \$6.00.

DURING the dark ages of state and local government—that generation just passed when the muckraker had disappeared and the attention of the professional student of government was fixed on Washington and the world—the torch of knowledge in the field was carried by the empiricist. Students and scholars were attracted and held by the lure that in state and local governments “facts are at your fingertips,” “little laboratories at your disposal” and, in general, an abundance of research material was accumulating in the corners of every capitol, court house, and city hall.

Even today, where a new dawn is clearly visible, and foundation spokesmen, university presidents, and research directors tumble over one another in professing their concern with this area of study, the battle cry remains much the same. The governments below the national level have found new academic respectability because they seem logical places to apply modern techniques for descriptive investigations, because data can be acquired and processed under what appear to be manageable hypotheses. The assumption persists that if only one labors long enough in the earthy vineyards of our lower political echelons, he is bound to find a treasure chest filled with testable generalizations and important insights concerning the ordering of man's relationship to man.

Given this almost single-minded fixation, it was inevitable that as the field grew in popu-

larity, the validity of the proposition would come under increasing scrutiny. Intimations of skepticism have been with us for some time: in the provocative analysis of A. R. Richards on the state of local government research in the 1954 spring issue of this *Review*, for example; through the explorations of V. O. Key in his *State Politics*, where painstaking investigations directed by a master hand resulted in “test borings”—an introduction, but not a conclusion. They abound in research concerned with public finance, where hard numbers always are available, but where, as Lyle Fitch and Harvey Brazer have pointed out in their investigations of municipal expenditure and revenues their association is often tantalizingly obscure. All these admonitions were mournfully summarized by Dwight Waldo in the review he prepared for UNESCO, *Political Science in the United States of America*. Now it is Coleman Ransone who convincingly demonstrates that, for political science and public administration at least, the time-honored asset of access to facts may, in fact, be an awesome liability.

The Office of Governor in the United States, it should be emphasized, makes other important contributions. It is the most comprehensive study of the governor's office yet undertaken; it stands as a basic reference book, a sturdy supplement to available textbooks, and it offers sound judgment and provocative insights about the role a governor might play and should play. Carefully, and in detail, Ransone surveys the current activities of the chief executives of our states—how they are nominated, elected, and set about their work. He shows how far from realization the

plans of state reorganization movements and reform really are, how untouched are the legacies from nineteenth century political values and mores. Dispassionately, he considers—and rejects—the arguments which have been advanced to prevent governors from assuming responsibilities which the modern age seems to require. Persuasively, he argues for administrative and political reform which would allow state executives to do their jobs better. One may quarrel with some of his characterization of gubernatorial functions—the “public relations” activities which Ransone stresses might better be categorized as efforts within the policy continuum to ensure political survival. But, certainly, the “model” governor of the last chapters in the book, well-staffed and highly conscious of his duties, would be an impressive and effective figure on the American political scene.

Too Much Data, Too Little Organized

NONETHELESS what emerges most forcibly from a reading of this book is a conclusion that facts offer no easy road to understanding, if the available concepts by which they can be assembled are defective. As a more disturbing corollary, what emerges is a conviction that in state and local government, established concepts and methods, useful in other fields of political analysis, yield precious few results. A full scale, tightly organized analysis undertaken by a competent professional, well-versed in the techniques of our trade, fails in the end to identify the forces at work which make governors in one ecology act differently from those in another.

The indictment that Ransone delivers is no less devastating because it is tangential. Dealing with the variety of circumstances in which modern state executives operate, he extracts as many well-grounded conclusions as can be expected, and the book is positive in outlook and organization. But, having used the most up-to-date concepts that political science and public administration have developed—decision-making and policy-formulation—and having employed accepted statistical methods for the analysis of voting behavior and interviewed extensively, he is forced to conclude on a prescriptive, not a descriptive note. A

generalized picture of the governor—in many places and in many situations—emerges, sufficient to support generalized recommendations. A series of pictures, describing different governors in different situations, eludes the analysis to the end.

Each chapter testifies to the difficulty of handling the data available within our present frame of reference. The analysis of the effect of different patterns of party politics on gubernatorial behavior destroys the utility of a party-oriented inquiry, for even in the most competitive of two-party states, Ransone finds that factions are the most critical entities involved. The study of gubernatorial-legislative relations relegates to relative unimportance the powers and prerogatives customarily taken as bench marks for judging executive influence and identifies the politics of personality as the essential ingredient. The study of the governor's administrative activities belies any contention that the governor by inclination or position adopts a managerial role which corresponds to models established in formal or informal organizational theory. Few chief executives of American states, it appears, are conversant with the doctrines of POSDCORB or engage in either conscious or unconscious efforts to achieve equilibriums leading to optimums in maximizations or satisfactions. They even seem to fail to recognize the variety of uses to which administration can be put in the political process. Thus one by one, the methods of selecting and analyzing facts which have proved valuable elsewhere reveal themselves as unsuited to a study of the governor. The forces and factors which Ransone uses to develop his proposals for reform are brought into view only through illustration and example, by and large isolated one from another.

Even though we have had earlier variations on the same theme, the message Ransone delivers—that we are, in Daniel Lerner's apt phrase, “data-rich and theory-poor”—is both timely and compelling. It is timely because Ransone's findings sound again the warning for those of us who work in this field: that we are in the unenviable position of arriving at a position of substantial notoriety without the equipment necessary to capitalize on our newfound popularity. It is compelling because it underwrites with book-length documentation

the contentions of the other skeptics that new theories, not new facts, are the urgent needs in the area. It points up with disturbing clarity the dangers of relying on doctrines initiated in other fields for other purposes to arrange and catalogue the present stream of reality.

The New Directions

IF the message is heeded, then obviously scholarship in state and local government in the next ten years will be quite different in character than that of the ten years just passed. In place of massive group research enterprises, organized to draw facts like giant carpet-sweepers, more limited forays will be undertaken. In place of the automatic application of "accepted" hypotheses, some new hypotheses will be tried. Regarding the governor, Ransone offers important clues to what some of these models might be: a classification of states by major factions rather than by parties, or by metropolitan or nonmetropolitan, by regions, by size, by demographic characteristics of the population, and by the tradition of philosophy of government emerging from a region, perhaps expressed in legal forms. He suggests an especially provocative line of inquiry in his discussion of the tendency of southern one-party chief executives to focus on legislative relations while governors operating in other regions and in a two-party context seem to pay more attention to administrative problems.

Others too, have pointed toward new directions. Herbert Kaufman has indicated, again in this *Review*, how case studies can be more effectively employed, at least to refute or mod-

ify selected hypotheses. The leadership studies, now undertaken in metropolitan areas by Norton Long, Robert Dahl, Edward Banfield, Frederick Cleaveland, Henry Bruck, and others offer promise. Something may be even borrowed from the study of comparative government—though this analogy can be overworked, for few states or cities exhibit the sharp variations in values, institutions, and political and social processes which form the basis for analysis among nations. Regardless of which approaches are selected, however, it seems clear that different kinds of abstractions and different systems of interaction need to be posited before the facts become as manageable and useful as the old cliché supposed, and before the vineyards become fertile again.

A suggestion that the study of state and local government ought to stand on its own feet so far as theory is concerned is not a plea for any particular brand of theory. It is true that the field seems a likely candidate for descriptive hypotheses involving quantitative research if only because the variations in political and administrative behavior here seem so often a matter of degree and not of kind. But certainly the normative implications of current doctrine can stand a comprehensive review and there is room to accommodate almost every conceivable approach. At the present time, the job is the cruder one of simply laying the foundation in terms of concept formation, independent of related fields, from which a variety of subsequent investigations may be launched. In the midst of a resurgence of interest and study about the lower levels of American government, the time is not for action or application, but for speculation.

A Dashing Administrator

By CHARLES S. ASCHER, Institute of Public Administration

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BARON HAUSSMANN: PARIS IN THE SECOND EMPIRE, by J. M. and Brian Chapman. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1957. Pp. 262. (Available in the U.S.A. from The Macmillan Co. \$5.00.)

THE western world has never seen so dramatic a transformation of a city as that of

Paris between 1853 and 1869. As a program of city planning, it was brilliantly interpreted for the American reader twenty years ago in a lecture by the architectural historian, Siegfried Giedion, embodied in his *Space, Time and Architecture*.¹ Lewis Mumford has character-

¹ (Harvard University Press, 3rd ed., 1954), pp. 641-79.

ized the "indispensable element" for such a program: "a dominant personality of marked administrative or designing talent, capable of fusing together in a common design the special projects needed, anticipating future developments, making ready for them, installing them successfully, making them intelligible and useful to the community at large. . . . Wherever one encounters the highest type of planning work, one discovers such a personality, such a mind at the head of it."²

The "indispensable element" for Paris was Baron Georges Haussmann. Now for the first time we have in English what the authors call "an administrative biography" of this "ebullient, ruthless and highly intelligent prefect of France, whose career led him from the byways of provincial France . . . to supreme power in Paris during the Second Empire."

This full-dress but pithy and succinct account has been written with vivacity, grace, and charm by Brian Chapman of Manchester University, author of several books on French local government, and Mrs. Chapman, a lecturer in economics at Manchester. They know and love their France well enough to paint colorfully the society in which Haussmann worked and the political forces which pulled upon him and which he manipulated brilliantly. At the same time, they have had access to his administrative dossier, with the comments ("ratings") of his provincial superiors; and they expound lucidly the intricate financial maneuvers to which Haussmann resorted to pay for his enormous program of public works (the Emperor, his patron, forbade an increase in taxes), which ultimately led to his downfall.

Our authors are well aware of the intimate relationship between politics and administration. Haussmann faced a parliament dominated by provincials. His "inflationary" public

expenditures aroused the sustained opposition of the Rothschilds and the Bourse. The very tempo of his operations favored "honest graft" and speculation in land. "In other words, projects of this order amounted to a series of problems in human relations." (p. 104)

There are fascinating pictures of Haussmann as administrator: his assumption of office in Paris; his appraisal of his inherited staff; his creation of a "planning section" and bringing in able men whom he had known in the provinces, like Alphand from Bordeaux; his methods of supervision. Haussmann knew the importance of a quick, resounding impact, so that he seized and drove through Napoleon's vague dream of converting a run-down state forest into a park for the citizens of Paris—the Bois de Boulogne (largely paid for by selling off lots for luxurious villas at the north end in Neuilly). "It was administratively the most successful and the least useful item of the initial programme of works." (p. 89) Yet he knew how to get approval for sewers and drains, vital but without public appeal or interest for the Emperor, his indispensable patron. Early in his career he learned how to bury a billiard room for the prefect's residence in a larger proposal where it would escape notice. Haussmann sent his secretary general to London for observations; the Chapmans note how much better administrative machinery Haussmann had at his disposal in Paris.

In his memoirs Haussmann characterized himself as "a democrat, very liberal, but nonetheless authoritarian." Mumford's characterization of the "indispensable element" was, of course, not of Haussmann, but of a man responsible for many of the parks and highways of New York since the 1930's. It is one of the added fillips of the Chapmans' book for the American reader that he will find himself constantly comparing Haussmann with this dominant contemporary personality.

² *City Development* (Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1945), pp. 139-40.

Developments in Public Administration

Compiled by WILLIAM B. SHORE

Staff Officer

American Society for Public Administration

Organizing and Administering Scientific Programs

"Can the huge powers and huge responsibilities of science be harnessed and directed by a democracy in the interest of human freedom?" A. Hunter Dupree, a historian who has specialized in the relationships of government and science, focused the attention of the Senate subcommittee on reorganization on this central question in hearings this spring on establishing a Department of Science and Technology and other federal science sponsorship and coordination proposals. (Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, *Science and Technology Act of 1958* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958).)

Democracy, he continued "has a threefold task. It must be true to itself even if science seems almost too complex to be amenable to popular control. It must effectively organize science, because the military power necessary for survival depends on it. To accomplish this second goal democracy must also achieve yet a third one—to be true to the values of science as one of the major traditions of western culture."

Opposing a Department of Science, Dupree instead suggested that the office of James R. Killian, special assistant to the president for science and technology, should become an agency like the Council of Economic Advisers, that Killian should "develop some kind of partnership with Congress," and that the so-

cial sciences should be included. Since Killian's problems "will involve people and their institutions rather than electrons and protons," social scientists can be of help to him. "Many natural scientists are not aware of the stark simplicity of their social and political judgments."

Most testimony before the subcommittee urged dependence on already existing research bodies for many of the scientific needs discussed, particularly the improvement of communications among researchers through indexing, abstracting, and translating.

ASPA Group Explores Scientist-Administrator Relations

Charles E. Mills, Executive Officer, National Institute of Mental Health, reports on a continuing study of research administration:

Is research administration really different? How do you organize to produce research? Are the specific research goals set out by Congress productive of fruitful research in a federal installation? These are some of the questions which a group of scientists and administrative officers at the National Institutes of Health have been discussing in a series of seminars organized by the Washington, D. C. chapter of ASPA.

The group is composed of about an equal number of scientists in charge of large research programs and senior administrative officers with considerable experience in management. During 1957 and 1958 this group has

held twelve meetings with the following purposes generally in mind:

1. To explore intensively the nature of science, research, and research administration.
2. To ascertain to what extent general principles of administration are applicable to research administration.
3. To discover better ways to administer a federal research organization in order to maximize high quality research while assuring that progress is made towards the goals of the organization as expressed by Congress.

The discussion was opened with a statement on the nature of science and its relationship to certain aspects of society. This was followed by an analysis of conditions that affect the advancement of science. The concepts of science and of the intellectual held by the layman and problems of communication and education in science were developed.

The problem which finally evolved was this: How encompass an essentially individual and autonomous activity within an organization that must be guided by goals and subject to controls established by others, i.e. Congress and the President, and how accomplish this without impairing the results.

As we in the group discussed this question, we were led to explore how goals are established, what determines the motivation of scientists, and what are some of the conditions established by the Congress and the Administration and some of the controls set by administrators which affect for better or for worse the capacity of scientists to perform their work.

By the time we had reached our twelfth meeting we were devoting our attention primarily to the following questions:

1. What is the best way to bring together scientists of different skills, temperament, abilities, interests, and training?
2. For what types of projects should scientists from various disciplines be grouped together and for what types should groups be restricted to specialists of a single discipline?
3. What criteria are used in evaluating professional performance?
4. What are the best organizational and geographic relationships?
5. What is the optimum size of a research group?
6. What are the criteria used in evaluating a re-

search organization for administrative management?

In dealing with all of these problems we were concerned with whether clear criteria could be formulated or whether administrative leadership had to be by the "seat-of-the-pants."

By the end of the twelfth session considerable progress had been made in bridging the language barriers between the scientists and the specialists in administrative management. These participants were by then, for the most part, both talking the same language and dealing with much the same subject matter.

It is our hope that this experimental discussion group will provide a prototype for ASPA workshops in other substantive areas. This particular group may attain some degree of permanent structure during the next year or so. As it matures it will invite participation from persons outside the National Institutes of Health. More than likely it will also stimulate and provide material for open forums.

The importance of thorough study of research administration is underscored by the recent remark of James A. Shannon, M.D., Director of the National Institutes of Health:

A good case could be made, I think, for the position that norms in research administration are all theoretical, and that the practical considerations are those which depart from theory in order to meet realistically the actual circumstances.

First: Understanding Scientific Operations

Administering scientific programs requires an understanding of how science operates. Even scientists cannot tell us this, according to physicist Harold K. Schilling. "If . . . we are to project for science a truly significant function in public affairs, we must base our thinking about how it should operate in the future upon a model that depicts as accurately and inclusively as possible how it does in fact operate now. So far as I am aware, such a model, or image, does not now exist. Our thinking has been dominated altogether too much by a stereotype that is thoroughly inadequate and misleading."

The "scientific process," for example, is not one mode of behavior. Science on the frontier of knowledge differs sharply from "the science

of the interior." "Frontier science is exploratory and adventurous. . . . More often than not, [ideas] . . . are audacious guesses or vague hunches that rarely conform to established patterns of thought. Often they are . . . what many people would even regard as 'unscientific'."

There also is "tremendous contrast between the science of the great masters and that of the ordinary, common man of science. . . . Most current conceptions of the operations and modes of thought of science and scientists have resulted from a disproportionate preoccupation with, and abstraction from, the science of the great masters." Actually, "ways of thinking and habitual modes of experimentation and research differ widely, . . . there are many degrees of sophistication with regard to the purposes, goals, and methodology of science and many fundamental disagreements about both the content and meaning of its principles, concepts and generalizations." And especially, Schilling suspects, there is "pronounced dissimilarity between the patterns of intellectual strategy and tactics prevailing in the common-man science and those of the great-man science."

Schilling, unlike the ASPA study group, emphasizes that science is both a social and communal activity—that the phrase "science community" has real, though only vaguely definable meaning. ("A Human Enterprise," 127 *Science* 1324 (6 June 1958).)

Without a clear conception of scientific operations, it is not surprising perhaps that difficulties in administering scientific programs have become a topic of major concern to both business and government as shown by studies, journal articles, and conferences. For example, three engineers recently estimated that scientific productivity in southern California is about 8 per cent of capacity. They had surveyed scientific productivity in fifty electronic and aviation plants, educational institutions, and consulting firms.

Productivity is inhibited by scientists being required to do work below their skill, by firms maintaining a stable of scientists without work for them to do, by scientists going off on their own tack because they disagree with their assignment, by turnover, poor physical facilities (including overcrowding and excessive

noise), and by duplication of effort due to ignorance of similar projects elsewhere—partly due to business and government secrecy, partly due to communications difficulties even within the same firm. (Irving Hirsch, William Milwitt, and William J. Oakes, Jr., "Increasing the Productivity of Scientists," 36 *Harvard Business Review* 66 (March-April, 1958).)

Most journal discussions do not address the core questions raised by Dupree, the ASPA study group, and Schilling. Nevertheless, some of the experience-based advice on meeting the symptoms of maladministration may be of value.

Understanding Reactions of Researchers

One type of aid to administrators is a description of scientists' behavior.

There is a discernible pattern which characterizes the work of genius irrespective of environment. Its stages are: recognition of the problem; a period of study; a period of frustration; revelation; realization; and finally, elation.

Rather than trying to eliminate the trials and frustrations of the creative process, the wise leader of a research program must try to understand this cycle. . . . (E. Finley Carter, "Creativity in Research," address to the Third Communications Conference of The Art Directors Club of New York, April 3, 1958.)

Scientific personnel interviewed and surveyed by a psychologist and engineer said that the pleasure in doing research and its challenge was their main reason for being in their present position, yet more than one in four complained that there was too little professional challenge. "In the course of personal interviews, the authors were struck by the numerous complaints about the lack of sufficient responsibility and freedom of action in the basic approach to problems, as well as the reluctance of supervisors to accept new concepts." (George A. Peters and Max Lees, "Better Incentives for Scientific Personnel," 34 *Personnel* 59 (January-February, 1958).)

Research Managers: Specialists or Generalists?

While "research managers almost invariably come from the ranks of scientists" ("judging from the 56 registrants at Columbia University's Eighth Industrial Research Conference"

in June, 1957), "the knowledge, interests, and abilities essential to success in management differ widely from those necessary in research," according to Daniel R. Davies, Associate Director of the Conference. ("Selection and Development of Research Managers," 34 *Personnel* 42 (January-February, 1958).)

Davies added that research administration was not one job; it varies with its position in the hierarchy, as other administrative jobs. At higher levels, using generalists who are given special training in scientific matters seems "to be perfectly satisfactory. By contrast, outstanding ability and success in research have often proved a negative predictor of success in management."

A similar observation was made by C. Garrow of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, "one of the world's major government research institutes . . . acknowledged to be, by both scientists and the public, a successful research institution." Despite the fact that "most scientific administrators in C.S.I.R.O. and other research institutes . . . come from the ranks of scientists . . . the non-scientifically trained administrator can contribute to research administration; but he must . . . [learn] at first hand how research is carried out. . . ." Scientists often are poor administrators because their training encourages them to take "a close detailed view," and tends to limit their acceptance of personal differences and make them unwilling to delegate. ("Some Aspects of the Administration of Scientific Research," 16 *Public Administration* (Australia) 218 (December, 1957).)

Autonomy and Control

There is an emphasis on separateness for scientific operations, evident in the bill to establish a Department of Science and Technology and in administrative arrangements in Australia, Great Britain, and France. Garrow, although favoring generalist administrators, emphasizes the need for scientist leadership of work groups and decentralization to work groups of responsibility for hiring and choosing research projects and goals.

Separateness of the personnel system for scientists, with a strong voice for scientists in personnel decisions, is provided in the British

government, and in France's National Scientific Research Center, personnel management is "totally in the hands of the scientists," (Promotion in rank and pay is independent of administrative responsibilities in both countries.) Indeed, the French Center's "destiny is almost wholly controlled by a National Scientific Committee made up of 465 scientists representing a complete cross-section of French scientific life." (Edward McCrensky, "Scientists in Public Service Abroad," 21 *Personnel Administration* 34 (September-October, 1958).)

But this, of course, does not answer Dupree's question. How do we connect policy-making within the scientific enterprise to that of the society as a whole?

The Political Executive, the Administration, and the Legislature at Three Levels

United States concerns about the executive branch of government—its growing dominance over the legislature; the necessary growth of government and hence of the executive's activities, with resulting growth in executive staff; and the growing participation of career administrators in policy-making are common to many other countries in the world, according to a UNESCO survey.¹ (Jean Meynaud et al., "The Role of the Executive in the Modern State," 10 *International Social Science Bulletin* 171 (No. 2, 1958).)

"On one point nearly all the national Studies agree: they emphasize the broad scope of the executive's tasks and the way these tasks have been continually increasing over the last twenty or thirty years."

The cause is the growth of government activities generally and those which seem unsuited to legislative leadership in particular. The executive is called upon to settle disputes, both between private parties, as in strikes, and among advocates of different visions of the public interest, as in the budget process where there has been a sharp decline in the legislature's role.

In response to these greater demands,

¹ The countries described at length: Canada, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia. Some information was collected on: Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

there has been an attempt to unify the executive in most of the countries and to provide the central executive core (e.g., the prime minister in countries with plural executives, as France and Canada) with an administrative structure of its own. Two dangers arise with institutionalization of the executive's staff—friction between the staff and the line departments and transfer of too much power from political to career officials.

"The technical character" of many public questions has been a cause of increasing career civil servant influence in any case.

. . . It has become more and more an established custom to associate the officials of the State—and particularly the senior civil servants—with the process of determining policies to be adopted and making decisions. . . . It has led several writers to assert that any realistic enumeration of the component parts of the executive should in future include a certain number of senior civil servants who are closely associated with the preparation of decisions and capable of exerting a decisive influence on choices which appear to be made on the responsibility of the politicians themselves.

The course of development thus described appears to be irreversible; it is linked with a particular set of social structures and relationships which renders utopian any attempt to restore the traditional division (regarded, in certain quarters, as somewhat fictitious) between administration and politics.

There are two views: (1) that there is no demarcation between the political executive and the bureaucracy; (2) that there is an intermediate zone between them with the bulk of the career civil servants continuing "to be occupied with practical tasks." The latter view seems more accurate to Meynaud. Recent attempts "to institute a complete separation between the ministries and the government offices responsible for current business . . . shows that this severance by no means prevents the ministries from exerting influence on the offices, and vice versa." No method of assuring political control of the administration "seems entirely satisfactory." The parliamentary system "at least provides a theoretical control. . . . The presidential system . . . would seem to make it easier for civil servants to attempt to gain a hold over the executive."

The political executive and career administrators have established direct contacts to the public both to ascertain public opinion and to seek to guide it.

Proposals aimed at protecting citizens against excesses of the administration, for example by establishing administrative courts, have aroused interest recently in several countries.

The Administrator as Lobbyist

Despite laws at the federal level to control pressure politics by administrators—for example, a prohibition on the use of public funds for publicity experts or to influence a vote in Congress, congressmen in fact reason that "executive agencies have a definite requirement to express views to Congress, to make suggestions, to request needed legislation, to draft proposed bills or amendments, and so on," in the words of Representative Frank Buchanan. (Quoted by J. Leiper Freeman, "The Bureaucracy in Pressure Politics," 319 *Annals* 10 (September, 1958).)

The restrictive laws stand as "threats against agency officials," but agencies have succeeded both in publicizing their work and influencing congressional votes, Freeman points out. In state and local government, restrictions on lobbying by executive agencies are even less stringent. Perhaps a more important control is the Chief Executive's power in many governmental units to channel legislation-influencing activities through his office, but this does "not necessarily remove bureaucrats from the arena of pressure politics. . . ." On many matters, the Chief Executive depends upon the agencies to secure initiation and support of legislative action since he cannot get involved in every legislative skirmish himself.

Agency-congressional relations have become more formalized in the federal government recently. High-level officials with sizeable staffs spend their full time on legislative liaison. Continuing close rapport with relevant congressional committees "can build up the kind of understanding which maximizes the effect of agency opinions upon committee decisions."

Administrative leaders also work for legislation through their clientele groups, most strikingly the Veterans Administration through veterans organizations. They also seek a gen-

eral climate of opinion favorable to their agency, most strikingly the FBI through many books and articles about the Bureau and by its chief. Agency public relations do contribute to the achievements of its administrative purposes by preparing the way for public cooperation with its programs. At the same time, however, they give it added leverage with Congress.

But, warns Freeman, "legislators are capable of being very sensitive to what they regard as improper administrative propagandizing. . . ."

The Governorship Develops

Only in relatively recent years have U. S. governors emerged as key political and administrative leaders, according to William H. Young, University of Wisconsin political scientist. ("The Development of the Governorship," 31 *State Government* 178 (Summer, 1958).) Before 1880, the governorship was not really a stepping-stone to the White House. Since, more than half the Presidents have come almost directly from state capitals.

"The emergence of the new type of political leader in the Governor's chair [for example, Cleveland, Hughes, La Follette, Wilson, Roosevelt] probably was the prerequisite to the reconstruction of the office which has occurred in the past forty years."

Many new state services also have emerged in the twentieth century. The combination of expanding activities, requiring more active direction and coordination, and the new political leadership gradually produced a new office of the governor, characterized by the extension of the governor's term to four years, the executive budget, clearer responsibility for state programs formerly dispersed among independent or semi-independent agencies, central administrative management units, and publicity arms for the governor. The governor's ability to command public attention particularly through mass media gives him great power over the legislature, Young asserts.

The Future of Cities and City Managers

Six city managers from various-sized cities of the East, South, and Midwest—at a panel of the National Municipal League's 1957 Na-

tional Conference on Government—generally agreed with the view of Orin F. Nolting, Executive Director, International City Managers' Association, that:

The manager . . . has found it desirable to advise the council on policy formation and even to enter actively into policy salesmanship by educational efforts in the community. The city manager has shown that it is possible to stay out of politics in a partisan sense and at the same time demonstrate the value of community leadership in recommending policies which he feels the council should adopt. (*Summary of Proceedings*, the League, 1958, p. 10.)

This year, half a century after the first city manager took office in Staunton, Virginia, Nolting predicted the following for the future of cities, managers, and the manager plan:

In six years, 400 more U. S. cities will have the manager plan, bringing the total here to 2,000—a majority of cities over 5,000.

The idea of the appointed executive will spread to other countries. (Already there are more than 1,500 manager cities, towns, and counties in five European countries.)

A graduate degree in public administration plus an internship will come to be regarded as requirements for a city manager career. More managers will have assistants.

The manager will want to know more about the philosophy of government, and he will better appreciate his role in it.

State or regional institutes will refresh his management skills. Cities will be spending more on in-service training generally.

The manager will use consultative management techniques and continue to experiment with new administrative methods. He will spend more time planning.

He will devote more time to relations with the public but still stay out of the limelight, and he will "have a large role with the council in policy formulation without infringing upon the responsibility of the council to make policy decisions." The council will expect his recommendation on all matters before it. "The manager has no single boss or master so far as his public responsibility is concerned. He gets direction from the council, from department heads, from line supervisors, and from the press, the chamber of commerce, and local civic and other organizations."

There will be fewer independent boards to dilute the manager's responsibility to the council.

Relations with the federal and state government will expand, particularly in housing, redevelopment, transportation, certain public works, urban and regional planning, and civil defense. Organization of services for metropolitan areas will require increasing attention.

City services will expand in housing, urban renewal, care of the aged, recreation, cultural activities, and city beautification.

City managers "will be in great demand in other fields where management ability is required." New retirement systems will allow him to carry his benefits to positions at all levels of government.

Two aspects of the profession will help the manager avoid getting into a rut: "One is that we are generalists and not specialists. Another is that we are not a closed or exclusive profession for which certification or licensing is required." ("The City Manager of Tomorrow," 40 *Public Management* 234 (October 1958).)

Creativity and Order in Organizations and Society

The collapse of the Roman empire came partly because it failed to inspire enthusiasm and it overplayed stability. There was good administration and social justice, but also dullness and uncreativity. To citizens brought up on stories of the previous anarchy and oppression, dullness seemed a price worth paying, but it "turned out to be greater than was realized by the generations which paid it without complaint." Thus historian Arnold Toynbee relates to an earlier era a central question of our own:

For us today, world order, peace, and social justice are literally necessities of life. We know we shall destroy ourselves if we do not achieve these goals, so there can be no question of boggling over the price. We have to pay it, whatever it may be; and I think it is going to be the same price that the Greco-Roman world paid in and after the generation of Augustus.

All institutions, he warns, are becoming more like government in accumulating a superstructure of administration which crushes

individual creativity. Toynbee attributes this administrative growth to excessive concern for the whole institutional policy rather than for each case or project within it—an overcautiousness to avoid decisions which are correct in themselves but set bad precedents and an overemphasis on clearance.

"We can no longer tolerate the evils of private enterprise. But . . . if we have to restrain it in the fields of economics and politics, can we find compensatory outlets for it in the fields of art and science and scholarship and religion? . . . Is it possible to foster freedom in some fields when one is compelled to restrict it in other fields?" ("Thinking Ahead: Will Businessmen Be Civil Servants," 36 *Harvard Business Review* 23 (September-October, 1958).)

Freedom to be Creative in Organizations

Business and public administrators and social scientists have not given up the attempt to reconcile creativity and the conformity necessary to keep members of an organization working toward the same goal.

What social scientists can tell us about creativity and conformity in organizations has been reported succinctly by The Foundation for Research on Human Behavior (Carol Ludington, ed., *Creativity and Conformity*, the Foundation, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1958):

1. Tests are being devised which can measure creativity. Some may be useful now for personnel selection.
2. But organizations already have far more creative ability than they are using. "In every organization, there are pressures which inhibit originality," although group pressures also can increase the amount of originality. Some pressure toward conformity is necessary in an organization, of course.
3. Conformers also are identifiable; they tend to be low on originality. Three kinds have been identified: (1) those who accept group opinion as most accurate when they do not know the answer, (2) those who go along with the group even when they disagree, and (3) those who may know the answer but, lacking confidence, accept the group's opinion.
4. But conformity is not just related to the individual; it also is a product of the situa-

tion. Whether persons conform or do not at a particular moment depends upon (1) the nature and importance of the issue, (2) how important it is to be right, (3) how anonymous the individual is, (4) how unanimous the group is, (5) how large a change is contemplated. Even small support for the person who disagrees with the group greatly decreases the conformity.

5. When persons work together as a group, conformity is more marked than when the same persons compete.

6. Groups tend to enforce conformity on all members; standards of groups can be kept more in line with organization goals if the group participates in decisions affecting them—to the greatest extent when the whole group participates rather than when only their representatives do.

7. When different ranks are included in a decision-making group, conformity tends to increase. For example, when each member of a crew of three, each with different rank, tried to convince the other two that his answer to a question was correct (when it was correct), the lowest rank failed most often (37 per cent), the middle rank next (20 per cent), and the top rank least (6 per cent). When three persons of different rank not constituting an ongoing crew were brought together, each succeeded in persuading the others to the right answer more often than did members of the regular crews, but still failing to convince in inverse order of rank (12, 10, and 0 per cent). And when answers were given orally, starting with the lowest rank, far more agreement was won on the correct answer than when opinions were given orally starting with the highest. In other words, subordinates often tended to go along with the wrong answer voiced by their superior when he spoke first.

8. When a discussion leader deliberately sought minority opinions, groups made fewer errors in answering questions than when there was no discussion leader.

Social Science Contributions to Management

What social science research of the past ten years has contributed most to understanding good management practices? Social sci-

tists themselves—a sample from university, business, and other research agencies selected by the American Management Association—mentioned fifty as being among the most important five. Thirteen were named by more than one person. Four were particularly singled out:

University of Michigan Survey Research Center Studies of productivity of work groups in the Prudential Insurance Company office and Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad work gangs tending to show that supervisors of high productivity groups differed from low in (1) being supervised less-closely by the next level, (2) placing less emphasis on production as the goal, (3) encouraging employee participation in decision-making, (4) being more employee-centered, (5) spending less time in production work, more on supervising, (6) having greater confidence in themselves as supervisors, (7) feeling that they knew where they stood with the company.

Yale University studies tending to encourage job enlargement and rotation, showing the interaction of formal and informal organization, and explaining employee reaction on the basis of psychological needs.

Cornell University studies, also showing interaction of formal and informal organization, indicating that a change in labor-management relations from conflict to consultation could decrease grievances and tensions and increase productivity, and analyzing the effects of different systems of monetary incentives.

Ohio State University's Personnel Research Board studies of how executives, both successful and unsuccessful, actually operate, tending to show that the effective leader has real consideration for the group and facilitates its interaction, and that members identify strongly with it.

Almost all of the studies cited as useful are by groups which include psychologists, social psychologists, sociologists, economists, and anthropologists. They seem mainly in search of unconscious motives and informal relationships.

Some of the conclusions of these studies have been challenged by later results, for example that employee-centered rather than production-centered work groups consistently have highest productivity. (Thomas Q. Gil-

son, "Some Significant Projects in Recent Management Research," (35 *Personnel* 43 (September-October, 1958).)

National Support Urged for Behavioral Sciences

Fifteen social scientists this year published a lengthy plea for greater national support for behavioral sciences. Observing that there has been far less aid for graduate students in behavioral sciences than in physical and life sciences and that the present federal program of fellowships and research grants tips the balance even further, the manifesto explains areas of national life in which the social sciences could contribute importantly: understanding creativity, identifying capabilities under stress, personnel utilization, decision process, group functioning, understanding cultural differences and change, clarifying the psychological underpinnings of economics, relating new machines to man's capabilities, and the effects of drugs.

Specific program proposals include:

1. Development of a general behavior theory by a small group of behavioral scientists selected from different specialties, detached from regular duties and in a somewhat isolated location.
2. Initiation of new centers for foreign area study which would keep in close touch with the government's foreign and intelligence programs.
3. Study of processes of decision-making.
4. Study of the use of social statistics.
5. Identification, motivation, and education of talented students.

Citing instances, particularly during World War II, in which social science studies "paid off," the writers emphasize the potential contribution of social science to peace through possible alleviation of international tensions and improvement of our own foreign policy by (1) learning more accurately what other countries think of us, (2) clarifying our own self-image, (3) improving our information program, (4) suiting aid programs more closely to the culture of receiving countries, (5) reducing stress from too swift technological change in developing countries.

Social science can strengthen national well-being by helping us turn from traditional attitudes to meet new realities when necessary, improve industrial relations, and overcome mental illness and such social-mental ills as divorce, delinquency, and racial strife. In war, strength to resist panic might be found. ("National Support for Behavioral Science," 3 *Behavioral Science* 217 (July, 1958).)

Brookings Research, Educational Programs to Expand

The Brookings Institution programs of education, research, and research promotion in public affairs will vastly expand through a new Center for Advanced Study aided by a \$6.2 million grant from the Ford Foundation.

Study groups will bring together public servants, scholars, and leaders outside of government to examine public problems. Weekly or bi-weekly seminars over six- to ten-month periods and few-day conferences will be the format. Also conferences of scholars and researchers on social science and seminars for graduate students are planned.

Executive development programs for small groups of top-level career administrators will be continued, and middle-management training may be initiated.

Personnel from the legislative and executive branches will be provided with facilities and fellowships for three to twelve months of full-time research. Research fellowships for scholars will be increased from six to about thirty a year in economics, government, and international relations, and distinguished scholars may be provided one- or two-year research professorships.

Off-the-record round tables on particular topics will be continued, with transcripts developed into books.

Transmission of current scholarly thought to the public through background conferences for news analysts and lectures also are planned.

Research will be done on leadership, management, and personnel; the legislative process; nomination and election politics; metropolitan growth, urban change, and federalism; national defense; education and development of youth; regulatory administration; foreign

assistance policy; general objectives and strategy of foreign policy; science technology and foreign policy; planning and implementing foreign policy; general surveys of major foreign policy problems; economic growth and stabilization; financial institutions and policies; competition, monopoly, and public regulation; taxation policy; international economic problems; and economics of higher education.

The Institution will move into a new building in the summer of 1960 with double its present floor-space and room for expansion. (Press Release, October 26, 1958.)

Brookings research projects on governmental affairs soon to be published or well underway include:

The Problem of Presidential Transitions. An examination of the four most recent changes in party—Taft to Wilson, Wilson to Harding, Hoover to Roosevelt, and Truman to Eisenhower, looking at the action and problems of the incoming President and the behavior of the outgoing administration.

Legislative Control of Administration. How legislatures of nine countries seek to assure administrative compliance with their policy direction through statutes, budget, expenditure investigation, general oversight, parliamentary questions, and civil service rules.

The Job of the Federal Executive. Views of a picked group of federal executives elicited at a series of discussions in 1957.

Government Publications and Their Use. An up-dating of the Institution's earlier editions of 1936 and 39, also looking at problems of the government's publishing program and the current policy. (Paul T. David, "A Report on the Governmental Studies Program of the Brookings Institution, 1953-58," July, 1958.)

Communication Lessons from Closed Social Systems

"A prison setting was chosen [for research] because of the almost experimental clarity provided by its social system in miniature. . . . Although the prison should not be taken uncritically as a society in microcosm, the comparative isolation of its social process from the impact of external variables provides a rare opportunity for systematic analysis. The

vast majority of interaction patterns in inmate society begin and end within the walls and are subject to a measure of official control and manipulation. Finally, the identification of formal and informal systems of behavior is simplified by a sharp distinction between the ruling and subject class. . . ."

The study by Richard H. McCleery, Michigan State University, compares behavior under two kinds of government and particularly with two different communication systems as Oahu prison, Hawaii changed from an authoritarian to a liberal government. (*Policy Change in Prison Management* (Governmental Research Bureau, Michigan State University, 1957).) Although force is a much more important element in prison administration than in other types, even here the power of the communication network stands out.

The authoritarian prison was characterized by a one-way communication system—upward—with a bottleneck at the captain of the yards. Inmates were told nothing and part of the dominance of the guards was achieved through the terror of the unknown. This was partly exercised through senior inmates who could provide explanations (often false) for events. "The absence of published regulations or official orientation for new men, the secrecy and arbitrariness of disciplinary action, the shocking unfamiliarity of the prison world to men just arrived, and the demands imposed by regimentation—all these combined to make the new inmate dependent on the experienced prisoner. The old inmate knew the uncertain limits of official tolerance in a system which, of necessity, prohibited far more than it punished."

Since control of the prisoners was the dominant purpose of the authoritarian prison, the guard force was the most influential group regardless of rank, and attempts at rehabilitation were thwarted by the guards and the custodial atmosphere.

A radical change—originally unplanned—seemed to flow from the personalities and communication habits of five new appointees who gradually entered the prison administration. The warden (see *Public Administration News*, February, 1958, p. 5) was inexperienced in prison administration. He simply inaugurated

an open-door policy which began to change the narrow one-way communication channel. The new deputy warden held hearings before signing punishment orders initiated by the guards, emphasizing justice instead of control, and further opened a communication channel around the chain of command. The prison industries enlarged jobs from routine manual tasks to more responsible craft work under a new industrial superintendent. A new education director brought an informality in personal relationships, and the director of treatment brought a faith in group discussion and in written procedures, so that when the new policies were evolved, they were published.

In addition to the publication of the rules, an inmate-elected council added a new channel to the center of power that did not go through the guards. An orientation program for new prisoners was added. Greater emphasis on treatment meant more frequent relationships between officials and inmates, and the new job arrangements brought inmates together in different patterns, weakening the domination of the senior inmates.

The transition was not without a struggle with the guards and old inmates, but gradually the open communication system survived and dominated. Through the transition, the guards remained dedicated to the control idea—by the nature of their work as well as the desire to protect their previous status. Among the guards, communication remained one-way. Gradually inmates knew more about prison policy than the guards, and, through the council, had more influence on policy. For a time, the guards slowed the evolution by closing some communication channels from inmates to prison officials, disciplining inmates who adapted to the new environment, and strictly enforcing control measures, often keeping prisoners from rehabilitation programs.

Gradually, a number of control-oriented officials died or resigned, to be replaced by rehabilitation-oriented persons, and slowly the inmates recognized that "the treatment unit had assumed control." Escape attempts, violence, and disorder that had increased during the period of uncertain dominance, declined.

An important last stage in the struggle was a legislative hearing on the prison. Though stimulated by the guard force, the hearing vindicated the treatment group. Press reports of the hearing "had a stabilizing influence on the inmates. Issues which had seemed, at first, to be little more than an administrative contest for power were defined for everyone on the level of principle."

Another study—of wartime Japanese relocation centers—corroborates the importance of communication in a prisonlike situation. (Norman R. Jackman, "Collective Protest in Relocation Centers," 63 *American Journal of Sociology* 264 (November, 1957).)

"The development of collective protest is a function of the inability of contending parties to comprehend one another. This results from lack of free association, arbitration or negotiation." This was seen by comparing several relocation centers that had identical formal structures but different patterns of communication to evacuees.

As long as intermediate bodies functioned between the administration and the evacuees, collective protest never reached the stage of riot.

The greater the isolation of interest groups of the evacuees from officially sanctioned meetings, the greater was the divergency of meaning between them and the administration. Conversely, maximum communication reduced misunderstanding to a minimum.

In every incident investigated in this study, evacuee groups withdrew from communication whenever they interpreted actions of the administration as dictatorial, as taking decisions about their welfare out of their hands. This occurred when there was no established procedure for arbitration and negotiation or when the administration discouraged negotiation or negotiated in an arbitrary or dictatorial manner. . . .

Initially divergent definitions of a situation became so divergent when communication broke down that riots resulted. In other situations, "meetings of a parliamentary nature" sufficiently modified divergent points of view to avert riots.

Philosophers Look at 'the Public Interest'

While the concept, "the public interest," plays a large part in shaping public policy and government action, there is wholesale

confusion about its meaning, according to a statement drafted by The Committee to Advance Original Work in Philosophy, chaired by Wayne A. R. Leys, Roosevelt University.

A symposium on the subject is scheduled at the annual meeting of the Western Division, American Philosophical Association, May, 1959, and a preliminary statement has been developed by the Committee which notes some basic differences in defining the public interest: (1) the most precise definition of legislative intent possible; (2) the common good, independent of the legislature; (3) the result of the political struggle or the balancing of divergent interests. Even analyzing the two words separately, the Committee finds each subject to many different interpretations.

Cancellation of Foreign Service Entrance Examinations

No Foreign Service entrance examination will be given this year, breaking a regular sequence of semiannual examinations since 1955 and annual examinations before that.

The Foreign Service expects that 240 persons who already have passed the written examination will be available for appointment in fiscal year 1959 and 245 in fiscal 1960. (Persons often take the oral examination a considerable time after passing the written test or become eligible for appointment long before they are available.) Only 150 entrance level appointments will be made in 1959 and again in 1960, according to present plans: only 156 were made in fiscal 1958 compared to an average of 280 appointments per year in fiscal 1956 and 57.

While the number of appointments have dropped, the number of persons taking the written examinations has jumped—from an average of just over 1,000 per year (1948-54) to nearly 7,500 per year (1955-57). This increase followed (1) cutting of the examination's length from 3½ days to one, (2) an intensive recruitment campaign, and (3) an apparent increase of public interest in international affairs, according to Douglas Jenkins, Jr., Executive Secretary of the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service. (Letter dated November 3, 1958.)

Annual written examinations will be re-

sumed next year, Jenkins expects. The age limit for taking the examination has been raised to 21 (at the closing date of filing) unless a 20-year-old applicant is a university senior or graduate.

Control of Administrative Adjudication

A watchdog council on administrative tribunals has been established by law in Great Britain, following generally the recommendation of a committee headed by Sir Oliver Franks. (See 18 PAR 74 and 35 *Public Administration* 347.) Appointments to the 35 British tribunals (administrative boards with adjudication powers) and of inspectors (examiners) who hold local public hearings will be made by the Government only after consultation with the council. Tribunal chairmen will be appointed by the chief judicial officer, the Lord Chancellor, with the Lord President of the Court of Sessions. They may not be dismissed without the Lord Chancellor's consent. The Franks report, arguing that tribunals are not part of administration but of judicial machinery, had recommended that the council appoint all tribunal members.

Parliament also declared its willingness to have decisions of tribunals appealed to the courts even where the original legislation establishing the tribunal indicated an intention that there be no appeal to the courts.

Several changes in specific adjudicatory machinery were made at the Franks committee's suggestion: altogether 71 of the committee's 95 recommendations were accepted in whole and 8 in part. (Geoffrey Marshall, "Tribunals and Inquiries: Developments Since the Franks Report," 36 *Public Administration* 261 (Autumn, 1958).)

Struck by the large volume of lawsuits against the government of India, N. K. Bhojwani won one of the two top prizes in the Indian Institute of Public Administration essay contest last year with a survey of administrative tribunals in India, Great Britain, France, and the United States. He urges increasing use of administrative tribunals for simplicity, speed, and expertness, without curtailing appeal to the courts from their decisions. Bhojwani feels that Indian tribunals which hear cases against the government now fall short of procedural

standards of openness, fairness, and impartiality, but that these standards could be developed without separating tribunals from the machinery of administration. "In a country undergoing the pains of economic growth and social and political changes, policy is bound to play a more dynamic role than normally in shaping decisions, and tribunals are liable to suffer in their value if kept beyond the issues of policy." ("The Problem of Administrative Tribunals," 4 *The Indian Journal of Public Administration* 165 (April-June, 1958).)

A code of ethics for the more than 100 federal tribunals and other U. S. adjudicatory agencies is being written by a committee of the American Bar Association. Apparent favoritism headlined from House committee hearings was the immediate stimulus. The committee "will seek to define the judicial area of agency work as distinct from executive and legislative provinces where outside inquiries and protests might not only be proper but also desirable," the *New York Times* reported. (October 12, 1958.) The committee then will try to specify proper and improper outside contacts in the judicial area.

An *International Review of Administrative Sciences* editorial (Volume 24, Number 2, 1958) points out growing concern in Italy, Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland over procedures in administrative adjudication. Also reported is Yugoslavia's new extensive code, covering both local and central government, which makes adjudicatory agents independent of "particular orders or directives" of the government. (p. 181.)

Local Democracy and Coordination among Federal Programs Frustrated

Depression-era experiments in local administration of federal programs by the program clientele have failed, according to Leon Wolcott. Using the soil conservation and Agricultural Adjustment Administration (and its successors) as examples, he finds that participation at the grass roots has not been as wide as anticipated and that locally elected spokesmen, instead of adapting the national program to local needs, have formed national organizations which work for program autonomy and protection. Also, elections are na-

tionally oriented, with farm organizations, the Extension Service, and the Department of Agriculture itself fighting for control. "... a similar tendency marks the administration of flood control, reclamation, health, education, public assistance, and other programs in which there has been less emphasis on local democracy."

Intergovernmental cooperation presents no problems, but such cooperation on program lines "frustrates efforts at intra-governmental and regional coordination, and insulates administration from political responsibility." ("National Programs and Local 'Democratic' Administration," 11 *Western Political Quarterly* 396 (June, 1958).)

Success of Regional Administration in Britain

British experience with regional field offices is of interest here "particularly in suggesting means of securing greater co-operation among departments at the regional level," according to John S. Harris, University of Massachusetts.

Decentralization to regions is relatively recent in Great Britain, the basic rationale having been published in 1932 by the Committee of Inquiry on the Post Office and a full-scale regional structure beginning during World War II when twelve standard regions were constituted and a regional commissioner with staff was established. Wartime arrangements were mainly a preparation for regional government if the area were cut off. While the regional commissioner was abandoned during peacetime as incompatible with the responsibility of each department directly to its own minister, Harris found "the main outlines of the system . . . remain and appear to constitute a permanent part of the national administrative machinery. . . ."

Coordination among departments in the field is encouraged: first, by the use of standard regions by almost every decentralized department; second, by the Treasury's promotion of coordination; third, by seven major standing committees with subcommittees in each region plus additional interdepartmental committees in certain areas. Some of these serve as liaison to the public on matters in

which the departments have joint interest, as the regional boards for industry and the regional physical planning committees. In a few instances, regional offices of two departments with similar responsibilities in the field have been combined.

To coordinate regional policy with that of the central department, some ministries hold monthly conferences at headquarters.

Despite the small geographic area (over half of our states are nearly as big or bigger than England and Wales), a 1954 parliamentary study found that "... Generally the evidence seems to show that Departments are not maintaining regional organizations without good reason." ("Regional Decentralization of Government Departments in Britain," 24 *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 57-69 (February, 1958).)

'Home Rule' Type of Delegation Urged

A new attitude toward delegation—the granting of freedom rather than authority, in much the same way as some municipalities are granted home rule or business enterprises are free as long as they satisfy market demands—is urged by Bennett E. Kline and Norman H. Martin. ("Freedom, Authority, and Decentralization," 36 *Harvard Business Review* 69 (May-June, 1958).)

An essential of this kind of delegation is that the superior "must provide an adequate system of information and communication so that subordinates will have all the knowledge necessary for the making of decisions. He becomes literally a resource to those below. . . .

"... one of the chief ways in which power-oriented superiors control and thwart strong subordinates is to deny them the full knowledge they need to take action."

Why, when most executives will agree in principle that subordinates should be free to act, do they not allow it? A leading cause "is an environment of uncertainty and insecurity," causing "authoritarian personalities" to center decision-making in themselves, making them more status conscious and certain of important differences between themselves and lower echelons. To achieve real delegation, an atmosphere of freedom must permeate the entire organization.

Apart from conflicting with our ideals of freedom and equality, the hierarchical organization looks like this from below:

There is a "... probability that the chief characteristic of the command hierarchy, or any group in our society, is not knowledge but ignorance. Consider that any one person can know only a fraction of what is going on around him. Much of what that person knows or believes will be false rather than true. And many of the directions he gives to those under him will be misunderstood. . . .

"It seems possible, then, that in organizing ourselves into a hierarchy of authority for the purpose of increasing efficiency, we may really be institutionalizing ignorance. While making better use of what the few know, we are making sure that the great majority are prevented from exploring the dark areas beyond our knowledge. And while we progress, our increasing knowledge is more than matched by the emergence of new areas of ignorance, and the trappings of status are substituted for the dignity which naturally crowns achievement."

States Increase Management Planning

"There has been a definite quickening of interest in management analysis during the postwar years as evidenced by the increases in management planning staffs in both large and small states," a recent survey shows. However, only 11 states now have separate central units for management analysis, 7 use budget analysts for this purpose when they have time, and the rest have no permanent program though some have used *ad hoc* management studies, Little Hoover Commissions, outside consultants, and personnel staffs for management studies.

A trend toward more management analysis is indicated. New York's Administrative Management Unit greatly expanded its activity in 1955 and the number of New York state departments with administrative planning units has more than doubled since 1950. Ohio just started a management unit; Oregon's three-year-old office plans an increase in staff from 10 to at least 16; Minnesota set up a Division of Research and Planning in the Department of Administration last year (though the Budget Division had done such work be-

fore); and three more states are seeking management analysts. (Robert T. Daland and Raymond Wickham, "States Seek Efficiency," 47 *National Municipal Review* 166 (April, 1958).)

State Budget Procedures Changed to Sharpen Legislative Focus

Idaho and North Carolina report recent changes in budget procedures to help the legislatures sharpen their focus on what is to be spent.

An *ad hoc* joint legislative committee sat in on executive budget hearings in Idaho last year. Budget books containing revenue estimates, agency requests, and budget committee recommendations were available to all legislators and to the public forty days before the session. With this advance information and public discussion, the governor's budget message did not need to go over most of the supporting data for his recommendations. Instead, he emphasized highlights.

Although the legislative committee was at work before the election, with the risk that its members might be "lame ducks," it was composed of members of the Finance Committee in the Senate and Appropriations Committee in the House, made up of senior legislators, most of whom were re-elected.

North Carolina also has an Advisory Budget Commission composed mainly of members of the legislature's Appropriation and Finance Committees. The new innovation requires each agency to prepare two budget requests. Budget "A" shows the cost of continuing current programs without any change in quality and with changes in quantity only sufficient to match anticipated increases within the requirements of the enabling legislation. For example, in the case of a per pupil grant to schools, the "A" budget request would cover expected increases in the number of pupils but would not include any increase per pupil. The "B" budget includes expansion or improvement of services. When anticipated revenue covers current programs, little attention seems to be given to possible cutbacks there. (Robert E. Smylie, "The Pre-Legislative Budget in Idaho," and Paul A. Johnston, "New Budget Procedures in North Carolina,"

31 *State Government* 83, 106 (May and June, 1958).)

Business Still Relies on Committees

Top and upper-middle management in 79 various-sized companies indicated in a recent survey that their companies rely more on committees now than five years ago. (Boards of directors were not considered a committee in the survey.) This was not a random sample, being drawn from an American Management Association conference, which would include companies biased toward a particular approach to management.

Number: Two-thirds reported their companies have more committees than five years ago. Only one in nine said fewer. Fewer of the largest companies increased the number of committees, but even among them more than half did.

Importance: Two-thirds report committees exercise more power in their firms than five years ago; only 7 per cent said less. Committees make key decisions on new products in 42 companies, on personnel policy in 27, production volume in 26, and long-range planning in 24. Executive hiring and major capital investment are the only key decisions made by committees in fewer than 20 companies.

Evaluation: Only 7 per cent felt committees had too much power, about 20 per cent thought they should have more, the rest about the same.

Decision-making process: One in five said decisions often are determined in advance by "powerful individuals." Two in five said occasionally. Fewer than one in ten felt strong influence by an individual occurred seldom or never. Most committees decide by consensus, i.e. discussion until "participants arrive at mutual understanding and . . . at least harmony." In others, the chairman or a majority vote decides. Some require unanimity.

Size: Most have six to 10 members, only one in nine have more than 10, nearly one-third have five or fewer. (Harvard's Laboratory of Social Relations recommends four to seven, ideally five.) ("Committees: Their Role in Management Today," 46 *Management Review* 4 (October, 1957).)

ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Special Decision-Making Issue—December 1958

Theories and Studies in Decision Making

Martin Shubik

The Role of Expectations in Business Decision Making

R. M. Cyert, W. R. Dill, and J. G. March

The U. S. Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea

Richard C. Snyder

Individual Decisions to Undertake Psychotherapy

Charles Kadushin

Applications of Operations Research
to Managerial Decision Making

Burton V. Dean

In this issue we have tried to do more than present several discrete, private studies in decision making. The issue is bound together by an introductory article on decision theory, and each article is presented as an example of a theoretical approach to the study of decision making and a method of analyzing decisions in a given organization context. Beyond this, the studies add much to our knowledge of how organizational and personal values shape individual choice. . . .

Robert V. Presthus, editor

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York

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Comment and Critique

Brief letters on *Review* articles and other public administration matters, selected for general interest, stimulating ideas, and thoughtful content. Letters are welcomed by the Editors.

On the Contributions of Laverne Burchfield

Laverne Burchfield became Managing Editor of *Public Administration Review* in 1943, three years after its beginning, and held that post until 1958. During these fifteen years she was a strong and steady influence in forming and maintaining the character of the *Review*.

Her influence ranged widely. She stimulated the production of papers which were published in the *Review*, guided by her wide knowledge of who was doing what and which things needed recognition in the rapidly developing field. She showed keen and discriminating judgment about the merit and importance of manuscripts. She helped many an author to trim his copy and to bring into better focus matters that were significant. She had a rare capacity for stimulating members of the editorial board into providing fresh ideas and finding themselves refreshed by the

process. She maintained the highest standards of editorial work, insisting upon accuracy and clarity in the words and sentences which the *Review* printed. To those who worked with her, she proved herself a warm and understanding friend.

While she has now moved from her responsibility for the *Review* into fulltime work for Public Administration Service, we know that she will remain a valuable counselor to the editorial board and to the staff. But her completion of fifteen years as managing editor of *Public Administration Review* seemed to the former editors-in-chief to require a public acknowledgment of her immeasurable services. We are sure that Leonard D. White, the first editor-in-chief, would have wanted to join in this statement, and that he would be particularly happy to acknowledge Laverne Burchfield's distinguished part in achieving a publication of the high standard at which he aimed.

GORDON CLAPP
ROWLAND EGGER
PENDLETON HERRING
FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX
FREDERICK C. MOSHER
WALLACE S. SAYRE
YORK WILLBERN

SPECIALIST AND GENERALIST

A NUMBER of signs point to the revival of an old agenda item: "the specialist and the generalist." The administrative class in the British public service, the long-prevalent conception of the ambidexterity and even amphibiousness of officers of general rank in the armed services, the capacity of foreign service officers to serve in a succession of countries and to address their intelligence to a wide range of subject-matter problems, and the careers of some of our Society's most distinguished members have all been persuasive reminders of the generalist's value in public administration. Engineering degrees have declined sharply as qualifications for city managerships, and the federal service has recruited able liberal arts graduates for careers as administrators.

What seems to us an item of "old business" appeared on the agenda of the 1930's as exciting "new business." The generalist "school" won out over those arguing that a man must administer *something* and that a knowledge of that something is a necessary qualification for high administrative rank. The argument that prevailed was that at the higher reaches of administration, the bulk of the job is administration and general policy-making rather than practice of the specialty; that a bright higher administrator could master quickly the vocabulary and concepts of the specialized subject matter; and that he could readily draw on the specialized competence of his staff to compensate for his own deficiencies in the area. "The expert should be on tap, not on top" maximized the argument.

But new doubts are arising, or old doubts reviving. Few would contend that the same army general can bring equal competence to direction of a scientific program, command of an Arctic post, supervision of contract renegotiation, and liaison with Congress. In the foreign affairs field, the Wriston Committee noted the need for "individuals with a high degree of specialization in economics, commercial promotion, agricultural knowledge, labor competence, fiscal practice, certain branches

of the law, and the languages and cultures of important areas of the world." "The Foreign Service," added the Committee, "has been almost indifferent to these specialities; . . . loath to make room for them in its ranks." In domestic affairs, many who are recruited as potential general administrators quickly become, and then remain, administrative specialists in such areas as procedures analysis, personnel administration, budgeting, and the requisitioning of space and things that occupy space. Others often settle down in a particular bureau or division and never emerge. Their valuable contributions do not dispel concern over where our top administrators are to come from.

The increasing specialization of knowledge, professionalization of skill groups, and involvement of the government in science and technology suggest that administrators of a number of critical programs must be trained specialists, at home in the other-worldly language of particular subjects and perceptive in judgment among disagreeing members of a scientific or professional community.

There clearly remain important areas that call for generalists—for intelligence and judgment, sophistication in the ways of government, and a sound foundation in the liberal arts. What is needed is a more discriminating appraisal of the variation of needs for generalist and specialist administrators according to program area.

If specialist administrators are bound to be with us, then much thought needs to be given to the career stages by which a young scholar changes into a promising top administrator, the apparent impossibility of identifying him during his pre-entry training, and the means by which, when his promise becomes clear—usually at a midpoint of his career—some of the values inherent in the preparation and careers of the general administrators might be transmitted to him.

JAMES W. FESLER
Editor-in-Chief

INTERCHANGE, TRANSFERS AND ASPA

A DEEP and lasting impression that one takes away from an experience such as I had last year in traveling among thirty chapters of ASPA, is that it is impossible to tell the teachers from the practitioners and the private from the public managers. When one comes "cold" into group after group of this sort, one frequently encounters surprise that this man should be the professor and that man the personnel director or the budgeteer. One's impression based upon clothing, bearing, interest, and vocabulary is frequently to the contrary.

One could argue that there should be no surprise; that with the high level of education which the administrators, the teachers, and the researchers have in common, this should be expected. In fact, some faculty members are administrators between semesters, others act as consultants to government agencies, and many participate in the public administration of universities. At the same time, many bureaucrats teach part-time.

Yet it remains far too difficult to cross over the lines between government jurisdictions and the university world, among government units, and between private and public management.

It seems to me that this is truly dangerous in a nation, not to say a world, becoming increasingly interdependent and more tightly bound together. Are we fragmenting artificially what is naturally closely knit? If so, how do we promote the kind of transferability and interchangeability that this Society's 1957 National Advisory Committee (and particularly its vice chairman, Robert Walker, in a paper on *Professional Standards*) has urged?

Walker recommended two steps:

1. The interchangeability of personnel among agencies in a particular governmental jurisdiction so that an entire federal or state service would become a single professional service permitting the transferability of managerial skills.

2. Transfers among governmental jurisdictions

to promote integration of federal-state and state-local functions and a concept of the public service as a *whole* constituting a professional field for managerial talent.

I propose that the Society promote interchangeability of top personnel between government, university, business, and industrial enterprise. How?

1. The Society should plan for the coordination of retirement systems, preferably on a nationwide basis, to facilitate transfers both as among jurisdictions and as between government jurisdictions and other enterprises including the academic. There are patterns, the TIAA is one, whereby, once inducted, the man may take his retirement plan with him to other employers.

2. The personnel exchange should be expanded with emphasis on such interchange, building on its present roster of varied talents and backgrounds.

3. We need to encourage establishment of the sabbatical principle for bureaucrats. A number of other countries have such a provision whereby every five, six, or seven years a man gets off for a year of study, travel, or employment in another capacity.

4. We need to raise the academic standards of executive development programs, providing credits and degrees where earned. Events this year (the federal and California training legislation, for example) give hope that this can be done.

5. Similarly, we need to promote governmental and business employment of academic personnel. Why not a Management Institute for university faculty, conducted by ASPA?

We should also, of course, seek the extension of the informal interchange now existing in which administrators teach and some teachers consult or work in government for short periods.

Breadth of outlook and better understanding of the subcultures that make up our culture will result.

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Index

Volume XVIII—1958

NOTE: This index includes those items from the Developments in Public Administration sections which bring together material on the same subject from several

different sources or are based on unpublished data. Indexed by the key subject, they are identified by the title of the item and the abbreviation DIPA.

- Adams, John Clarke. On the Teaching of Public Administration Abroad 124
- Acheson, Dean G. Letter, *New York Times*, quotation from 105
- Adrian, Charles R. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—A Study of Three Communities, part of symposium .. 208
- ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR. *See* Behavior.
- ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY. P I & E review (of *First Blood*) by E. A. B. 255
- Sayre, Wallace S. Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging 102
- ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY. *See* Responsibility.
- ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS. P I & E review (of *Ideal and Practice in Public Administration*) by E. A. B. 144
- ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM. Brownlow, Louis. *A Passion for Anonymity*, quotation from ... 101
- ADMINISTRATIVE TECHNIQUES. *See also* Work Measurement.
- The Art of Brain-Picking, book review by John D. Young 133
- ADMINISTRATORS. *See also* Executive, Generalist vs. Specialist, Leadership.
- Reining, Henry, Jr. Society Perspectives: Interchange, Transfers and ASPA 371
- ADVISORY COMMITTEES. *See* Committees.
- Argyris, Chris. *Personality and Organization: The Conflict Between System and the Individual*, reviewed by Wallace S. Sayre 239
- AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, ASPA Research Committee Answers Primary Questions (DIPA) 160
- Durham, G. Homer. Society Perspectives: "Years of Decision" 164
- Macy, John W., Jr. Society Perspectives: Time for Growth 272
- Matteson, Robert J. M. Society Perspectives: Science Is Not Enough 88
- Reining, Henry, Jr. Society Perspectives: Interchange, Transfers and ASPA 371
- ANECDOTE. Brody, William. Keeping Personnel Informed 331
- Ascher, Charles S. The Dashing Administrator, book review 351
- P I & E review of *The General* 64
- P I & E review of *The Ship* 64
- AUTOMATION. Automation and the Public Service: Impact on Program and Method (DIPA) 70
- BEHAVIOR. *See also* Loyalty.
- The Unhappy Bureaucrats: Views Ironic, Hopeful, Indignant, book review by Wallace S. Sayre 239
- Bell, James R. A Coordinator for State Agencies 98
- Benson, Bernard S. "Let's Toss This Idea Up . . ." *Fortune*, quotation from 13
- BIOGRAPHIES. A Dashing Administrator, book review by Charles S. Ascher 351
- Emmerich, Herbert. "It Won't Work" .. 237
- Gaus, John M. Leonard Dupee White 1891-1958 231
- A Passion for Executive Leadership, book review by Gordon R. Clapp 252
- P I & E review (of *The Democratic Roosevelt*) by E. A. B. 65
- P I & E review (of *Drive*) by E. A. B. ... 63
- P I & E review (of *The General*) by Charles S. Ascher 64
- P I & E review (of *Lloyd George's Ambulance Wagon*) by E. A. B. 66
- Price, Don K. Leonard D. White: Tribute 2, ii
- Russell Forbes: Prototype of the Future Administrator (DIPA) 84
- Bosworth, Karl A. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—The Manager Is a Politician, part of symposium 216
- Bowen, Cornelius M. Specialist or Generalist Head for Treatment Programs? letter to the editor 269
- BRAITHWAITE, WILLIAM J. P I & E review (of *Lloyd George's Ambulance Wagon*) by E. A. B. 66

- Breul, Frank R. A Reply to Richards, book review 249
 Brody, William. Keeping Personnel Informed 331
 Brownlow, Louis. *A Passion for Politics and A Passion for Anonymity*, reviewed by Gordon R. Clapp 252
 A Passion for Anonymity, quotation from 101
 BROWNLOW, LOUIS. A Passion for Executive Leadership, book review by Gordon R. Clapp 252
 BUDGETING. Kroeger, Louis J. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" 47
 Parsons, Malcolm B. Reply to Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" 129
 Stene, Edwin O. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" 49
 Zimmerman, Virgil B. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" 43
 Bunker, Robert. *Other Men's Skies* reviewed by Emil Sady 143
 BURCHFIELD, LAVERNE. Seven PAR Editors-in-Chief, On The Contributions of Laverne Burchfield, letter to the editor 369
 BUREAUCRACY. Key, V. O., Jr. *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, quotation from 132
 Burkhead, Jesse. Informing Government with Economics, book review 340
 Burns, William J. Father of the "Lakewood Plan," letter to the editor 117

 CALIFORNIA. Bell, James R. A Coordinator for State Agencies 98
 Cannell, Charles F. See Kahn, Robert L.
 CAREER SERVICE. See Civil Service.
 CASE METHOD. Montgomery, John D. Flesh for the Bones of Principle 118
 CASE PROGRAM. The Next Step in Case Studies, book review by Herbert Kaufman 52
 Chapin, F. Stuart. *Urban Land Use Planning*, reviewed by Coleman Woodbury ... 332
 Chapman, Brian. See Chapman, J. M. 351
 Chapman, J. M. and Brian. *The Life and Times of Baron Haussmann: Paris in the Second Empire*, reviewed by Charles S. Ascher 351
 Chute, Charlton F. The Honolulu Metropolitan Area: A Challenge to Traditional Thinking 7
 CITY MANAGER. Adrian, Charles R. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—A Study of Three Communities, part of symposium 208

 Bosworth, Karl A. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—The Manager Is a Politician, part of symposium 216
 Pealy, Dorothee Strauss. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—The Need for Elected Leadership, part of symposium 214
 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. Hammond, Paul Y. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Effects of Structure on Policy, part of symposium 175
 Radway, Laurence I. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Uniforms and Mufti: What Place in Policy? part of symposium 180
 CIVIL SERVICE. Pincus, William. The Opposition to the Senior Civil Service 324
 Van Riper, Paul P. The Senior Civil Service and the Career System 189
 Clapp, Gordon R. A Passion for Executive Leadership, book review 252
 Cleveland, Harlan and Mangone, Gerard J., eds. *The Art of OverseasmanSHIP, Preparing Americans for Work Abroad in Business, Industry and Government*, reviewed by Egbert S. Wengert 136
 Codman, Charles R. *Drive* reviewed by E. A. B. 64
 COMMITTEES. Mainzer, Lewis C. Science Democratized: Advisory Committees on Research 314
 COMMUNICATION. See also Information.
 The Art of Brain-Picking, book review by John D. Young 133
 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT. P I & E review (of *Other Men's Skies*) by Emil Sady 143
 CONGRESS. See Legislative-Executive Relations.
 COORDINATION. Bell, James R. A Coordinator for State Agencies 98
 Cordiner, Ralph J. *New Frontiers for Professional Managers*, quotation from 20
 CURZON, SIR HERBERT. P I & E review (of *The General*) by Charles S. Ascher 64

 DECENTRALIZATION. Cordiner, Ralph J. *New Frontiers for Professional Managers*, quotation from 20
 Further Decentralization of Federal Personnel Functions (DIPA) 153
 DECISION-MAKING. See also Policy-Making.
 Benson, Bernard S. "Let's Toss This Idea Up . . ." *Fortune*, quotation from 13
 Miles, Rufus E., Jr. The Orientation of Presidential Appointees: A Continuing Challenge 106

- Stover, Carl F. Changing Patterns in the Philosophy of Management 21
- "The Decision-Making Schema": A Reply, reply to earlier book review, by Herbert A. Simon 60
- DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF. Hammond, Paul Y. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Effects of Structure on Policy, part of symposium 175
- Mosher, Frederick C. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Old Concepts and New Problems, part of symposium 169
- Radway, Laurence I. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Uniforms and Mufti: What Place in Policy? part of symposium 180
- DEFENSE ORGANIZATION. Margach, James, *The Sunday Times* (London), quotation from .. 230
- Dimock, Marshall E. Executive Development after Ten Years 91
- Durham, G. Homer. Society Perspectives: "Years of Decision" 164
- E. A. B. P I & E 63, 141, 255
- P I & E review of *The Democratic Roosevelt* 65
- P I & E review of *Drive* 64
- P I & E review of *First Blood* 255
- P I & E review of *Ideal and Practice in Public Administration* 144
- P I & E review of *Law and Contemporary Problems* (Summer, 1957) 143
- P I & E review of *Lloyd George's Ambulance Wagon* 66
- P I & E review of *Reflections on International Administration* 66
- ECONOMIC THEORY. Informing Government with Economics, book review by Jesse Burkhead 340
- EDUCATION. See also Executive Development, Training.
- Perkins, John A. Higher Education and Training for Administrative Careers .. 14
- EDUCATION, ADMINISTRATION OF. Morlan, Robert L. Toward City-School District Rapprochement 113
- EFFICIENCY. Mosher, Frederick C. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Old Concepts and New Problems, part of symposium 169
- Redford, Emmette S. *Ideal and Practice in Public Administration*, quotation from 123
- EGYPT. P I & E review (of *Maze of Justice*) by Laurence I. Radway 142
- Emmerich, Herbert. "It Won't Work" 237
- ETHICS. Fletcher, T. W. The Nature of Administrative Loyalty 37
- EXECUTIVE. See also Executive Development, Legislative-Executive Relations, Political Executive.
- Executive Tension: More Myth Than Reality (DIPA) 261
- EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT. Dimock, Marshall E. Executive Development after Ten Years 91
- Educating Executives: Social Science, Self-Study, or Socrates?, a symposium . 275
- Evaluation of Executive Development Program's Effect on Decision-Making (DIPA) 161
- Grundstein, Nathan D. Understanding Self and Organization, part of symposium 285
- Mowitz, Robert J. Benefits from Management Training, part of symposium ... 300
- McDonald, William T. and Stover, Carl F. Brookings' Executive Conference Program, part of symposium 296
- Nelson, Charles A. Liberal Education for Public Service, part of symposium 278
- Reynolds, Harry W., Jr. Training Middle Management in the Field, part of symposium 291
- EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS. See Legislative-Executive Relations.
- Farley, Alice. See Mandel, B. J.
- Fesler, James W. Editorial Comment: The Role of the Review 271
- Editorial Comment: Specialist and Generalist 370
- FIELD SERVICE. See Headquarters-Field Relations.
- Fletcher, T. W. The Nature of Administrative Loyalty 37
- FORBES, RUSSELL. Russell Forbes: Prototype of the Future Administrator (DIPA) 84
- FOREIGN POLICY. See also Technical Assistance.
- Can We Train for "Overseasmanship"? book review by Egbert S. Wengert ... 136
- Forester, C. S. *The General*, reviewed by Charles S. Ascher 64
- The Ship*, reviewed by Charles S. Ascher 64
- Gaus, John M. Leonard Dupee White 1891-1958 231
- GENERALIST VS. SPECIALIST. Bowen, Cornelius M. Specialist or Generalist Head for Treatment Programs? letter to the editor 269

Broader or More Specialized Education for Public Health (DIPA)	75	INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS. Chute, Charlton F. The Honolulu Metropolitan Area: A Challenge to Traditional Thinking	7
Fesler, James W. Editorial Comment: Specialist and Generalist	370	Increasing Attention to Intergovernmental Relations (DIPA)	147
Kammerer, Gladys M. The Organization of Child Welfare Services	28	Morlan, Robert L. Toward City-School District Rapprochement	113
Kammerer, Gladys M. Specialist or Generalist Head for Treatment Programs? A Reply, letter to the editor	88	INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION. P I & E review (of <i>Reflections on International Administration</i>) by E. A. B.	66
Matteson, Robert J. M. Society Perspectives: Science Is Not Enough	88	Inter-University Case Program: <i>Cases in Public Administration and Policy Formation</i> , Nos. 24-38, reviewed by Herbert Kaufman ..	52
Goodall, Merrill. P I & E review of <i>Call the Next Witness</i>	257	Joint Economic Committee, Papers Submitted to and Hearings before, on Federal Expenditure Policy, reviewed by Jesse Burkhead	340
Government Affairs Foundation, Inc. <i>Metropolitan Communities: A Bibliography</i> , reviewed by Coleman Woodbury	332	Kahn, Robert L. and Cannell, Charles F. <i>The Dynamics of Interviewing: Theory, Technique, and Cases</i> , reviewed by John D. Young	133
GOVERNORS. Bell, James R. A Coordinator for State Agencies	98	Kammerer, Gladys M. The Organization of Child Welfare Services	28
The Perils of Popularity, book review by Robert C. Wood	349	Specialist or Generalist Head for Treatment Programs? A Reply, letter to the editor	269
Grundstein, Nathan D. Understanding Self and Organization, part of symposium	285	Kampelman, Max M. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Congressional Control vs. Executive Flexibility, part of symposium	185
Hakim, Taufik al. <i>Maze of Justice</i> reviewed by Laurence I. Radway	142	Kaufman, Herbert. <i>The Next Step in Case Studies</i> , book review	52
Hammond, Paul Y. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Effects of Structure on Policy, part of symposium ..	175	Keith-Lucas, Alan. <i>Decisions About People in Need: A Study of Administrative Responsiveness in Public Assistance</i> , reviewed by Allan R. Richards and Frank R. Breul ...	245
HAUSSMANN, BARON. A Dashing Administrator, book review by Charles S. Ascher	351	Key, V. O., Jr. <i>Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups</i> , quotation from	132
Hawthorne, Nathaniel. Letter to Richard Henry Stoddard, <i>Good Government</i> , quotation from	323	KNUDSEN, WILLIAM S. Emmerich, Herbert. "It Won't Work"	237
HEADQUARTERS-FIELD RELATIONS. P I & E review (of <i>Call the Next Witness</i>) by Merrill Goodall	257	Kroeger, Louis J. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines"	47
P I & E review (of <i>First Blood</i>) by E. A. B.	255	<i>Law and Contemporary Problems</i> , Summer, 1957 issue reviewed by E. A. B.	143
Hobbs, Edward H. The President and Administration—Eisenhower	306	LEADERSHIP. Adrian, Charles R. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—A Study of Three Communities, part of symposium	208
HOOVER COMMISSION. See Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Commission on.			
HUMAN RELATIONS. Fletcher, T. W. The Nature of Administrative Loyalty	37		
The Unhappy Bureaucrats: Views Ironic, Hopeful, Indignant, book review by Wallace S. Sayre	239		
INDIANS, AMERICAN. P I & E review (of <i>Other Men's Skies</i>) by Emil Sady	143		
INFORMATION. Public Information: Continuing Pressure for More (DIPA)	145		

- Bosworth, Karl A. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—The Manager Is a Politician, part of symposium 216
- A Dashing Administrator, book review by Charles S. Ascher 351
- Dimock, Marshall E. Executive Development after Ten Years 91
- LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS. Emmerich, Herbert. "It Won't Work" 237
- Kampelman, Max M. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Congressional Control vs. Executive Flexibility, part of symposium 185
- Pealy, Dorothee Strauss. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—The Need for Elected Leadership, part of symposium 214
- The Political Executive, the Administration, and the Legislature at Three Levels (DIPA) 356
- Mainzer, Lewis C. Science Democratized: Advisory Committees on Research ... 314
- LINE AND STAFF. See Staff and Line.
- LOCAL GOVERNMENT. See also City Manager; Education, Administration of; Metropolitan Government.
- Lukens, Matthias E. Practicing Management Theory 223
- Morlan, Robert L. Toward City-School District Rapprochement 113
- The Perils of Popularity, book review by Robert C. Wood 349
- Loveday, A. *Reflections on International Administration*, reviewed by E. A. B. 66
- LOYALTY. Fletcher, T. W. The Nature of Administrative Loyalty 37
- Lukens, Matthias E. Practicing Management Theory 223
- Lyon, Leverett S. *Governmental Problems in the Chicago Metropolitan Area*, reviewed by Coleman Woodbury 332
- Macy, John W., Jr. Society Perspectives: Time for Growth 272
- Mailick, Sidney. One University's Role in Executive Development, part of symposium .. 275
- Mainzer, Lewis C. Science Democratized: Advisory Committees on Research 314
- MANAGEMENT. Lukens, Matthias E. Practicing Management Theory 223
- Mandel, B. J., Mindlin, Albert, and Farley, Alice. Work Sampling in a Nationwide Field Organization 201
- Mangone, Gerard J. See Cleveland, Harlan . 136
- Margach, James. *The Sunday Times* (London), quotation from 230
- Marric, J. J. *Gideon's Night*, reviewed by Frederick Mosher 141
- Marshall, Hubert. Public Administration: Wider Vistas, book review 139
- Mason, E. S. *Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference, the Institute of Public Administration*, quotation from 236
- Matteson, Robert J. M. Society Perspectives: Science Is Not Enough 88
- McDonald, William T. and Stover, Carl F. Brookings' Executive Conference Program, part of symposium 296
- METROPOLITAN AREAS. Chute, Charlton F. The Honolulu Metropolitan Area: A Challenge to Traditional Thinking 7
- METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT. Burns, William J. Father of the "Lakewood Plan", letter to the editor 117
- Great Cities, Great Problems, Great Possibilities? book review by Coleman Woodbury 332
- Miles, Rufus E., Jr. The Orientation of Presidential Appointees 1
- The Orientation of Presidential Appointees: A Continuing Challenge 106
- MILITARY ORGANIZATION. See Defense Organization; Defense, Department of.
- Mindlin, Albert. See Mandel, B. J.
- Montgomery, John D. *Flesh for the Bones of Principle* 118
- Morlan, Robert L. Toward City-School District Rapprochement 113
- Mosher, Frederick C. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Old Concepts and New Problems, part of symposium 169
- P I & E review of *Gideon's Night* 141
- Mowitz, Robert J. Benefits from Management Training, part of symposium 300
- MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION. See City Manager, Metropolitan Government.
- Nelson, Charles A. Liberal Education for Public Service, part of symposium 278
- NEWS MEDIA. See Information.
- ORGANIZATION. Hammond, Paul Y. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Effects of Structure on Policy, part of symposium 175
- Kammerer, Gladys M. The Organization of Child Welfare Services 28

Mosher, Frederick C. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Old Concepts and New Problems, part of symposium	169	POLICE ADMINISTRATION. P I & E review (of <i>Gideon's Night</i>) by Frederick Mosher	141
The Unhappy Bureaucrats: Views Ironic, Hopeful, Indignant, book review by Wallace S. Sayre	239	POLICY-MAKING. See also Decision Making.	
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, COMMISSION ON. Pincus, William. The Opposition to the Senior Civil Service	324	Adrian, Charles R. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—A Study of Three Communities, part of symposium	208
Van Riper, Paul P. The Senior Civil Service and the Career System	189	Bosworth, Karl A. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—The Manager Is a Politician, part of symposium	216
OVERSEAS REPRESENTATION. Can We Train for "Overseasmanship"? book review by Egbert S. Wengert	136	Hammond, Paul Y. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Effects of Structure on Policy, part of symposium	175
Parkinson, C. Northcote. <i>Parkinson's Law and Other Studies in Administration</i> , reviewed by Wallace S. Sayre	239	Mosher, Frederick C. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Old Concepts and New Problems, part of symposium	169
Parsons, Malcolm B. Reply to Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines"	129	Pealy, Dorothee Strauss. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—The Need for Elected Leadership, part of symposium	214
PATTON, GENERAL GEORGE C. P I & E review (of <i>Drive</i>) by E. A. B.	64	Radway, Laurence I. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Uniforms and Mufti: What Place in Policy? part of symposium	180
Pealy, Dorothee Strauss. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—The Need for Elected Leadership, part of symposium	214	POLITICAL EXECUTIVE. Are We Making Enough Use of Businessmen in Government? (DIPA)	263
Perkins, John A. Higher Education and Training for Administrative Careers	14	Miles, Rufus E., Jr. The Orientation of Presidential Appointees	1
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION. Further Decentralization of Federal Personnel Functions (DIPA)	153	Miles, Rufus E., Jr. The Orientation of Presidential Appointees: A Continuing Challenge	106
Hawthorne, Nathaniel, letter to Richard Henry Stoddard, <i>Good Government</i> quotation from	323	POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION. Adrian, Charles R. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—A Study of Three Communities, part of symposium	208
Reynolds, Harry W., Jr. Training Middle Management in the Field, part of symposium	291	Bosworth, Karl A. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—The Manager Is a Politician, part of symposium	216
PHILIPPINES. Kroeger, Louis J. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines"	47	Hobbs, Edward H. The President and Administration—Eisenhower	306
Parsons, Malcolm B. Reply to Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines"	129	Miles, Rufus E., Jr. The Orientation of Presidential Appointees	1
Stene, Edwin O. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" ..	49	Miles, Rufus E., Jr. The Orientation of Presidential Appointees: A Continuing Challenge	106
Zimmerman, Virgil B. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines"	43	Pealy, Dorothee Strauss. Leadership and Decision-Making in Manager Cities—The Need for Elected Leadership, part of symposium	214
Pincus, William. The Opposition to the Senior Civil Service	324	Pincus, William. The Opposition to the Senior Civil Service	324
PLANNING. A Dashing Administrator, book review by Charles S. Ascher	351		
Great Cities, Great Problems, Great Possibilities? book review by Coleman Woodbury	332		

- PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY. Lukens, Matthias E. Practicing Management Theory 223
- PRESIDENCY. Hobbs, Edward H. The President and Administration—Eisenhower 306
- PRESTIGE. Mason, E. S. *Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Conference, the Institute of Public Administration*, quotation from ... 236
- Price, Don K. Leonard D. White: Tribute .. 2, ii
- PROFESSIONALISM. Durham, G. Homer, Society Perspectives: "Years of Decision" 164
- PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW. Fesler, James W. Editorial Comment: The Role of the Review 271
- Seven PAR Editors-in-Chief, On The Contributions of Laverne Burchfield, letter to the editor 369
- PUBLIC INFORMATION. See Information.
- PUBLIC POLICY. Informing Government with Economics, book review by Jesse Burkhead 340
- PUBLIC RELATIONS. Public Relations for the Public Service Tied to Anniversary (DIPA) 267
- PUBLIC SERVICE. See also Civil Service, Prestige. Acheson, Dean G., letter, *New York Times*, quotation from 105
- PUBLIC SERVICE UNIONS. Unions in the Public Service (DIPA) 77
- PUBLIC WELFARE. Democracy and Rights in Administering Assistance, book review by Allan R. Richards 245
- Kammerer, Gladys M. The Organization of Child Welfare Services 28
- A Reply to Richards, book review by Frank R. Breul 249
- Radway, Laurence I. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Uniforms and Mufti: What Place in Policy? part of symposium 180
- P I & E review of *Maze of Justice* 142
- Ransone, Coleman B., Jr. *The Office of Governor in the United States*, reviewed by Robert C. Wood 349
- Redford, Emmette S. *Ideal and Practice in Public Administration*, reviewed by E. A. B. *Ideal and Practice in Public Administration*, quotation from 123
- REFORM. See Administrative Reform.
- Reining, Henry, Jr. Society Perspectives: Interchange, Transfers and ASPA 371
- REORGANIZATION. Hammond, Paul Y. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Effects of Structure on Policy, part of symposium 175
- Mosher, Frederick C. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Old Concepts and New Problems, part of symposium 169
- Radway, Laurence I. Decision-Making in Defense: The Role of Organization—Uniforms and Mufti: What Place in Policy? part of symposium 180
- RESEARCH, ADMINISTRATION OF. Mainzer, Lewis C. Science Democratized: Advisory Committees on Research 314
- Organizing and Administering Scientific Programs (DIPA) 353
- Recruitment and Organization of Scientific Work in Government (DIPA) ... 68
- RESEARCH IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. ASPA Research Committee Answers Primary Questions (DIPA) 160
- Evaluation of Executive Development Program's Effect on Decision-Making (DIPA) 161
- Major Research Plans (DIPA) 265
- Miles, Rufus E., Jr. The Orientation of Presidential Appointees: A Continuing Challenge 106
- The Perils of Popularity, book review by Robert C. Wood 349
- Research in Progress (DIPA) 85, 160
- RESPONSIBILITY. Democracy and Rights in Administering Assistance, book review by Allan R. Richards 245
- Key, V. O., Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, quotation from 132
- P I & E review (of *Ideal and Practice in Public Administration*) by E. A. B. ... 144
- A Reply to Richards, book review by Frank R. Breul 249
- Reynolds, Harry W., Jr. Training Middle Management in the Field, part of symposium 291
- Richards, Allan R. Democracy and Rights in Administering Assistance, book review ... 245
- Robson, William A. *Great Cities of the World; Their Government, Politics and Planning*, reviewed by Coleman Woodbury 332
- ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN D. P I & E review (of *The Democratic Roosevelt*) by E. A. B. ... 65
- Sady, Emil. P I & E review of *Other Men's Skies* 143
- Sayre, Wallace S. Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging 102
- The Unhappy Bureaucrats: Views Ironic, Hopeful, Indignant, book review 239
- Self, Peter. *Cities in Flood; The Problems of Urban Growth*, reviewed by Coleman Woodbury 332
- Simon, Herbert A. "The Decision-Making Schema": A Reply, reply to earlier book review 60

- SOCIAL SCIENCES.** Social Science and Government (DIPA) 259
- SPECIALIST.** See Generalist vs. Specialist.
- STAFF AND LINE.** Hobbs, Edward H. The President and Administration—Eisenhower ... 306
- Stahl, O. Glenn. The Network of Authority 1, ii
- Stahl, O. Glenn. The Network of Authority . 1, ii
- STATE GOVERNMENT.** See Governors.
- STATISTICS.** Mandel, B. J., Mindlin, Albert and Farley, Alice. Work Sampling in a Nationwide Field Organization 201
- Stene, Edwin O. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" 49
- Stover, Carl F. See also McDonald, William T. Changing Patterns in the Philosophy of Management 21
- Swanberg, W. A. *First Blood*, reviewed by E. A. B. 255
- TEACHING.** Adams, John Clarke. On the Teaching of Public Administration Abroad 124
- TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.** Adams, John Clarke. On the Teaching of Public Administration Abroad 124
- Kroeger, Louis J. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" 47
- Parsons, Malcolm B. Reply to Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" 129
- Stene, Edwin O. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" 49
- Zimmerman, Virgil B. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" 43
- THEORY OF ADMINISTRATION.** "The Decision-Making Schema": A Reply, reply to earlier book review, by Herbert A. Simon 60
- Public Administration: Wider Vistas, book review by Hubert Marshall 139
- Sayre, Wallace S. Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging 102
- Stover, Carl F. Changing Patterns in the Philosophy of Management 21
- TRAINING.** See also Executive Development.
- Miles, Rufus E., Jr. The Orientation of Presidential Appointees 1
- Miles, Rufus E., Jr. The Orientation of Presidential Appointees: A Continuing Challenge 106
- Tugwell, Rexford. *The Democratic Roosevelt*, reviewed by E. A. B. 65
- UNIONS.** See Public Service Unions.
- UNIVERSITY-ADMINISTRATOR RELATIONS.** Mailick, Sidney. One University's Role in Executive Development, part of symposium . 275
- Miles, Rufus E., Jr. The Orientation of Presidential Appointees 1
- Miles, Rufus E., Jr. The Orientation of Presidential Appointees: A Continuing Challenge 106
- Van Riper, Paul P. The Senior Civil Service and the Career System 189
- Waldo, Dwight. *Perspectives on Administration*, reviewed by Hubert Marshall 139
- WATER RESOURCES.** P I & E review (of *Law and Contemporary Problems* (Summer, 1957)) by E. A. B. 143
- WELFARE.** See Public Welfare.
- Wengert, Egbert S. Can We Train for "Overseasanship"? book review 136
- White, Leonard D. *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*, quotation from 2, iii
- The Jacksonians*, quotation from 2, iii
- WHITE, LEONARD D. Gaus, John M. Leonard Dupee White 1891-1958 231
- Price, Don K. Leonard D. White: Tribute 2, ii
- Whyte, William H., Jr. *The Organization Man*, reviewed by Wallace S. Sayre 239
- Wood, Robert C. The Perils of Popularity, book review 349
- Woodbury, Coleman. Great Cities, Great Problems, Great Possibilities? book review 332
- Woodruff, Philip. *Call the Next Witness* reviewed by Merrill Goodall 257
- WORK MEASUREMENT.** Mandel, B. J., Mindlin, Albert and Farley, Alice. Work Sampling in a Nationwide Field Organization 201
- Young, John D. The Art of Brain-Picking, book review 133
- Zimmerman, Virgil B. Comments on "Performance Budgeting in the Philippines" .. 43

